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ABSTRACT 
 
Keeping Time in Place: 




In this dissertation, I identify a conspicuous shift in the formal articulation of time and space 
in modernist literature and film of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This “transformation 
of chronotopes,” I argue, has important historical, political, and aesthetic implications that 
have to do with a critical negotiation of our – and art’s – being-in-history in late modernity. 
In case studies on the work of Theo Angelopoulos, Heiner Müller and Alexander Kluge, I 
demonstrate that literary and cinematic time-space articulations function as both formal 
sedimentations of and antagonistic aesthetic responses to a transformed understanding of 
time, space and the historical process in the wake of the world-historical transformations 
around and after 1989 as well as in an age of globalization. All three authors are centrally 
concerned with the precarious status of modernity and futurity today – with the question, 
that is, of what happens to the constitutively modern promise about an “open future” amid a 
wide-spread exhaustion of the historical imagination in European societies, amid hyper-
acceleration in the fields of technology and the economy, and amid manifold processes of 
systemic autonomization that undermine concepts of human praxis and self-determination. 
Interrogating the conditions of possibility for a contemporary political aesthetic – can there 
be a conjunction of art and politics today? – Angelopoulos, Müller and Kluge are informed 
by and draw on different forms of modernist political aesthetics of the early 20th century in 
their engagement with the present and thus also pose the question about the continued 
relevance, the legacy and timeliness of political modernism today. 
! i 







The Transformation of Chronotopes: 




What Does the Auteur Produce? 
Cinematic Form, Historical Time, and  
the Politics of Aesthetic Production  





Empty Time, Historical Aposiop(oi)esis,  
and the Messianic Promise in the  




Democratic Poetics for the 21st Century: 
Globalization, Globality, and the  
Politics of Planetarity in the  





Futurity, Transformation, and the Politics of Poiein     240 
            
  
 





To write a dissertation is to inhabit a chronotope of its own – and perhaps, occasionally, to 
keep time in place a little too long. Many people and different institutions have helped, over 
the years, to make the allmähliche Verfertigung einer Doktorarbeit a wonderful endeavor. 
 I would like to thank my dissertation advisors, Andreas Huyssen and Stathis 
Gourgouris, for their advice, support and guidance, for their faith in this project, and for a 
style of mentoring that is equally constructive and un-patronizing. Their scholarship 
combines sensitivity to form, theoretical brilliance, historical acumen, and an engagement 
with the present in a way that I consider exemplary, and I have been very lucky to benefit so 
directly from their work as teachers and writers. The profound impact they both have had 
on my own thinking is present throughout this dissertation.  
 The other members of my dissertation committee – Devin Fore, Kriss Ravetto-
Biagioli and Oliver Simons – have asked many important questions and given much useful 
advice for carrying this project to the next stage. Much of what I know about modernity and 
time today I first heard about from Harro Müller, whose seminars and books were absolutely 
indispensable for the articulation of this project. Vangelis Calotychos and Karen Van Dyck 
made sure that, at Columbia too, part of my family was Greek. If I had ended up there in the 
first place without Dimitris Papanikolaou is not entirely certain: His teaching and mentorship 
during my undergraduate years at Oxford was one of those eye-opening experiences that 
usually precede – or at the very least enhance – the desire to stay in academia. 
 I am grateful to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia University 
for offering me an International Travel Fellowship to do research in Europe for one 
semester. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) generously supported me with 
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a Long-Term Research Grant that allowed me to work and live in Berlin for a whole 
academic year. Thanks to an Olin Library Grant from the Max Kade Center for 
Contemporary German Literature at Washington University in St. Louis I was able to put 
the finishing touches on the dissertation manuscript while commencing work on future 
projects in the summer of 2015.  
 The Department of Germanic Languages at Columbia University was a home 
department in the best sense of the term. An atmosphere of genuine respect, collegiality and 
– very often – friendship made it a great place to work at. I am particularly glad to have met 
and become friends with the other members of my cohort, Arthur Salvo and Patrick Walsh, 
as well as with Dalia Inbal, Julia Nordmann, Christoph Schaub, Johanna Urzedowski, and – 
at ICLS – Sarah Jean Lazur. If the department was home, then the best place in the house 
was where Bill Dellinger and Peggy Quisenberry were: they run things so well, but first and 
foremost they are lovely.  
 I will look back to this period with even more fondness for the fact that Laure 
Astourian was part of it. 
 Above all, however, I always knew that, back home in Germany, someone was there: 
These could never have been such happy and fulfilling years without the unconditional love 












THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHRONOTOPES 
NOTES ON THE TIMELINESS OF MODERNISM 
____________________________________!
 
       “Krisis” richtete sich gleichsam auf die Zeitnot, die zu 
begreifen, den Sinn des Begriffs ausmachte. 
- Reinhart Koselleck 
 
      Die ungelösten Antagonismen der Realität kehren wieder in den 
Kunstwerken als die immanenten Probleme ihrer Form. 
- Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 
The temporal structure of European societies today is marked by what seems like a paradox: 
Amid a proliferation of globalizing processes and in the wake of the digital revolution, the 
late 20th century witnessed, on the one hand, an unrelenting acceleration of almost all spheres 
of life. Politics and history, on the other hand, seem to have been gripped by forces of 
stagnation, if not outright paralysis. Political praxis of a genuinely transformative kind has 
become all but inconceivable, as scenarios of alternative futures have largely disappeared 
from the historical imagination. The mantra of contemporary political discourse that “there 
is no alternative” very clearly bespeaks this predicament. If modernity’s allure consisted not 
least in the philosophical discovery, during the Age of Enlightenment, of history as a 
universal terrain of action – a playing field on which an open future could be made through 
human agency and self-determination – then this very promise of modernity has become 
deeply precarious. Individual and collective action today often appear to be subjected to 
autonomous systemic processes, whose intricacy and whose pace can no longer be 
controlled by the deliberative mechanisms of a (democratic) politics. There is, arguably, no 
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time for projecting a future. The crisis of our imaginary of modernity, accordingly, is also a 
crisis of our notion of historical time.1 
 How, I ask here, can modernist literature and film from Europe contribute to our 
own understanding and to contemporary theorizations of this historical juncture? To speak 
of modernism’s timeliness, in this context, is at once to engage with the constitutive role of 
temporality in the modernist imagination and to suggest the possibility of modernism’s 
having been eclipsed. It is in this field of tension that my dissertation, Keeping Time in Place: 
Modernism, Political Aesthetics, and the Transformation of Chronotopes in Late Modernity, is situated. 
What I am concerned with, above all, is the nexus of modernist aesthetic practice, historical 
temporalities and the politics of aesthetic production, as well as the viability today of the 
conjunction of aesthetics and politics. The point of departure for my analysis is the 
observation that in the late 20th and early 21st century a conspicuous shift manifests itself in 
the formal articulation of time and space in the work of prominent modernist authors and 
filmmakers of this period. This “transformation of chronotopes,” I argue, carries important 
historical, political and aesthetic implications that have to do, ultimately, with a critical 
negotiation of our – and art’s – being-in-history in late modernity. 
 
CHRONOTOPE AND ZEITRAUM: ARTICULATIONS OF TIME AND SPACE  
 
Since the terms of analysis I offer in the title of this study are not entirely self-evident, I will 
in the following explicate in some more detail the conceptual framework and structure of my 
dissertation. Each of the case studies I present here departs from close reading and formal 
analysis. My emphasis thereby is on the formal articulation of time and space in fiction, 
poetry and film.2 The notion of a “chronotope,” of course, which I use here to designate this 
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kind of time-space articulation, points to the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who first introduced 
the term in 1938 in his influential essay “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the 
Novel: Notes toward a Historical Poetics.” “We will give the name chronotope (literally, ‘time 
space’),” Bakhtin writes, “to the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships 
that are artistically expressed in literature.”  
  In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused  
  into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens,  
  takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged  
  and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history. This intersection  
  of axes and fusion of indicators characterizes the artistic chronotope. (84)3 
It is in this very general sense, rather than in its specifically Bakhtinian application, that I use 
the concept of chronotopes here.4 What is crucial, however, to my argument is not simply 
the intrinsic connection between time and space – neatly captured, too, in the idiomatic 
German phrase of a Zeitraum5 – but above all the constitutive relationship between 
spatiotemporal imaginaries on the one hand and a thinking of history on the other. To speak 
about the conjunction of time and space is to speak about our being-in-history, to 
interrogate the framework within which human praxis – from both a systemic and a 
handlungstheoretische vantage point – actualizes itself. Reinhart Koselleck has argued that 
“Raum so gut wie Zeit gehören, kategorial gesprochen, zu den Bedingungen möglicher 
Geschichte” (Zeitschichten 82) and has suggested, indeed, that “[das] schöne deutsche Wort 
des Zeitraumes […] böte die Möglichkeit, die gegenseitige Verwiesenheit von Zeit und 
Raum in ihren jeweiligen geschichtlichen Artikulationen zu untersuchen” (90). It is precisely 
this suggestion that I follow here through my analysis of a transformation of chronotopes: If 
time and space, in Andreas Huyssen’s words, “[as] fundamentally contingent categories of 
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historically rooted perception […] are always bound up with each other in complex ways” 
(Present Pasts 12), then a shift in the cultural articulation of these fundamental parameters of 
historical experience will also affect the very concept of history itself, as the condition of 
possibility for human agency and self-determination. It is with one such instance of an 
epochal historical transformation that I am concerned with here.   
 
FORMS OF HISTORICAL TIME: (LATE) MODERNITY AND MODERNISM  
 
I have chosen “late modernity” as a denominator for the temporal delimitation of my 
project. This term, I believe, is conceptually more flexible and precise at once, and captures 
more adequately the stakes of my analysis than would other plausible options such as “in the 
late 20th and early 21st century,” “around and after 1989,” or “in the age of globalization.” In 
terms of a broader temporal categorization, the late 20th and early 21st centuries do coincide 
with the time in which the works I discuss here were produced, but as a name for a period 
they bear little descriptive, let alone analytic, value: When, for instance, does the late 20th 
century begin? In 1989, in the early 1980s, in 1977, in 1968 or 1945? What are its constitutive 
features? And can we already say anything historically precise about the 21st century, other 
than that it is the contemporary historical moment we inhabit? Around and after 1989, in 
this sense, is a more convincing label: Without being excessively rigid, it circumscribes a 
more succinctly delineated timeframe, and in its emphasis on the epochal date of 1989 
clearly points to the world-historical transformations and the momentous shifts in historical 
thinking that are of central importance to my own project. 1989 constituted the spectacular 
climax of a process that culminated in the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of European 
state socialism, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, and it was 
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at the core of a proliferation of discourses about “posts” and ends – of politics, of utopia, of 
history as such. What the term fails to account for, however, is on the one hand a sense of 
the broader conceptual genealogy of the manifold instances of historical crisis in this period, 
and on the other, importantly, the concomitant emergence of a new kind of master narrative 
in the course of the 1990s, namely that of globalization.6 To speak of an age of globalization 
would mean to take into account not only the new geopolitical constellations of a post-Cold 
War era but also the fact that the profound social-historical transformations attendant to this 
new world order were partly spurred by radical developments in sectors such as technology 
or economics. No analysis of a transformation – and crisis – of historical time in our 
contemporary situation would be complete without a consideration of the digital revolution, 
finance capitalism, or forms of neoliberal hegemony today. Though these issues are crucial 
especially to my argument in the third chapter of this dissertation, to place exclusive 
emphasis on the question of globalization as a conceptual framework for this study would 
nevertheless have been something of a stretch. By simply positing an “age of globalization,” 
in addition, one risks to leave unaccounted for the profoundly ambivalent effects of a 
process that has not only furthered trajectories of worldwide integration and connection but 
also produced unprecedented forms of inequality and disenfranchisement. Lastly, and 
crucially, a focus on globalization would also have unduly steered the project towards the 
discursive prevalence of space that the very imperative implicit in the title of my dissertation – 
keeping time in place – counteracts.7  
 If “the late 20th and early 21st century,” “around and after 1989,” and “the age of 
globalization” are ultimately too reductive, the notion “late modernity” both comprises their 
whole range of meaning and exceeds the limitations of each. What I mean to convey by the 
term is the becoming-precarious of an entire paradigm of historical thought: It is modernity 
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itself – “as a form of historical time” (Osborne ix) – that comes under duress in Europe in 
the course of the late 20th century through the confluence of deeply transformative historical, 
political, social, technological and economic processes on a global scale. The attribute late, 
accordingly, has both a descriptive and a normative dimension. It describes a trajectory that 
leads to a moment of crisis – and potentially the exhaustion – of the history of modernity, 
but it does so from within the purview and the conceptual parameters of modernity itself: as 
a project, ultimately, that would be worth salvaging. 
 
In a certain sense, the concept of modernity can itself be conceived of as a chronotope. 
Modernity, “as a world-historical project” (Osborne 21), is predicated on “a totalizing 
temporalization of history” (x), on a view of history as a “raum-[zeitliche] Totalität” 
(Koselleck, “Geschichtsbegriff” 690). Above all, the advent of modernity effectuated a 
radically new conception of time. In Koselleck’s influential argument, it was only with the 
begriffsgeschichtliche consolidation of the notion of history into a collective singular in the 
course of the 18th century that the concept of a genuinely historical time could arise: “Damit 
wurde eine neue Erfahrungswelt erschlossen, eben die der Geschichte. Ein sicheres Indiz 
dafür sind die Umschreibungen ‘Geschichte an und für sich’, ‘Geschichte an sich’, 
‘Geschichte selbst’ oder ‘Geschichte überhaupt’” (“Geschichtsbegriff” 649).8 “Was den 
neuen Begriff einer ‘Geschichte überhaupt’ auszeichnete, war […] die Freilegung einer nur 
der Geschichte eigentümlichen Zeit” (651). Simultaneously, the concomitant emergence of 
notions such as “world history” and the reflective discipline of the philosophy of history 
brought into being a conceptual space in which humanity, for the first time, was treated “als 
das präsumtive Subjekt seiner eigenen Geschichte in dieser Welt” (688). The collective 
singular of history thus became “eine Art transzendentaler Kategorie, die auf die Bedingung 
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der Möglichkeit von Geschichten zielte” (657). History, Koselleck argued, “war als 
transzendentale Kategorie immer auch handlungsbezogen. Nicht nur die Entdeckung der 
‘Geschichte’, besonders die Freilegung einer machbaren Geschichte gehört zur Signatur der 
aufbrechenden bürgerlichen Welt” (713). At the core of this process, crucially, was a form of 
radical temporalization: The rupture in what Koselleck called the relationship between 
Erfahrungsraum and Erwartungshorizont produced a differential space between past and future 
that was tantamount to a fundamental historical opening. “Die Differenz zwischen allen 
bisherigen Geschichten und der Geschichte der Zukunft wurde zu einem Prozeß 
verzeitlicht, in den handelnd einzugreifen menschliche Pflicht sei. […] [Die] Zeit [hatte] eine 
geschichtlich-dynamische Qualität gewonnen […]” (676), history become “verfügbar” and 
“machbar” (Vergangene Zukunft 264).9 An unprecedented “Handlungsraum” 
(“Geschichtsbegriff” 676) thus came into being during the Age of Enlightenment, and along 
with it what I will call here the constitutive promise of modernity: that history can be made 
and an open future be shaped through transformative human praxis. 
 This is, of course, a profoundly European conception of modernity’s chronotopic 
parameters. But it is precisely this question of agency and the future that emerges as the 
central problematic for the authors whose work I analyze here. Not surprisingly, their 
investment in a form of historical thought and in a notion of modernity they almost 
axiomatically embrace has its limitations: aporetic moments and conceptual impasses, as I 
will demonstrate in the course of this dissertation, are part and parcel of the artistic projects 
discussed here. More interestingly, however, what manifests itself in such work is also an 
attempt at reframing the promise of modernity for a new era, at interrogating anew the idea 
of the future – of our transformative being-in-history – under the changed social, historical 
and political conditions of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. As an analytic category, 
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modernity – in precisely its totalizing ambition – has proven remarkably versatile in engaging 
a contemporary social-historical formation that is conceived of as global. Modernity’s large 
canvas may just be a suitable medium for rendering intelligible the collective experience of 
life under the condition of globality. This is at the heart of the somewhat unexpected 
comeback of the conjunction “modernism/modernity” in recent academic discussion.10 And 
so, in disciplinary terms, my study is not a regressive return to an obsolete European 
modernism that posits itself as modernism tout court, but one particular example of a larger 
field of inquiry perhaps most easily subsumed under the label of global modernism studies. 
What happens to the classical European paradigms of modernism and modernity – and what 
bearing they may still have on contemporary realities – amid alternative modernities, a 
provincialized Europe, and a widely expanded understanding of modernism today, is one of 
the important subtexts especially of the third chapter of this dissertation.11 
 
The works I analyze here, then, can be read as negotiations of a crisis of a specifically 
modern, and European, sense of futurity12. This Zeitkrise, as I have hinted above, unfolds 
over a number of decades and is fuelled by a large variety of factors in different domains of 
human and systemic activity, from political history and economics to the environment and 
technology. Though these will be accentuated differently and discussed in their specific 
manifestations in the case studies I offer in this dissertation, it is worth mentioning here as a 
very general horizon the progressive exhaustion of revolutionary energies after 1968; the 
concomitant crises of industrial capitalism and the model of the European welfare state in 
the 1970s; the historical impasse of 1977, amid a series of oil and energy crises, domestic 
terrorism, and Punk’s programmatic statement that there is “No Future;” Thatcherism, 
Reaganism, and the radical neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, leading to forms of systemic 
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autonomization that further increased as a result of the far-reaching financial deregulation of 
the 1990s; the world-historical transformations, of course, of the period around 1989; 
environmental degradation and the threat of the catastrophe of the planet’s ecosystems; and, 
finally, the digital revolution and the seemingly all-immersive process of globalization, which 
have been producing forms of world-wide cultural and systemic uniformity on an 
unprecedented scale particularly from the 1990s onwards. 
 What all these elements have in common is their crucial role in what Andreas 
Huyssen has called, in a slightly different context, “a significant entropy of our sense of 
future possibilities” (Present Pasts 25). More fundamentally, they also constitute a radical 
challenge to the very historical paradigm of modernity itself. The proliferation of discourses 
in recent times about ends and endings, about the exhaustion of the future and the atrophy 
of historical time, is symptomatic of this process. Most notoriously, of course, Francis 
Fukuyama pronounced “the end of history” in the wake of 1989, though he did so in a 
distinctly celebratory key.13 Franco Berardi, in a recent book paradigmatically titled After the 
Future, asks, “What happens to political thought, practice, and imagination when it loses hold 
on ‘the future’?” His answer: “It goes into crisis” (3). For Berardi, the future “is a modality 
of projection and imagination, a feature of expectation and attention, and its modalities and 
features change […]. We don’t believe in the future in the same way,” he argues. “Of course, 
we know that a time after the present is going to come, but we don’t expect that it will fulfill 
the promises of the present” (24f.). Evoking one of the “reassuring qualities” of the “future 
of the moderns” – the fact “that it could be transformed by human will” (51) – Berardi 
states that the “future has escaped the grasp of political technique and everything has 
capsized, perhaps because of speed” (52). The future, indeed, “becomes a threat when the 
collective imagination becomes incapable of seeing alternatives” (59). 
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 Berardi’s reference to the role of speed is important. The manifold processes of 
acceleration in the contemporary world, in combination with the logic of spatial 
absolutization inherent in the trajectory of globalization, have produced a worldwide 
temporal regime of radical instantaneity in which the differential parameters of historical 
time, and especially the notion of a different historical – and not simply innovatively 
technological – future, have been shrunk to the point of disappearance. Discursively, this 
manifests itself in various guises, from Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s impossibly “breite 
Gegenwart” or Hermann Lübbe and Hartmut Rosa’s only seemingly antithetic 
“Gegenwartsschrumpfung” to Paul Virilio’s “instantaneity without history,” Jonathan 
Crary’s “24/7,” and Fredric Jameson’s “wholesale liquidation of futurity.”14 Gumbrecht 
defines historical time as “jener Ort, wo das Subjekt […] aus den von der Zukunft 
gebotenen Möglichkeiten auswählte” (Breite Gegenwart 15). “Wir leben nicht mehr in der 
historischen Zeit,” he concludes. “Das ist wohl, erstens, am deutlichsten im Hinblick auf die 
Zukunft. Sie ist für uns kein offener Horizont von Möglichkeiten mehr, sondern eine 
Dimension, die sich zunehmend allen Prognosen verschließt und die zugleich als Bedrohung 
auf uns zuzukommen scheint” (16).15 Rosa speaks of a “Gegenwartsschrumpfung infolge einer 
zunehmenden sozialen und kulturellen ‘Veraltensgeschwindigkeit’ bzw. einer wachsenden 
soziokulturellen ‘Innovationsverdichtung’” and quotes Lübbe’s use of the term as a 
“Vorgang der Verkürzung der Extension der Zeiträume, für die wir mit einiger Konstanz 
unserer Lebensverhältnisse rechnen können” (Beschleunigung 132). Virilio diagnoses the 
transition “from the extensive time of history to the intensive time of an instantaneity without history made 
possible by the technologies of the hour […] [that] are all moving towards the same 
restriction or contraction of time.” “If time is history,” he states, “speed is only a 
perspectival hallucination that is the ruin of all territory, of all chronology” (Polar Inertia 49f.). 
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“What is new,” Crary contends, “is the sweeping abandonment of the pretense that time is 
coupled to any long-term undertakings, even to fantasies of ‘progress’ or development. An 
illuminated 24/7 world without shadows is the final capitalist mirage of post-history, of an 
exorcism of the otherness that is the motor of historical change” (24/7 9). As a result, “the 
accelerated tempo of apparent change deletes any sense of an extended time frame that is 
shared collectively, which might sustain even a nebulous anticipation of a future distinct 
from contemporary reality” (41). Jameson detects in this “a suppression of history and even 
[…] of time and temporality itself” (“End of Temporality 701), “a dramatic and alarming 
shrinkage of existential time and the reduction to a present that hardly qualifies as such any 
longer, given the virtual effacement of that past and future that can alone define a present in 
the first place” (708).  
 Importantly, in all of these arguments it is no longer a kind of pre-modern inertia 
that prevents the opening of an historical horizon towards the future but a late modern form 
of systemic hyper-acceleration that simply leaves too little time for the voluntary production 
of an alternative future. Krise indeed is Zeitnot here.16 This predicament finds perhaps its most 
brilliant expression in Paul Virilio’s term of an inertie polaire or – in its even more compelling 
German variant – a rasender Stillstand, the paradoxical enmeshment of social-technological 
acceleration and historical stasis.17 
 This phenomenon also lends further credence to the notion of late modernity. Rosa, 
in his wide-ranging study Beschleunigung: Die Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne, has 
offered a reconceptualization of the theory of modernity through the prism of acceleration. 
For Rosa, it was a first wave of acceleration in “classical” modernity that brought about the 
constitutive rupture between Erfahrungsraum and Erwartungshorizont and thus the notion of an 
open future that can be made and shaped through self-determined human agency.18 In late 
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modernity, however, this logic of acceleration steadily intensifies and in the process becomes 
increasingly self-contained, thus going out of sync with the pace of human life-worlds. 
“Beschleunigung in der Moderne [wird] zu einem sich selbst antreibenden Prozess” (243). Acceleration, 
indeed, “hat sich […] verselbstständigt” (328). This moment constitutes a tipping point 
within the accelerating movement of modernity. The term late modernity, accordingly, 
signals, “dass das Neue sich nicht außerhalb des gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungsrahmens der 
Moderne bewegt, sondern nur eine Phase oder Entwicklungsstufe innerhalb des 
gesellschaftlichen Paradigmas der Moderne anzeigt” (335). 
  Die […] These lautet, dass die entwickelten Gesellschaften westlichen Typs  
  in den letzten Jahrzehnten einen neuerlichen Beschleunigungsschub erfahren  
  haben, der das ihnen zugrunde liegende Raum-Zeit-Regime noch einmal  
  transformierte und jene Gesellschaften damit einen für die individuellen wie  
  die kollektiven Selbstverhältnisse kritischen Umschlagpunkt erreichen ließ. 
   Der postulierte Beschleunigungsschub entwickelt seine   
  ökonomischen, informationstechnologischen und kulturellen Triebkräfte  
  spätestens seit den 1970er-Jahren, doch gewinnt er seine raumgreifende  
  Durchschlagskraft vor allem aus dem Zusammentreffen dreier historischer  
  Entwicklungen um 1989: Sowohl die politische Revolution jenes Jahres […] als  
  auch die insbesondere durch die Etablierung des Internet […] forcierte  
  digitale Revolution, die sich kurz danach zu einer mobilen Revolution erweiterte,  
  indem sie […] ortsungebundene Erreichbarkeit ermöglichte, und schließlich  
  die ökonomische Revolution der flexiblen Akkumulation bzw. der   
  postfordistischen […] Produktion des “Turbo-Kapitalismus” lassen sich im  
  Kern als Beschleunigungsbewegungen verstehen. (335f.) 
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These developments, Rosa argues, in turn lead to a tipping point in the functional 
differentiation of modern societies at which what manifests itself is an 
“[akzelerationsbedingte] Desynchronisation der Funktionssphären” (227). This de-synchronization, 
in consequence, renders deeply precarious the “zwei fundamentalen […] Annahmen über die 
Zeitstrukturen der Gesellschaft” that animate the project of modernity, namely that society is 
“ein in der Zeit politisch zu gestaltendes Projekt” (391) and that the temporal parameters and 
capabilites of human agency are “mit dem Gang der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung im 
Wesentlichen synchronisiert” (392). Diagnosing a “politischen Selbststeuerungsverlust der 
spätmodernen Gesellschaft als Folge einer ebensolchen Desynchronisation zwischen 
gesellschaftlichen Teilsystemen” (308) – “[dies] gilt insbesondere für demokratische 
Steuerungsansprüche” (326)19 – Rosa concludes: “Die Schwierigkeit, für das damit umrissene 
temporale Dilemma eine […] Lösung auch nur zu denken, erweckt indessen den Verdacht, 
dass das politische Projekt der Moderne sich als letztlich inkompatibel mit sozialen 
Bedingungen [der Beschleunigung] erweisen könnte […]” (396).  
 
The key question of my dissertation is how this becoming-precarious of the promise of 
modernity is negotiated in modernist literature and film of the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries. Modernism is umbilically bound to modernity, both as one of its cultural 
expressions and as its immanent critique. Modernism’s emergence, indeed, in the mid- to late 
19th century is inextricably linked to an instance of large-scale transformation in the history 
of modernity that is closely analogous to the moment of crisis I have outlined above.20 The 
spectacular technological advances of the era – most emblematically the railway, but also the 
telephone and telegraph, the automobile and the airplane, x-ray and the cinema21 – brought 
about a first wave of radical acceleration that constituted a profound challenge to forms of 
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human perception, individual subjectivity and human self-determination. The dramatic 
dynamization of almost all spheres of life created a sense, in Marshall Berman’s borrowing 
from Marx, that “all that is solid melts into air.”22 Such processes of acceleration, in 
conjunction with the drastic expansion of global networks of circulation, trade and mobility 
– crucial to this was the introduction of a worldwide standard time – were at the heart of 
what David Harvey has famously called a “time-space compression” at the core of 
modernity.23 It is in this context that what is today called “classical” modernism as a cultural 
response emerged. The question of time, accordingly, is constitutive for the modernist 
imagination from its very inception and pervades the entire canon of classical modernism. It 
suffices here to mention a very narrow list of names and movements that includes Baudelaire 
and Benjamin, Proust and Rilke, Döblin, Eliot and Faulkner, jazz, futurism and cubism, as 
well as Eisenstein and Vertov.  
 A field of tension manifests itself in the work of all of these authors and artists 
between the pressures of the social and historical times of accelerated modernity on the one 
hand and human and autonomously aesthetic measures of time on the other. My own study, in 
this sense, represents an analysis of the historical tail end – or rather: the continuation in late 
modernity – of this constitutively modernist negotiation of temporality. What I am 
concerned with is modernist art, in Adorno’s terms, in its “Doppelcharakter […] als 
autonom und als fait social” (Ästhetische Theorie 16). The forms of time I will analyze here 
under the rubric of a “transformation of chronotopes” are simultaneously sedimentations of 
social and historical shifts in the conceptualization of time, space and the historical process 
in late modernity and aesthetic – and often antagonistic – responses to the latter. 
 Modernism, of course, denotes a vast terrain of cultural practices and is 
extraordinarily heterogeneous in its forms and expressions, not to speak of its political 
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determinations. If I nevertheless speak in explicit terms of modernism in the title of my 
dissertation, I mean to convey three things: Firstly, an inventory of certain forms and 
techniques: modernism, that is, as a poetics. Secondly, a specific historical-philosophical 
horizon for the theorization of our, and art’s, transformative being-in-the-world: modernism, 
that is, as a politics. And thirdly – this aspect brings together the first two – a particular 
tradition or lineage of modernism to which all three of the authors whose work I will discuss 
here belong: modernism, that is, as a legacy. 
 The forms I refer to emerged out of modernism’s original encounter with the 
experience of time. What Baudelaire and his successors tried to achieve through their poetics 
was, in a self-consciously aesthetic way, both to convey the experience of and to run counter 
to the frantic rhythms and perceptual challenges of accelerated modernity. This was at the 
heart of the multiple phenomena of narrative and poetic fragmentation, simultaneity, 
juxtaposition, de-stabilization, and (re-)construction.24 Key among these, of course, was the 
technique of montage. But one should not forget that modernism embraced not only the 
small form, speed, and parataxis, but also the epic scale, slow pace, and the long sentence. 
The un-cut plan-séquence for instance, as I will demonstrate in this study, is as propitious to 
novel ways of articulating time and space as is the rapidly cut montage, and both continue to 
be part of a quintessentially modernist grammar of time in late modernity.  
 In its historical-philosophical horizon, modernism is predicated on what I have 
described above as the chronotopic parameters of the normative project of modernity itself. 
Modernity and modernism, Peter Osborne has argued,  
  are categories of historical consciousness which are constructed at the level  
  of the apprehension of history as a whole. More specifically, they are   
  categories of historical totalization in the medium of cultural experience. As  
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  such, [they involve] a distinct form of historical temporalization – a   
  distinctive way of temporalizing “history” […]. Associated with such   
  temporalizations are both particular historical epistemologies […] and  
  particular orientations towards practice, particular politics of time. (ix) 
Whatever its levels of formal fragmentation and its ultimate eschewal, frequently, of unity 
and completeness, it is against a totalizing view of history as such – of humanity’s existence in 
time and space – that the lived reality of the present is, positively or negatively, measured in 
modernist art. It is in its very effort to grasp conceptually, and represent aesthetically, an 
historical experience in its totality, indeed, that modernism often arrives at a poetics of 
fragmentation.25 Simultaneously, modernism’s investment in concepts like novelty, 
innovation, self-interrogation and experimentation bring it into lockstep, ostensibly, with 
modernity’s propulsive thrust towards “permanent transition” (Osborne 14).26 One of the 
key questions I am asking here is what happens to modernism and the cultural forms it 
produces when permanent transition has morphed into rasender Stillstand, when novelty and 
innovation have become de-synchronized, in Rosa’s term, from open futures, human self-
determination and autonomy. To what extent, that is, can modernism in late modernity 
continue to exercise its role, in Osborne’s words, as an “[intervention] in the field of the 
politics of time” (ix)? 
 
ART AS TRANSFORMATION: POLITICAL AESTHETICS  
 
This brings me to the question of political aesthetics and to the legacy of a particular form of 
modernism to which all three authors whose work I will discuss here belong. The main part 
of my dissertation consists of extensive case studies of the work of the filmmaker Theo 
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Angelopoulos, the dramatist and poet Heiner Müller, and the writer, director and social 
theorist Alexander Kluge. Near-contemporaries, Müller (b. 1929), Kluge (b. 1932) and 
Angelopoulos (b. 1935) all rose to prominence during a phase of revolutionary optimism in 
the arts between the late 1950s and the early 1970s: Müller in the newly constituted GDR, 
with its foundational myth of anti-fascism and socialist transformation; Kluge in the Federal 
Republic, amid the period now identified with the annus mirabilis of 1968; Angelopoulos in a 
newly post-dictatorial Greece. All three, thereby, explicitly situated their work within the 
parameters of a Western Marxist, modernist, and – at least initially – avowedly Brechtian 
aesthetic: Müller wrote a series of Produktionsstücke; Kluge developed a theory of realism in 
dialogue with the writings of Brecht; Angelopoulos adapted epic theater for the screen. 
 More important than the specific forms of Brechtianism, however, was a more 
general historical-philosophical horizon for the making of art. What all three authors shared 
in their early work was an emphatic conception of artistic production, in which what came 
together were the axiomatic features of Marxism and modernism alike: human labor and 
aesthetic innovation. Art was not merely fully embedded in the untranscendable horizon of 
Marx’s eine einzige Wissenschaft, history,27 but played itself a generative and transformative role 
in the historical process. For Marx, art had constituted one of the “besondre Weisen der 
Produktion und [fiel] unter ihr allgemeines Gesetz” (quoted in Zill 67). The artist, 
accordingly, as one “Organ des Gesamtarbeiters,” became a prime instance of what Brecht 
would later call “der veränderliche und verändernde Mensch” (70). 
 The notions of art’s transformative character and of the inextricable position of art 
in the historical relations of production at large are the hallmark of the specific lineage of 
modernism that one could, for lack of a better term, label Marxist modernism.28 What 
manifests itself here is a particular variant of the avant-gardist dream of dissolving the 
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antinomy between poiesis and praxis, of turning art into politics.29 It is precisely this kind of 
conjunction that the term political aesthetics gestures towards. In the context of the 
functional differentiation of modern societies, importantly, this implies a subtle poise 
between art’s relative autonomy and its capacity to operate in transformative fashion in other 
functional spheres.30 Rosa’s argument about a functional de-synchronization brought about 
by the accelerating temporal logic of modernity, accordingly, not only renders precarious the 
notion of human self-determination as such but also poses a dramatic challenge to the 
concept of a political aesthetic. This process is potentially exacerbated by what Jürgen 
Habermas has called a “Veralten des Produktionsparadigmas” (Diskurs der Moderne 95) itself: 
late modernity’s propensity, that is, for post-Fordist production and forms of immaterial 
labor.31 Rüdiger Zill, in his comprehensive essay on the conjunction of “Produktion/Poiesis” 
has argued that one can “den Niedergang dieses Begriffs [der Produktion] allgemein als 
Symptom einer Gesellschaft, ‘der die Arbeit ausgeht’, betrachten” (40).  
 
It is at this stage that literary and cinematic form, historical time, and the politics of aesthetic 
production converge. If modernity, as I have argued above, denotes a specific regime of 
humanity’s being-in-history, then modernism, in analogy, negotiates a historically determined 
way of art’s being-in-history. That a transformation of chronotopes occurs more or less 
simultaneously within the very work of Angelopoulos, Müller, and Kluge points to a dramatic 
reconfiguration of the nexus of modernist aesthetic practice, the historical-philosophical 
horizon of modernity, and the position of art within society at large. The question that unites 
all three authors is not simply how to represent – in fiction, poetry, and film – the 
transformed historical terrain of late modernity. What is at stake, above all, is the 
problematic of how to re-conceive of the critical, and indeed transformative, function of art 
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at a moment when the entwined concepts of modernity, modernism and an open future 
have reached a point of crisis.32 It is with the conditions of possibility for a modernist 
political aesthetic in late modernity, ultimately, that Angelopoulos, Müller and Kluge are 
concerned. That the models they propose, as I will demonstrate here, are widely divergent 
and lead in utterly different directions also testifies to the internal heterogeneity of the 
tradition of a political modernism whose legacy they try to preserve. The timeliness of 
modernism, for Angelopoulos, Müller and Kluge, has to be sought in very different places. A 
study of the transformation of chronotopes, accordingly, can serve as the point of 
crystallization for this quest. 
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE  
 
My choice of authors in this dissertation, then, is not determined by the relationship between 
any particular national contexts but by the overarching fact that I consider them 
paradigmatic figures for how European modernism at large negotiates the challenges of late 
modernity in a variety of artistic forms. Angelopoulos, Müller and Kluge, I contend, 
represent a wide, if not the full, spectrum of possible responses to the problematic of a 
political aesthetic that can be articulated from within late 20th and early 21st century 
European modernism itself. That the national parameters of their work, by the period 
around and after 1989, become significantly less important – as both manifest content and as 
an analytic framework – is thereby symptomatic, as I will demonstrate here, of the very 
movement of convergence that is built into the trajectory of globalization.  
 Though my dissertation interrogates a larger social, historical and political 
problematic, it is firmly grounded in close reading and formal analysis, and predicated on a 
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belief in art’s “intrinsically theoretical aptitude”33 for rendering intelligible the historical 
moment we live in. Adorno’s dictum, indeed, that the unresolved antagonisms of reality 
return in works of art as immanent problems of form could be considered the 
methodological principle that guides my analysis throughout.34 Each chapter revolves around 
three axes, which can be identified with the three temporal dimensions of past, present and 
future: My notion of a transformation of chronotopes in literature and film will bring into 
view, kaleidoscopically, these works constitutive relationship to the historical juncture from 
which they emerge, to the specific tradition of a modernist political aesthetic they invoke, 
and to the particular models of futurity they engender. To underscore my argument about 
the aesthetically immanent capacity of art to theorize our historical moment, in each chapter 
I will also bring Angelopoulos, Müller and Kluge’s works into dialogue with 
contemporaneous theorizations of this moment in the field of political philosophy. 
 Chapter 1, “What Does the Auteur Produce? Cinematic Form, Historical Time, and 
the Politics of Aesthetic Production in the Films of Theo Angelopoulos,” examines a shift in 
the formal construction of the sequence shot or plan-séquence, the key element in 
Angelopoulos’s cinematic language. What characterizes the director’s use of the technique is 
that he often brings together different layers of time in one and the same shot. While in his 
early work, however, Angelopoulos articulates different historical periods as part of the 
untranscendable horizon of a political-historical Jetztzeit – the cinematic apparatus itself is 
firmly embedded in such “now-time” as a material force in the construction of the historical 
process – in later films what shares a common chronotope is the dreary reality of an 
alienating present and a redemptive realm of cinematic imagination that lies beyond history 
and politics. This transformation of chronotopes, accordingly, emerges as the formal 
sedimentation of a shift in Angelopoulos’s conception of aesthetics as such, leading him 
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from a production model associated with Brecht and the Benjamin of “The Author as 
Producer” to a dialectical model of aesthetic autonomy more closely aligned with Adorno. 
Angelopoulos’s work thus not only rehearses a theoretical conflict about political aesthetics 
internal to Marxist modernism itself but also forms part of the question of what would 
constitute a “late style” in general and a “late Marxism” in particular. The filmmaker’s 
progressive historical and political disillusionment, his often nostalgic turn to the past and 
his emphatic disavowal of a future perspective in his latest works, in addition, are crucially 
related not only to what I have called here the becoming-precarious of the historical 
paradigm of modernity but also to the discursive potency of a variety of post-historical 
discourses in the late 20th century. 
 If the key shifts in Angelopoulos’s work occur in the course of the 1980s, my second 
chapter, which also functions as a sort of hinge between the first and third, is concerned 
with the more immediate context of 1989. In “It’s 1989…: Empty Time, Historical 
Aposiop(oi)esis, and the Messianic Promise in the Late Poetry of Heiner Müller,” I analyze 
the complex amalgamation of two different forms of temporality in the poetry Müller wrote 
between this epochal moment and his death in 1995. At once crepuscular and forward-
looking, Müller’s poetry – his only literary output after the Fall of the Berlin Wall – coincides 
not only with the poet’s own terminal illness but also with the massive ambiguities of the 
political horizon and in the historical thinking of the period. This is crucially inflected by 
Müller’s position as a prominent figure in the GDR. While Müller’s work also gestures 
towards the writing-into-being of an ultimate existential and historical silence, it 
simultaneously enacts poetically an historical opening towards an indeterminate “future-to-
come.” As a radical critique of notions of linear historical time and of the entwined concepts 
of progress, accumulation and capitalist growth around 1989, Müller’s poetry proposes a 
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complex form of temporality as the guiding principle for a political aesthetic that has strong 
affinities with Benjamin’s project of a historical-theological messianism. As such, it also is 
part of a historically symptomatic and politically problematic proliferation of messianic 
discourses in the period around 1989, which animate a number of theoretical works of the 
era, including Jacques Derrida’s reading of Marx or the political philosophy of Giorgio 
Agamben. 
 Chapter 3, “Democratic Poetics for the 21st Century: Globalization, Globality, and 
the Politics of Planetarity in the Later Fiction of Alexander Kluge,” is the part of my 
dissertation that engages most explicitly with the question of aesthetics and globalization. In 
this chapter, I examine a vast expansion of the spatiotemporal parameters of Kluge’s 
narrative universe in his fiction since approximately the year 2000. This transformation of 
chronotopes is both a formal manifestation of new regimes of time and space in the era of 
globalization and forms part of an antagonistic epistemological project, which I call a 
“politics of planetarity.” What this project aims at is an alternative way of imagining the 
planet as a terrain for historical praxis, transcending the clearly circumscribed figure of the 
globe and discourses of globality that are predicated, above all, on forms of economic 
interdependence, worldwide systemic integration, and the erasure of differential forms of 
temporality amid the perpetual present and absolutization of space in the digital age. As a 
figure, at once, of articulation and contingency, of strategic alignment and contestation, 
planetarity not least gestures towards a democratic mode of thought that has been developed in 
recent decades in a specifically post-Marxist context under labels such as post-foundational 
political philosophy or radical democracy.35 In addition, Kluge’s re-conceptualization of time 
and space is also related to the emergence of potentially new forms of creative collectivity, 
mass intellectuality, and the work of the imagination in the age of globalization. It thus 
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directly harks back to the notion of a transformative kind of human labor – and to the 
concept of a production aesthetic – that plays a constitutive role in many accounts of a 
modernist political aesthetic. 
 
SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION  
 
With the present study, I aim to contribute to discussions both in and beyond my home 
disciplines of German Studies and Comparative Literature. Interdisciplinary in scope, my 
dissertation is located at the interstices of literature and film, aesthetic theory, the philosophy 
of history of modernity, and political philosophy. Methodologically, it draws on close 
reading and formal analysis and privileges literary and cinematic texts as loci for the 
production of knowledge about the historical moment we inhabit. As a form of immanent 
critique, it is conceived of as a contribution to the materialist analysis of cultural forms. 
 The dissertation can be read on different levels. As the first study to bring together 
the work of Kluge, Müller and Angelopoulos it offers a new perspective on the fiction, 
poetry and cinema of three important modernist artists. In its emphasis on a global 
problematic and on the historical trajectory of political modernism at large, my analysis 
transcends the narrowly national context as well as the author- and auteur-based approaches 
that remain prevalent in critical studies of the work of all three figures. In each chapter, in 
addition, Angelopoulos, Müller and Kluge are studied in artistic and theoretical 
constellations that have hitherto been overlooked or neglected: Angelopoulos and the 
Frankfurt School; Müller’s little-studied late poetry and the political-philosophical 
messianism of the period around and after 1989; Kluge and the thinkers of planetarity, the 
theorists of radical democracy, and the champions of the multitude. 
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 As a contribution to the field of modernist studies, my project envisages the 
conjunction of modernism and modernity from a historical vantage point that lies beyond 
the predominant focus on the crucial periods around 1800, the fin-de-siècle and the early 20th 
century. In turning my attention, in particular, from the much-studied origins and the heyday 
of political modernism in the 1920s and 1930s to the more neglected question of its afterlife 
and legacy today, I am telling a less frequently told chapter in the cultural and intellectual 
history of European artistic production. My emphasis on the notion of late modernity, in 
addition, underscores that my reading and critique of modernity and modernism originates 
from an immanent perspective: from within the normative parameters of the project of 
modernity itself, that is. It is ultimately with the issue of the potential viability and timeliness 
of modernism and the project of modernity today that I am concerned with, and not with 
yet another constatation of their end. 
 The dissertation in general, and the third chapter in particular, also represent a 
contribution to the interdisciplinary field of globalization studies and to a growing body of 
work that examines German and European cultural production in a globalizing context. 
Globalization, in the framework of my analysis, is an intrinsic aspect of the history of 
modernity itself. While the socio-historical and political dimensions of the process are crucial 
to my analysis, thereby, I am eager to avoid succumbing to a frequent tendency in the field 
of literary and cultural globalization studies of reading only thematically, of relegating 
cultural artifacts to the status of mere illustrative material. It is particularly a lack of attention 
to matters of form that my dissertation is directed against. The crucial emphasis I place on 
the question of time, in addition, is meant to serve as a corrective to many accounts of 
globalization that are characterized by an exclusive focus on issues of space, to the detriment 
of considerations of temporality in general and the question of futurity in particular. The 
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latter – futurity as both a political problematic and an intrinsically aesthetic property – will be 
addressed in more detail in the epilogue to this dissertation. Keeping Time in Place, then, is both 
a conceptual requisite for my interpretive approach and a political imperative concerning the 
conditions of possibility for human praxis in the era of globalization. 
 The question of time, indeed, some twenty years after the spatial turn in the 
humanities and social sciences, seems to have been undergoing a kind of revival recently. 
Perhaps one of the clearest indicators of this new interest in the problematic of temporality 
is the founding, in Germany, of a vast network for interdisciplinary inquiry, financed by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) under the title Ästhetische Eigenzeiten. Zeit und 
Darstellung in einer polychronen Moderne. As a Germanist working abroad, I am also in dialogue 
with these developments in the German academic sphere itself. My own project, in fact, 
perfectly coincides with the approach of the DFG network to study the transformation of 
historically contingent temporal structures in their cultural manifestations.36 In this very 
general sense, my dissertation also forms part of the study of historical epistemologies as 
such, of particular, historically determined forms of knowledge about our being in the world. 
More specifically, to speak of Eigenzeiten is both to imply a reflexive relationship between 
social-historical and aesthetic models of time and to posit art’s capacity for generating its 
own autonomous counter-times. It is in this sense too, as I have demonstrated in this 
introduction, that I conceive of a transformation of chronotopes in the work of Kluge, 
Müller and Angelopoulos. I also, however, go one step further and address a question that is 
often not given enough attention in discussions of the relationship between art and society. 
It is not simply aesthetic time as an antagonistic response to a particular social-historical 
formation that I am interested in but also the problematic of how precisely ästhetische 
Eigenzeiten operate – and potentially can become efficacious – beyond the sphere of the 
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aesthetic itself, in a particular social-historical moment. This is the ultimate horizon of the 
concept of a politics of aesthetic production. 
 
In its structure and scope, of course, my study is fundamentally part of and aimed at the 
academic domain. At the very heart of it, however, it also follows a broader impetus, a more 
general desire on my part to engage squarely with our contemporary world. And so 
ultimately, it is also a much wider set of questions that I pose here, through the prism of 
literature and film: What is the nature of modernity in a globalizing world? How can the 
improvement of society and the self-determination of our history be thought today? And 





1 The framework of my analysis – see in more detail below – follows Reinhart Koselleck and Hartmut Rosa 
here. See especially Koselleck, “Geschichtsbegriff,” on the modern conception of history; and Rosa, 
Beschleunigung, on the role and function of acceleration in modernity. 
  
2 Chapter 2 contains a brief discussion of drama, too. 
 
3 Bakhtin specifies that “[this] term [space-time] is employed in mathematics, and was introduced as part of 
Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. The special meaning it has in relativity theory is not important for our 
purposes; we are borrowing it for literary criticism almost as a metaphor (almost, but not entirely). What counts 
for us is the fact that it expresses the inseparability of space and time (time as the fourth dimension of space). 
We understand the chronotope as a formally constitutive category of literature; we will not deal with the 
chronotope in other areas of culture” (Bakhtin 84). 
 
4 Bakhtin’s essay – unlike my own analysis – is primarily concerned with the question of the historical 
parameters of literary genres. 
 
5 My own use of the term chronotope, in fact, could also be seen as an English rendering of the German word 
Zeitraum, which very neatly captures the inseparability of time and space and, as a common idiomatic expression 
in German, is less unwieldy than the artificial compound “time-space.” In its very quotidian character, however, 
Zeitraum is also devoid of the specifically aesthetic dimension of the Bakhtinian concept of a chronotope, which 
therefore constitutes a more adequate term for the description “der kulturellen Modellierung von Zeit-Raum-
Beziehungen” (Gamper and Hühn 47). 
 
6 The temporal origins of the process of globalization, of course, are controversial and – at the very least in 
certain dimensions – clearly predate the 1990s (see Steger; Held et al.), but it was during this period that the 
concept emerged as a powerful narrative for the signification of a new world order. 
 
7 Indeed, the notion of a chronotope could itself be said to privilege the variable of time, with space being a 
dependent factor. Bakhtin already, indicatively, conceived of his essay on the chronotope as one about “forms 
of time” in the novel. In the context of globalization, significantly, Rosa has argued that “Zeitstrukturen 
können sich in einem Maße ändern, in dem dies die Raumstrukturen niemals können. Veränderungen im 
‘Raum-Zeit-Regime’ einer Gesellschaft gehen daher stets von veränderten Temporalstrukturen aus, nicht von 
Veränderungen des Raumes. […] [Der] Wandel der spatiotemporalen Strukturen wird primär durch ihre temporale 
Veränderungsdynamik angetrieben.” For Rosa, for instance, the notion of a compression of space in the wake of the 
invention of the railway is simply a result of the faster bridging of distance (Beschleunigung 61f.). 
 
8 On the begriffsgeschichtliche transformation of die Geschichte into a grammatical singular, see especially 
“Geschichtsbegriff” 647f. Cf. also the French l’histoire and the English notion of history as such. 
 
9 See in more detail Koselleck’s essays in Vergangene Zukunft, “‘Erfahrungsraum’ und ‘Erwartungshorizont’ – 
zwei historische Kategorien” (349-375) and “Über die Verfügbarkeit der Geschichte” (260-277). 
  
10 See especially Huyssen, “Geographies of Modernism.” Huyssen argues that “the discursive return of 
modernity captures something in the dialectics of globalization, whose aporetic mix of destruction and creation, 
so reminiscent of modernity in the classical age of empire, has become ever more palpable in recent years” 
(193). 
 
11 In this context, see, for instance, Gaonkar; Chakrabarty; Appadurai; Friedman; and Mao and Walkowitz. 
 
12 I speak of futurity here in general terms, as the presence or perception of an open future that can be made 
and transformed through human praxis. For a discussion of futurity as an intrinsically literary property, as in 





13 Unlike his book, Fukuyama’s original article on the matter predates the Fall of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989 (see “End of History?” and End of History respectively). For Fukuyama, of course, the historical moment 
around 1989 does not constitute the end of history in the sense of its exhaustion but, indeed, as its fulfillment 
in a Hegelian sense. There is nothing deplorable for him about a lack of future alternatives. In his article, he 
writes: “What we may be witnessing [is] not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period 
of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and 
the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (“End of History?” 
5). 
  
14 See, respectively, Gumbrecht; Rosa, Beschleunigung; Virilio, Polar Inertia; and Jameson, “End of Temporality.” 
!
15 Gumbrecht in this context also speaks of a “[neues] Chronotop” (16). 
 
16 See Koselleck, Begriffsgeschichten 205. 
 
17 See Virilio, Rasender Stillstand. 
 
18 See Rosa, Beschleunigung 27. 
 
19 What Rosa points to here is the “tardiness” of the democratic process, i.e. the slow pace of the deliberative 
mechanisms at the heart of democracy. This problematic, incidentally, can also be seen as a crucial element in a 
partial uncoupling of democracy and capitalism in the course of the later 20th century, both within liberal 
democracies itself and in countries like China, to name just one example typically brought up in this context. 
 
20 The structural affinities between two instances of historical crisis that are approximately a century apart 
reinforces Rosa’s thesis about a continuous development within the trajectory of modernity itself.  
 
21 See Kern 1. 
 
22 See Berman. 
 
23 See especially Harvey 260ff. 
 
24 See also Lunn, chapter 2. 
  
25 This argument could be said to find its point of culmination in Adorno’s readings of the work of Beckett (see 
Noten zur Literatur). 
 
26 In Osborne’s account, the “temporal matrix” of modernity “has three main characteristics: 1. Exclusive 
valorization of the historical (as opposed to the merely chronological) present over the past, […] and as the 
standpoint from which to periodize and understand history as a whole. […] 2. Openness towards an 
indeterminate future characterized only by its transcendence of the historical present and its relegation of this 
present to a future past. 3. A tendential elimination of the historical present itself, as the vanishing point of a 
perpetual transition between a constantly changing past and an as yet indeterminate future […]. Modernity is 
permanent transition” (14). 
 
27 See Koselleck, “Geschichtsbegriff” 690. 
 
28 The term “Marxist modernism” can be said to denote forms of aesthetics that have been articulated in close 
conjunction with the theories and practices of what is now commonly referred to as Western Marxism. This 
lineage of modernist thought includes a wide number of thinkers over a long period of time, ranging – among 
others – from Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci to Raymond Williams and Fredric Jameson. Key figures for 
my own project include Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno. These thinkers’ 
contributions to Marxist and modernist thought, though today subsumed under a common label, are 




be developed today out of a dialogue with early 20th century Western Marxism, as my dissertation will crucially 
show, take extremely divergent forms.  
 
29 If, according to Huyssen, there were “three registers of the utopian imagination in the art and literature of 
the earlier twentieth century: the utopia of sublating art into life, the utopia of radical textuality, the utopia of 
aesthetic transcendence” (Twilight Memories 98), then Marxist modernism was most emphatically aligned with the 
first. 
  
30 See Harro Müller’s assertion that “[gerade] die Verschränkung von Ausdifferenzierungsbewegungen und 
Entdifferenzierungsträumen scheint mir wiederum für die Moderne charakteristisch zu sein” (Giftpfeile 9). 
 
31 In recent political philosophy however, as I will discuss in chapter 3, this very shift to post-Fordist 
production and immaterial labor has also been conceptualized as the very the condition of possibility for a 21st 
century production aesthetic. 
 
32 See especially Duve. 
 
33 See Gourgouris, Does Literature Think? xx. 
 
34 See Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie 16. 
 
35 For the notion of a “post-foundational” political philosophy, see especially Marchart. For a wide-ranging 
discussion of a number of thinkers of “radical democracy,” see both Marchart and Bedorf. 
  
36 See especially the presentation of the DFG research project in book form by Michael Gamper and Helmut 





WHAT DOES THE AUTEUR PRODUCE? 
CINEMATIC FORM, HISTORICAL TIME, AND 
THE POLITICS OF AESTHETIC PRODUCTION 
IN THE FILMS OF THEO ANGELOPOULOS 
__________________________________ 
 
    Also ehe ich frage: wie steht eine Dichtung zu den Produktionsverhältnissen der 
Epoche? möchte ich fragen: wie steht sie in ihnen? 
- Walter Benjamin 
 
 Der Akzent auf dem autonomen Werk jedoch ist selber gesellschaftlich-politischen  
Wesens. Die Verstelltheit wahrer Politik hier und heute, die Erstarrung der  
Verhältnisse, die nirgendwo zu tauen sich anschicken, nötigt den Geist  
dorthin, wo er sich nicht zu encanaillieren braucht. 
- Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 
If Theo Angelopoulos’s Landscape in the Mist is, arguably, one of the high points of late 
cinematic modernism, its final sequence can be considered one of modernist cinema’s most 
emphatically poetic statements. After a long and increasingly disheartening journey through a 
landscape of alienation literally, as well as metaphorically, veiled in mist, Angelopoulos’s 
child protagonists – little Alexandros and his older sister Voula – reach an unspecified 
border zone. In almost utter darkness, they enter a small boat to cross the river to 
“Germany,” the promised land where, they believe, their unknown father resides. Soon, 
however, a searchlight illuminates the screen, circles the boat, and envelops the children. A 
scream is heard, then gunshots, and the screen turns dark again. The sequence, however, 
does not end here: in the final moments of the film, out of the darkness the children emerge 
into light to find themselves in a tranquil landscape surrounding a beautiful tree, which 
Alexandros and Voula run to and embrace. This tree, if only obliquely, had occurred earlier 
in the film after the children’s faithful companion Orestes, amid an urban wasteland, had 
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rescued a discarded strip of film from a heap of garbage. “Can’t you see the tree?” he asks 
Alexandros as the boy, entranced but incredulous, gazes at the negative, unable to discern 
anything at all. 
 What is, ostensibly, the border between life and death for Alexandros and Voula, 
then, is reconfigured at the end of Landscape in the Mist as an altogether different line of 
demarcation: that between a dreary reality on the one hand and a free realm of artistic 
imagination on the other. The tree of life, recuperated on a strip of film, is the most 
poignant appeal in Angelopoulos’s work for the existence of a redemptive sphere of 
cinematic imagination and, indeed, of an autonomous domain of aesthetic production. The 
tree, by this token, also marks a climactic moment in the evolution of the filmmaker’s oeuvre 
itself. The high seriousness of Landscape in the Mist and its earnest espousal of a modernist 
autonomy aesthetic in 1988, in the heyday of postmodernist playfulness, are remarkable in 
themselves. Perhaps even more noteworthy, however, is the fact that Angelopoulos was 
catapulted to the first rank of European filmmakers less than fifteen years before with The 
Travelling Players, a film as notable for its Marxist politics and historical materialism as it was 
for its avant-garde aesthetics. What is at stake here is not only the question about the 
timeliness of cinematic modernism at this specific historical moment but also the very issue of 
what kind of modernism – as a poetics, a politics, and legacy – we are dealing with here in 
the first place. 
 
This chapter is concerned with the nexus of cinematic form, historical temporalities, and the 
politics of aesthetic production. I will read a shift in the formal articulation of time and space 
– a transformation of chronotopes – in Angelopoulos’s work as the formal sedimentation of 
a historically situated modification of spatio-temporal imaginaries in late modernity. The way 
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time and space, and thus our – and art’s – being-in-history, are imagined at this historical 
juncture, in turn, has profound implications for how the role of aesthetic production within 
society and history at large can be conceived of. My notion of a transformation of 
chronotopes accordingly serves as the point of convergence for a discussion of modernist 
aesthetic practice, the historical-philosophical predicament of late modernity, and the 
question of aesthetic autonomy and heteronomy. 
 
THE SEQUENCE SHOT AS CHRONOTOPE 
 
Whether or not a particular oeuvre qualifies for inclusion in the modernist canon often 
hinges on the category of individual style. Instead of in terms of a normative Regelpoetik, 
modernism has been constructed as a highly variegated assortment of successfully articulated 
styles, from Proust and Rilke to Beckett, and from Picasso and Stravinsky to Antonioni. It is 
no surprise, in this context, that in much of the critical literature on Angelopoulos’s work the 
director is closely associated with an original and idiosyncratic use of the sequence shot, or 
plan-séquence, a cinematic technique that is widely identified as the unifying stylistic 
characteristic of his work in its entirety. While I do not, however, question the centrality of 
the sequence shot for Angelopoulos’s oeuvre as a whole, I would like to shift the argument 
from an emphasis on the category of style – with its implications of continuity and 
timelessness – and frame it instead in terms of the historically more sensitive notion of form, 
or indeed: as a question about the content of the form of the sequence shot. While the 
sequence shot, I argue, is indeed the central feature of Angelopoulos’s cinematic écriture, the 
content of the form of the plan-séquence undergoes a radical transformation in the course of 
the filmmaker’s career.1 
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 Following Karel Reisz and Gavin Millar, the sequence shot can be defined as a “long 
and usually complex shot involving much camera movement during which a whole scene is 
shot in one take without cuts” (Technique of Film Editing 401). Though the use of this 
technique dates back to the very early history of cinema, the French term plan-séquence was 
only coined in the mid-20th century by André Bazin2, one of the most ardent proponents of 
the sequence shot (see Ruggle 35). In numerous articles, Bazin would stress the superiority 
of the sequence shot over the use of montage, highlighting what he perceived to be the 
former’s quintessentially cinematic nature. Cinema, he argues in “The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image,” “is objectivity in time” (Bazin 14). In the cinematic medium, “for the 
first time, the image of things is likewise the image of their duration” (15). What 
characterizes the sequence shot, Bazin suggests in “The Evolution of the Language of 
Cinema,” is its “respect for the continuity of dramatic space and, of course, of its duration” 
(34). It “does not sacrifice the specific effects that can be derived from the unity of image in 
space and time” (35) and is thus able to “transfer to the screen the continuum of reality” (37). 
While montage is an “anticinematic process par excellence,” Bazin concludes in “The Virtues 
and Limitations of Montage,” “[essential] cinema, seen for once in its pure state, on the 
contrary, is to be found in straightforward photographic respect for the unity of space” (46), 
in respect, that is, “for the spatial unity of an event” (50). 
 I do not want to go here into an argument about the virtues and limitations of 
Bazin’s very own contentious assertions regarding the qualities of the sequence shot vis-à-vis 
montage.3 What matters to me is that Angelopoulos – on a first and initial level – employs a 
similar rhetoric to explain his predilection for the sequence shot as the key formal principle 
of his films. Echoing Bazin’s cinematic originalism, Angelopoulos argues that he is “trying to 
give back to cinema that which brought it into existence: the image in movement” (Stathi, 
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Space and Time 151).4 It is, moreover, “important to mention that through the sequence shot 
it is possible to preserve both unity of space and unity of time” (Interviews 22). To anyone 
familiar with even a few sequences from Angelopoulos’s films, the director’s respect for the 
integrity of the moving image and its duration is very obvious. The notorious “slowness” of 
his films, in fact, largely derives from the way in which – through a combination of long 
takes, depth of field, and the frequent use of temps morts – the action unfolds in what Bazin 
calls the “continuum of reality.” The very first take of Angelopoulos’s first feature film 
Reconstruction already hints at this: over a period of almost ninety seconds, a bus is shown to 
make its way, very slowly and in long shot, from the depth of the image to the front, where it 
comes to a halt. In the final take of the same film – three and a half minutes long – the 
camera records various comings and goings in and out of the protagonists’ house, 
interspersed with temps morts during which the frame remains empty and nothing happens at 
all. Though this faithfulness to “real time” can be found in any of the director’s films, it is 
perhaps best illustrated by two sequences from The Hunters: In one, a static camera placed in 
a hotel corridor records, over a period of almost six minutes, every opening and closing of a 
door, every motion – and, importantly, lack of motion – in the hallway, every word uttered 
and every period of silence. In another – six and a half minutes long – the camera tracks the 
movement of a car as it completes several 360-degree circles around a large public square at 
a pro-democratic election rally in 1964, capturing too the sound and atmosphere at the 
event. Completing one of its circular movements, the camera becomes static and records a 
group of men that suddenly emerges from the car and viciously attacks an elderly participant 
of the rally, only to speed away again seconds later. The scene ends with a group of younger 
men helping the victim to his feet and leading him out of the frame as the camera assumes 
once again the same position it had occupied at the outset of the sequence. Bazin’s 
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“continuity of dramatic space and, of course, of its duration” are consummately observed in 
such sequences: “the image of things” indeed “is likewise the image of their duration” here.5 
 Angelopoulos, however, goes far beyond a simple adoption of Bazin’s “unity of 
image in space and time” in his own construction of the sequence shot. In fact, what 
distinguishes some of his most remarkable plan-séquences – and what is of crucial importance 
to the context in which I am analyzing this technique – is the fact that Angelopoulos often 
brings together different layers of time in one and the same take. What he achieves, thus, is a 
kind of suspension of the very temporal continuity that is conventionally – indeed: by 
definition – associated with the sequence shot. Or rather: what he accomplishes is a 
chronotopic expansion of the continuity of the sequence shot, in which the historical present no 
longer simply unfolds in linear fashion in front of the spectator’s eyes but is articulated with 
other layers of – and, as I will show, beyond – historical time, thus forming a new and wider 
“time-space” with its own conceptual unity and continuity.6 It is in this sense, precisely, that 
the sequence shot in Angelopoulos’s work becomes a medium for the aesthetic production 
of original chronotopes – that the plan-séquence, indeed, functions as a chronotope. To analyze 
a transformation in the content of the form of the sequence shot, accordingly, means to 
follow Koselleck’s imperative – itself inspired by “[das] schöne deutsche Wort des 
Zeitraumes” – “die gegenseitige Verwiesenheit von Zeit und Raum in ihren jeweiligen 
geschichtlichen Artikulationen zu untersuchen” (Zeitschichten 90) and thus to illuminate how 
problems of historical temporality are negotiated through aesthetic practice. 
 How, I contend, the historical present is articulated with other layers of, and beyond, 
historical time will reverberate with a sense of the possibilities and limitations offered – in 
both a systemic and a handlungstheoretische sense – by history at large. To pose the question of 
a Zeitraum, or chronotope, always carries with it the related issues of history as a possible 
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terrain of action, and of the mutual configuration of spaces of experience on the one hand 
and horizons of expectation on the other. In other words, to ask about a chronotope is to 
ask about what Koselleck calls the Verfügbarkeit of history as such.7 In this sense, the 
aesthetic production of chronotopes also points to how the very position of art itself within 
history is imagined: a historical materialist who subscribes to a production model of 
aesthetics, for instance, will conceive of the situatedness of artistic production within time 
and space in a way fundamentally different from that of the high modernist who champions 
aesthetic autonomy. Angelopoulos, intriguingly, seems to inhabit both of these positions at 
different moments in his work. How and why then, I ask in this chapter, do the director’s 
sequence shots – at various and historically specific stages in his career – articulate the 
historical present with, respectively: a perpetual, and conceptually open, now-time or Jetztzeit; 
an autonomous, and essentially ahistorical, aesthetic Eigenzeit; and a closed, though intensely 
remembered, collective and individual past? What are the historical, socio-political, and 
economic parameters for such a transformation of chronotopes? And how does it affect 
Angelopoulos’s conception of what I have called above a politics of aesthetic production? 
 
NOW-TIME: THE TRILOGY OF HISTORY 
 
 The very title of Angelopoulos’s first film Reconstruction (1970) – a detailed examination of a 
domestic crime, intimately bound up with the material conditions of rural Greece in the 
1960s – already hints at the constructivist element in the aesthetics of Days of ’36 (1972), The 
Travelling Players (1974) and The Hunters (1977), the three films made during and in the 
immediate aftermath of the military dictatorship in Greece (1967-74) and later subsumed by 
Angelopoulos himself under the label of a “Trilogy of History”: re-construction, 
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construction, and production – the probing into established and the fabrication of new 
historical narratives through film – are of crucial importance here. The politics and the 
aesthetics of the Trilogy of History indeed, I would like to argue, are based on two related 
factors: a chronotopic re-construction, or re-organization, of history; and the functional 
transformation of the cinematic apparatus into a means of production in the historical 
process. When I speak of functional transformation, I am of course invoking Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of Umfunktionierung, and it is indeed within the production model8 of 
aesthetics espoused by Benjamin and modeled on the work of Bertolt Brecht that I would 
like to contextualize Angelopoulos’s early work.9 The Trilogy of History can, in fact, be 
considered one of the most remarkable late contributions to the tradition of Marxist 
modernism in Europe as such, owing its status as much to Angelopoulos’s aesthetic choices 
as to the particular historical and political constellations from which it emerged. 
 To call the three films a trilogy of history is a felicitous and fully appropriate turn of 
phrase. Within the parameters of an ultimately avant-gardist Marxist modernism, history 
constitutes an absolute measure; indeed, it emerges as an untranscendable horizon: there is 
nothing outside or beyond history. History is not simply the subject matter of all three films; 
the cinematic medium itself, rather, becomes fundamentally embedded in the historical 
process. This precisely, I want to argue here, determines the content of the form of the 
sequence shot in Days of ’36, and especially in The Travelling Players and The Hunters: Different 
layers of historical time are co-articulated here in one and the same take as part of a perpetual 
Jetztzeit or now-time, an expansive Zeitraum or historical terrain in which the past is re-
activated as part and parcel of a contested present in constant flux towards future 
transformation.10 The cinematic medium itself thereby becomes a material force in the 




Though The Travelling Players and The Hunters are doubtlessly the best examples for such a 
fully articulated “politics of form” and will serve as the key points of reference in my 
discussion here, the first film in the Trilogy of History, Days of ’36, already combines a 
chronotopic reconstruction of history with a keen attunement to the workings of the 
cinematic apparatus itself. The film ostensibly deals with an episode in 1936, in which a 
prisoner accused of murdering a union leader takes hostage a right-wing member of 
parliament with whom, it turns out, he had been politically – and perhaps intimately, too – 
involved. The episode brings about a process of political maneuvering by the dictatorial 
government of General Metaxas, whose rule is partly based on the support of both the Right 
and Center and their shared anti-communist anxieties. The process – highly intricate and 
deliberately opaque – culminates in the killing of the prisoner by a specially trained sniper 
and the freeing of the politician from the prison cell. Despite this apparent resolution, 
however, Days of ’36 does not so much provide as frustrate analysis: the political charades of 
the government and prison authorities remain largely inscrutable, while the different layers 
of interest suffusing the case stay vague. What transpires is a distinctly uneasy atmosphere of 
political secrecy and unaccountability: the murdered union leader seems to be no one’s 
concern; prisoners are executed; shady figures are enlisted for political support; and 
parliamentary politics and the democratic process are replaced by an unrestrained military-
political executive and governing by fiat.  
 The chronotopic reconstruction I have hinted at above – and I reiterate: it is not as 
fully realized here formally as in either of the two following films – is predicated, in Days of 
’36, on a double movement of both compression and expansion. While, according to 
Angelopoulos, both the hostage situation and the murder of a union leader are based on real 
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historical events in the period around 1936, it was the director himself who constructed an 
immediate link between the two, thus compressing two historically separate occurrences into 
a more clearly delineated, unified Zeitraum. “The jail incident is a true one,” Angelopoulos 
explains, “and so is the murder of the union leader, though it happened a bit later. I put 
them together to give a better idea of the political climate during that period. The plot, 
however, is concentrated in the space of a few days only” (Interviews 10). This moderate 
chronotopic realignment serves to strengthen the sense of a “political climate” or 
atmosphere characterized as much by the workings of an authoritarian and anti-democratic 
government as by anti-communist frenzy. More crucially, however, the depiction of the 
political machinations of a society under dictatorial rule in “the days of ‘36” in a film made 
under censorship in yet another dictatorial society – that of 1972 – expands and projects this 
very atmosphere from one historical moment onto another: from 1936 to 1972, from 
Metaxas to the colonels. Brought into constellation, two distinct historical moments become 
part of one larger “time-space,” elements of that untranscendable horizon of a contested 
historical terrain, with the anti-democratic Right – at least momentarily – prevailing here.  
 Dictatorial rule and censorship, of course, rather precisely circumscribe the 
conditions of production for Days of ’3611, and it is within these parameters that 
Angelopoulos elaborates a historically specific politics of form. Umfunktionierung here, I 
would argue, manifests itself as a process by which the repressive appropriation or outright 
silencing of the cinematic apparatus through state censorship is transformed aesthetically 
into a critique of the latter. The austere and, indeed, forbidding aesthetic of Days of ’36 – 
through a process of what Angelopoulos calls autocensure (see Days of ’36, Bonus Material) – 
simultaneously inscribes and unveils the mechanisms of censorship and intransparency in the 
very fabric of the film. The spectator is kept at a distance throughout. Angelopoulos’s long 
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takes in Days of ’36 – less frequently amounting to sequence shots proper here than in later 
films – are characterized by an almost exclusive use of long shots; much of the action 
unfolds in depth of focus; characters are consistently filmed with their backs to the 
spectator; dialogue is sometimes inaudible. The image of a closed door, crucially, is elevated 
to a leitmotif: time and again, the spectator is quite literally shut out from the proceedings in 
the film. The sequence shot has an important function in this. In several instances, in takes 
of two minutes and more, a door opens; the camera tracks a person along his way down a 
corridor; the person enters and shuts another door and the camera – all this in real time – 
focuses on the now empty space in front, leaving the spectator in the dark about what is 
happening behind. Bazin’s “respect for the continuity of dramatic space and […] its 
duration” (34) in the sequence shot, importantly, is in the service here of an elliptical form of 
narration. “The ellipse,” however, in Angelopoulos’s words, “is a tremendous option for the 
spectator to become the filmmaker’s partner in the creative process” (Interviews 12). This 
assertion leads directly to the director’s own conception of a politics of form in Days of ’36: 
Through a properly, and self-avowedly, Brechtian kind of Verfremdungseffekt (see Interviews 12), 
censorship is umfunktioniert into its opposite, the disenfranchisement of the spectator turned 
into critical praxis. The historicity of aesthetic form, then, is fully apparent in Days of ’36 
already. 
 
It is in The Travelling Players and The Hunters, however, that Angelopoulos’s politics of form – 
again: a chronotopic reconstruction of history and the functional transformation of the 
cinematic apparatus – comes fully into its own, and it is here, too, that the sequence shot 
itself emerges as the carrier of the director’s political aesthetic. The Travelling Players – perhaps 
one of the least known great films in the history of cinema – was made during the final 
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stages and finished in the immediate aftermath of the military junta that ruled Greece from 
1967 to 1974. The film, on its most basic level, portrays a group of actors travelling through 
Greece in the period between 1939 and 1952 as they present the popular drama Golfo the 
Shepherdess to various audiences across the country. This general plot line, however, is 
refracted through a complex temporal and narrative structure. Nearly four hours long, the 
film is framed by two almost identical shots of the travelling players at a provincial train 
station: the opening shot, however, is set in 1952, and thus at the very end of the Zeitraum 
dealt with in the film, while the final sequence takes the spectator back to its beginnings in 
1939. In between, a first diegetic level moves chronologically from 1939 to 1952 but is 
constantly interspersed with anachronous levels of time and leaps ahead or even backwards. 
The narrative is punctuated by three long monologues – spoken directly into the camera – 
about historical events in 1922, in World War II, and during the Civil War in Greece. The 
theater group in The Travelling Players, quite literally, roams through the history of Greece 
between 1939 and 1952, witnessing along its way all of the historical milestones of the 
period, including World War II and the German Occupation; national liberation and post-
war British and American involvement in the country; Resistance, Civil War and the 
disarmament of the guerrilla forces; and – as a constant point of reference – the national 
election campaign, in 1952, of the military strongman Marshall Papagos, victor over the 
communist Left during the Civil War.12 
 Importantly, however, the role of the travelling players in Greece’s historical drama 
is not restricted to that of witnesses only, of subjects to a grand history devoid of dialectics. 
Angelopoulos’s conception of the travelling players’ position within the historical process is 
eminently performative. First of all, the theater group – nota bene: actors – in its collective 
make-up is itself traversed by the very internal divisions that also characterized, and shaped, 
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Greek society and politics of the period. The head of the group is represented as a patriotic 
leftist; his son and another younger actor at one point leave the group to join the Resistance 
in Greece’s mountains; another crucial member is a committed royalist and collaborator with 
the Nazi occupiers; one of the women a staunch supporter of the guerrilla faction; another 
an opportunist; a few of the actors are uncommitted or apolitical; and there is a poet, vexed 
by the question of how to turn verse into politics, poiesis into praxis. Secondly, the plot of the 
idyllic Golfo the Shepherdess, the popular but rather banal pastoral romance from the 19th 
century which the group performs night after night along its way through the country, is 
continuously brought into parallel with the real historical events accompanying, or 
interfering with, its staging: A monologue about the menacing gaze of an eagle in the sky is 
the prelude to an air raid carried out by Italian forces in 1940 that envelops the stage in fire; 
the star-crossed couple’s anxious dialogue about the possibility of being discovered in their 
illicit affair preempts the arrival of a German officer who seeks to arrest a guerrilla 
sympathizer under shelter by the group; and the outcry “They will kill each other,” part of 
the text of the play, precedes a real murder on stage. Thirdly, however, and most 
importantly, Angelopoulos – in a brilliant application of what T. S. Eliot would call the 
“mythical method”13 – weaves a further parallel between these initial two layers and the 
mythical story of the House of Atreus, about the murder of King Agamemnon by his wife 
Clytemnestra and her lover Aigisthos, and about the revenge enacted on the latter two by the 
slain king’s children Orestes and Electra. This mythical sub-layer is enacted subtly – with the 
exception of Orestes’s, none of the names are ever spoken in the film – but forcefully: the 
wife (Clytemnestra) of the group’s leftist leader (Agamemnon) conspires with her secret 
lover, the Nazi collaborator (Aigisthos), to have her husband arrested and executed by the 
Nazis. Her children plot revenge: the guerrilla fighter (Orestes), aided by his sister (Electra), 
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returns from the mountains to kill his mother and her lover. The scene in the film 
magnificently brings together all three layers of the narrative: while the Golfo drama is 
performed, and as a violent argument erupts on the stage as part of the play, Orestes (as 
character in the play, member of the fractured theater group, and mythical figure) invades 
the stage and kills the homicidal couple – his antagonists, simultaneously, on stage, in reality, 
and myth. The internal dynamics of the theater group, the plot of the Golfo play, and the 
mythical story of the House of Atreus thus become inextricably interwoven in The Travelling 
Players with the murderous schisms in Greek history of the period.  
 The theatricality of The Travelling Players is mitigated, however, by a self-consciously 
de-dramatizing style of performance. The film, somewhat ironically, is at once heavily 
theatrical and adamantly “anti-theatrical.”14 The distanciating effects from Days of ’36 – long 
takes, long shots, the absence of close-ups, the muted performances of the actors, the lack of 
extra-diegetic music – are ubiquitous here too, and once again point to the strong 
undercurrent of Brechtianism in the Trilogy of History.15 So, too, does the employment of 
some of the standard techniques of epic theater: the three monologues for instance, spoken 
directly into the camera, only begin after the actors have adjusted their clothes and assumed 
their position; a child recites a historical narrative from a school book; popular songs – 
mostly political in nature – constantly interrupt, and reflect on, the flow of the action; the 
mise-en-scène is devoid of illusory, cosmetic, or “culinary” elements. Verfremdungseffekte of this 
kind – Angelopoulos fully subscribes to the Brechtian position here – are meant to block 
empathy and identification and to encourage a reflective attitude in the viewer. 
Simultaneously, of course, they are designed to draw attention not only to the theatrical 




 This is not the place to discuss at length the real efficacy of Brecht’s epic theater or 
the merits and limitations of this kind of political aesthetic for the cinematic screen. What 
matters here is that, much like Brecht, the Angelopoulos of the Trilogy of History does 
conceive of history as a performative terrain, as a contested and contingent – and therefore 
alterable – field of struggles. The model of historical praxis that emerges from The Travelling 
Players thus is substantively more complex, and dialectical, than what the film’s basic plot line 
suggests. It evokes, in fact, Marx’s famous comment in the Eighteenth Brumaire that men 
“make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under 
self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted 
from the past” (Tucker 437). 
 This brings me back to the questions of time and space, of chronotopes and the 
sequence shot. History is indeed, as I have argued above, the ultimate horizon for the 
travelling players’ journey through time and space. There is no scene, throughout the film, in 
which Angelopoulos’s collective of protagonists is not at once subjected to and subject of 
the dynamic force field of a history in the making. As Lino Miccichè has correctly pointed 
out, thereby, in the Trilogy of History “for Angelopoulos […] History is always a History of 
the present” (Miccichè 136): the travelling players are performing on the stage of a perpetual 
now-time. It is precisely as an aesthetic sedimentation of such a model of historical time as 
permanent now-time that I am reading some of the most distinctive sequence shots in The 
Travelling Players – those in which different layers of time are formally articulated as a unified 
Zeitraum in one and the same take. Through what I have called above a chronotopic 
expansion of the unity and continuity of the sequence shot Angelopoulos enacts new, and 
aesthetically distinctive, time-spaces and thus, as I will argue in the following, aims at the 
construction and production of alternative historical narratives. The director’s critique is 
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directed above all against an ideological configuration of narratives of liberation, national 
unity, and political stability in the era of the military dictatorship.  
 Angelopoulos is very much conscious of the link between cinematic form and 
historical time. The camera, he has argued, is a means for “embodying time in film” (Days of 
’36, Bonus Material) – it is an important semantic tool for what I would like to call here a 
cinematic grammar of time. For Angelopoulos, then, while cutting and montage cannot but 
situate two articulated elements in “a different time” (Travelling Players, Bonus Material), the 
sequence shot manages to “preserve both unity of space and unity of time” (Interviews 22): 
“Everything” – even two historically distinct periods – “occupies the same time” (Travelling 
Players, Bonus Material). 
 I would like to illustrate my argument with three paradigmatic plan-séquences from The 
Travelling Players. In the first – about one hour into the film, and about three minutes long – 
Angelopoulos brings together Papagos’s election campaign in November 1952 and the 
German Occupation of Greece in the winter of 1942: In a provincial town, the camera 
follows the travelling players as they make their way from a seaside street into town. In the 
off, music can be heard and the voice from a loudspeaker, announcing the date of the 
forthcoming election (“November 16, 1952”) and extolling the virtues of Marshall Papagos, 
architect of “the victory over the communist rebellion from 1947-1949,” the period of the 
Civil War. The camera then captures a motorcycle carrying banners in favor of Papagos and 
follows its movement from the left to the right and out of the frame. For quite some while, 
the frame remains empty, until a black limousine enters from the right and is followed, in a 
reverse movement of the camera, on its way to the left. In the very position from which the 
motorcycle had emerged in the 1952 setting, the spectator now beholds a roadblock with a 
sign in German, reading “Halt Kontrolle,” and a soldier fully clad in Nazi uniform. In the 
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following scene, Aigisthos is seen in conversation with a group of Nazi officers, committing 
– as it will later transpire – the betrayal of Agamemnon that will result in the latter’s 
execution at the hands of the Germans. 
 In a second such plan-séquence – some forty minutes further into the film, and more 
than four minutes long – Angelopoulos compresses the historical events from September to 
December 1944 into one magnificently rendered sequence shot, consisting of two full 360-
degree movements of the camera around its own angle. On a large public square in the 
Peloponnesian town of Nafplion, the camera – initially in fix position – records a celebration 
of the people in the immediate aftermath of Greece’s liberation from Nazi occupation. As a 
solemn song invoking freedom and national unity sounds out from a loudspeaker, the crowd 
chants along, waving – respectively – Greek, American, British, and Soviet flags. This 
demonstration of political unity, however, soon descends into chaos as a gunshot rings out 
and the crowd, in panic, disperses into the square’s adjoining side streets. The camera 
surveys the commotion in the course of a full 360-degree movement around its own angle 
before it assumes its initial, fix, position again. The scene on the square is now drastically 
different: in place of the earlier crowd, only a few corpses can be detected. The frame 
remains unchanged for a few intense moments, but suddenly a British soldier playing a 
bagpipe enters from the right and traverses the square before exiting again on the left. In a 
highly theatrical, and anti-realistic, turn of events, one of the corpses – the travelling players’ 
accordion player – now rises to his feet and runs out of the picture, too. This movement 
initiates a second full circle of the camera as it pans along the side streets and records the 
arrival of a new crowd, now exclusively equipped with banners carrying communist slogans, 
as well as effigies of Marx and Lenin. The camera’s movement concludes once again in its 
initial position as a sea of red flags fills the square, still strewn with corpses. 
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 In my third example – the sequence occurs about three hours into the film and is 
more than five minutes long – Angelopoulos draws a line from New Year’s Eve in 1946 to, 
once again, Papagos’s election campaign in November 1952. The sequence is preceded by a 
long scene – a plan-séquence, in fact, of nine minutes – in which two groups of young people 
are having a New Year’s party in the same taverna: while one group, however, is decidedly 
left-wing, the other – made-up exclusively of sinister-looking men in hats – is staunchly 
right-wing and royalist. The episode initially plays out as Brechtian kind of musical contest: a 
veritable battle of lyrics ensues during which the leftists’ sexually explicit send-ups of the 
British military presence in Greece are being answered by the rightists’ paeans to the King. 
The atmosphere, however, soon turns ugly: one of the men in hats fires a warning shot into 
the ceiling, and the leftists are forced to leave the place. The royalists then come together in 
a slow dance to a solemn song extolling once again the King. In the sequence I would like to 
discuss here, the party has just ended and the royalists – blissfully drunk – leave the tavern. 
The camera, in long shot, follows the group’s movement down a road as the drunken men 
stumble forward roaring anti-communist songs. In due course, however, their chants 
become more rhythmical as their postures steady and the procession takes on the character 
of a military march. As the camera tracks the men, now marching in formation, the street 
takes on a different character: campaign flyers are seen lying on the ground, and in the off, 
the spectator hears the now familiar anti-communist soundtrack from Papagos’s campaign. 
The sequence, which had started outside a bar in 1946, concludes with the men in hats 
enthusiastically joining Papagos’s election rally in 1952. The travelling players – two of 
whom had been witness to the New Years’ celebration – are present too. 
 The three sequence shots I have presented here are paradigmatic for the way in 
which questions about historical time and historical praxis are negotiated in the Trilogy of 
 
! 48 
History through the specifically cinematic form of the plan-séquence. A number of factors 
should have become clear by now: Firstly, whether the sequence shot brings together 
temporally proximate (September-December 1944) or more distant moments (1939-1952), 
and whether it links them in a forward or backward movement, the articulation of different 
layers of historical time eventually always results in the aesthetic production of one unified 
Zeitraum. The ultimate and untranscendable horizon of such time-spaces, thereby, is 
invariably the larger, and sharply contested, political history of the period. This political 
history, secondly, is one that cannot be compartmentalized into the grammatical sequence of 
past, present and future but must be conceived of – through the sequence shot – as a 
perpetual now-time. This is why I have spoken above of a specifically Angelopoulean 
grammar of time. Unlike the formally more conventional and much more widely used 
technique of the flashback, for instance, even the plan-séquence that moves backwards in time 
(1952-1939) does not articulate the past and the present – in purely formal terms – as 
“different times” but as parts of one chronotope in which, in Angelopoulos’s terms, 
everything “occurs in the same time” (Travelling Players, Bonus Material). The past in The 
Travelling Players, very importantly, is never a remembered – let alone a past – past but always 
manifests itself as a present past. Thirdly, and crucially, I would argue however that this kind 
of past does not have a deterministic impact on the present. History as now-time implies an 
open terrain of action that is made up of historically contingent acts of human praxis. Marx’s 
circumstances that are “existing already, given and transmitted from the past,” to be sure, are 
very much present in The Travelling Players, and often the individual and collective fates 
portrayed in the film are fully under the sway of – indeed: determined – by the past. But – 
and here the first part of Marx’s assertion counts – men also “make their own history”: 
witness, for instance, Aigisthos’s betrayal of Agamemnon. The sequence shot in which 
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Angelopoulos moves backwards to the Nazi Occupation then, I would suggest, signifies 
neither the inescapable impact of the past on the present nor the aesthetic enactment of its 
reversibility but the fact of history’s contingency. Angelopoulos suggests – at least by 
implication – not that the past drowns all present nor that it can be changed, but that it could 
have been different, and that the fight over the past continues in, and as part of, our now-
time. The past, in other words, is dialectically bound to a future towards which it can be 
sublated in the contested present of Jetztzeit. 
 As I have indicated above, amid such an emphatic notion of the historical present as 
now-time the cinematic apparatus itself is firmly embedded in a history in the making: it 
becomes a material force – indeed, a means of production – in the historical process. This is 
precisely why I have invoked Benjamin’s essay “The Author as Producer” in the title and the 
epigraph to this chapter, with its question about the “attitude of a work [not] to the relations 
of production of its time [but] […] in them” (81). The “technique,” as Benjamin would call 
it, of the sequence shot in Angelopoulos’s Trilogy of History emerges as the “dialectical 
starting point from which the unfruitful antithesis of form and content can be surpassed” 
(81) – it becomes the measure for a politics of form that is aimed at a “transformation of the 
forms and instruments of production” (85), at an aesthetically and politically alternative “use 
(transformation) of certain institutes and institutions” (85). This also explains the 
significance of Brecht and the techniques of epic theater for the Trilogy of History. 
“Brecht,” as Benjamin writes, “coined the term Umfunktionierung [functional transformation]. 
He was the first to make of intellectuals the far-reaching demand not to supply the apparatus 
of production without, to the utmost extent possible, changing it” (85). “What matters,” he 
continues, “is the exemplary character of production […]. We already possess such an 
example […]. It is Brecht’s Epic Theater” (89).16 
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 What, then, does the auteur produce in the Trilogy of History? To pose this question 
means to extend the nexus between cinematic form and historical time I have established 
above and to include the question of a politics of aesthetic production. And indeed, it is the 
purposeful (re-)construction of historical narratives – the production of an alternative history 
– that could be considered the key political function of the chronotopes Angelopoulos 
constructs in The Travelling Players. The film represents a radical departure from the dominant 
historical discourse of the time: it proposes, as Angelopoulos has suggested, a genuinely 
“new reading of history” (Travelling Players, Bonus Material). New chronotopes, in and 
through aesthetic form, make visible new unities and continuities in the historical process; 
the sequence shot brings into the present – quite literally a process of Vergegenwärtigung – 
what has been elided from or written off of the historical record. The three plan-séquences I 
have discussed above are once again instructive: Papagos emerges not – as he was widely 
perceived then – as the guarantor of post-war reconstruction and stability but as the 
seamless continuation of a fascist, or at the very least pro-fascist, rule of Greece that went 
back to the “days of ‘36” and the Nazi sympathizer Metaxas.17 The period after Greece’s 
liberation from Nazi occupation demarcates not the beginning of national unity and popular 
sovereignty but its very betrayal, ushering in a new phase of radical political polarization and 
an oppressive right-wing rule violently enforced by British and American military power.18 
The young royalists’ enthusiastic participation in Papagos’s campaign, finally, not only points 
to a continuing history of bully tactics and thuggish behavior in the country’s political 
discourse but, more importantly, demonstrates that Papagos’s success is itself predicated – as 
the episode in the tavern shows – on the marginalization or even forceful eviction of a 
dissenting Left from the public sphere. This “new reading of history,” of course, takes on 
particular urgency within the historical context from which The Travelling Players emerged: the 
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dictatorial rule of a rabidly right-wing, and anti-communist, military junta. Like in Days of ’36, 
the historical period with which The Travelling Players engages (1939-1952) becomes part of an 
extended Zeitraum – a vividly present now-time – that comes to include the historical present 
of the film’s production, distribution and reception. With The Travelling Players, then, 
Angelopoulos positions himself as a partisan filmmaker, unequivocally siding with what 
Benjamin would call a “tradition of the oppressed” (“Theses” 257) – with a violently 
marginalized, that is, and politically disenfranchised popular Left.  
 
“Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly 
convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has 
not ceased to be victorious” (Benjamin, “Theses” 255). Benjamin’s assertion could be 
considered the perfect epigraph to the third film in the Trilogy of History, The Hunters. The 
plot of the film, made in 1977, constitutes a powerful allegory for the spectral sur-vie of a 
vanquished history of left-wing and guerrilla struggle in a country now fully in the grip of the 
Right. On New Year’s Eve in 1976-1977, on the premises of former guerrilla headquarters 
that have been converted into a large hotel, a group of people convenes to celebrate the 
arrival of the new year. The group is made up of members of the ruling classes and their 
wives, among them the hotel’s owner, a man of the military, a bourgeois publisher, an 
engineer and factory owner, and a former liberal politician who has made his peace with the 
new regime. On the morning of the festivities, the men go hunting and discover – in the 
magnificent opening sequence of the film – the dead body of a guerrilla fighter from the 
days of the Civil War some thirty years before. His corpse is perfectly preserved under a 
thick layer of snow; the blood pouring from his fatal wound – as the hunters realize in 
horror – is still fresh. The men decide to take the corpse back to the hotel, where its 
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stubborn presence haunts both the day’s festivities and a police investigation into the finding 
that takes the form of an exploration of the hunters’ and Greece’s more recent historical 
past. The Hunters thus completes the historical project that was launched by Days of ’36 and 
continued in The Travelling Players by bringing the Trilogy of History fully into the narrative 
present. 
 The present of The Hunters, of course, is slightly different from that of the two 
preceding films. Unlike Days of ’36 and The Travelling Players, the third installment in the 
Trilogy of History was not made during but in the immediate aftermath of the military 
dictatorship. Angelopoulos is not so much concerned here with a direct challenge to the 
dictatorial narrative about history as with preventing the hegemonization or naturalization of 
a radically anti-leftist discourse in the period of post-dictatorial reconstruction. The film, 
accordingly, portrays the new elites’ desire – frequently verging on paranoia – for repressing, 
literally and psychologically, the memory of a violent and contested historical past: a desire, 
needless to say, that Angelopoulos is not willing to gratify. While the guerrilla fighter’s 
corpse is the film’s emblematic sign for the presence of the past, it is once again through the 
formal construction of chronotopes and the sequence shot that Angelopoulos “keeps time in 
place.” Returning to the present a history that has been all but extinguished, The Hunters also 
gives a place in time to Benjamin’s dead, to those who will not “be safe from the enemy if he 
wins.” The premise of the entire film, then, is predicated on what I have called above a 
chronotopic re-construction of history, through which a sealed-off past is reactivated as the 
present of an ongoing now-time.  
 In my discussion of The Travelling Players, I have demonstrated in some detail how 
Angelopoulos articulates different layers of time through the sequence shot. I will therefore 
not give an extended discussion of the same technique in The Hunters at this point.19 It is, 
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however, important to notice that The Hunters expands, and radicalizes, the way 
Angelopoulos had used the plan-séquence in The Travelling Players. The film, to begin with, is 
almost entirely composed of sequence shots, giving it an impressive degree of formal unity 
and bringing its average shot length to a staggering 214 seconds.20 More crucially, the 
movements between different layers of time in this film are more complex – sometimes 
perplexingly so – and more wide-ranging than in The Travelling Players. One sequence, for 
instance – some 36 minutes into the film, and a remarkable eight minutes long – begins on 
New Years’ Eve of 1977: The protagonists are lined up sitting in front of the corpse in the 
Great Hall of the hotel as a policeman records their testimonies concerning the dead 
guerrilla, whose blood – as one of the wives anxiously reiterates – is “still fresh.” When it 
comes to the factory owner’s turn, the criminal investigation turns into a kind of “trial of 
history” (Stathi, Angelopoulos 247). In a lengthy narrative, the factory owner recounts his role 
in the national elections of 1958 – at a time, that is, when the Left was “rearing its head 
again.” Speaking into a static camera, the man explains his involvement in various attempts 
by the Right at “isolating the Left” and manipulating the vote in his electoral district. As the 
factory owner begins to talk of a specific episode, the camera starts moving – capturing, too, 
the corpse of the guerrilla in the center of the room – and the sequence turns from narrative 
to performance: Looking outside the window, the factory owner observes that the streets 
have suddenly become filled with commotion as a leading communist figure has returned to 
his neighborhood from jail. The door to the Great Hall then suddenly opens and the 
communist leader enters the room. The setting of the criminal investigation of 1977 remains 
fully intact and the corpse of the guerrilla is still present as the two men’s encounter on 
election day in 1958 is performed. In the course of a tense exchange, the leftist tells the 
factory owner that, “your father killed my mother on February 12, 1946,” to which the 
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factory owner replies: “And your father killed my father on February 12, 1949.” The 
dialogue here situates the sequence in the very period of Civil War from which the dead 
guerrilla’s corpse – the silent center of the scene – originates. The communist then takes his 
ballot and moves out of the frame. The sequence turns to narrative again as the factory 
owner talks about electoral successes of the Left and the “unexpected” re-surfacing of the 
enemy on the political scene. Suddenly, however, a shot is heard, the factory owner moves 
quickly to the side, and the camera captures a dead soldier lying in front of a curtain in one 
corner of the room. With the camera in motion, the man resumes his narrative, trying to 
dispel the rumors in newspapers of the time that the soldier’s death was a suicide, prompted 
by political pressure to vote for the party of the Right. The sequence concludes with the 
camera assuming again its initial position in the sequence and the factory owner returning to 
his seat, adding “just two more words: I too, realized, that the blood was still fresh, as if 
alive.” The sequence’s serpentine temporal movement – formally constructed through a plan-
séquence – returns the plot, via 1958 and 1946-1949, to New Year’s Eve of 1977, articulating 
once again all three periods as the historical present of a perpetual now-time and making 
present, in its wake, a history now almost fully repressed.  
 The most important sequence of this kind, however, comes towards the very end of 
The Hunters, in a virtuosic plan-séquence lasting more than twenty minutes. In a veritable feast 
of camera movements, Angelopoulos here records the New Year’s festivities proper, 
including several musical performances, a surreal “dance with the King” by one of the 
hunters’ wives, and the actual beginning – at midnight – of the new year. Some seventeen 
minutes into the sequence, amid a jolly dance, the doors to the Great Hall are violently 
forced open and a group of armed guerrilla fighters enters the scene. The music stops 
abruptly, the curtain behind which the party had hidden the corpse opens, and the dead 
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guerrilla – now fully and unquestionably alive – joins his comrades: the hunters are taken 
hostage and brought outside. In the following sequence – a full four minutes long – the 
hostages find themselves lined up horizontally outside the hotel and former guerrilla 
headquarters, faced by the group of armed men. As the camera begins to move and captures 
the surrounding landscape, the “corpse” proceeds to read an announcement “on behalf of 
the Revolution and the Government of the Mountains,” dated August 29, 1949: the hunters 
and their wives are condemned to death and, after a further 180-degree movement of the 
camera, are executed by the guerrillas. The sequence, however, continues: for a considerable 
amount of time, a motionless camera remains focused on the corpses of the party, until – 
one after the other – they slowly get up and rise again, nowhere near dead. The festivities of 
1977 resume inside after the hotel owner has checked and confirmed that the corpse is safely 
tucked away behind the curtain, and the film concludes on the next morning, with the 
hunters burying the dead body at the very spot in which they had first discovered it in the 
opening moments of the film. The phantasmatic intrusion of the past was but a short-lived 
nightmare, a flash of horror: the lives of the hunters, and their triumphant procession 
through history, continue unobstructed. 
  
I have talked extensively, perhaps excessively, about the construction of a historical now-
time through the sequence shot in the preceding passages. This – as well as my reference to a 
flash-like intrusion into the historical continuum – is not, of course, a random choice of 
vocabulary but also gestures towards Benjamin’s work on history. I am somewhat hesitant, 
on the one hand, to employ the full armature of Benjaminian thought here: the spectacular 
reception of his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and the Arcades Project in the late 20th 
and 21st centuries, after all, could itself be considered symptomatic of some of the more 
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radical political aporias occurring in late modernity.21 Nevertheless, it might be worth asking 
to what extent Angelopoulos, in his sequence shots, is approaching a – purely cinematic – 
realization of what Benjamin must have meant by his notion of “historical materialism” in 
general and his notoriously elusive concept of the “dialectical image” in particular. “History,” 
Benjamin writes in the “Theses,” “is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, 
empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now [Jetztzeit]” (261, my emphases). “Materialistic 
historiography” for him,  
  is based on a constructive principle. Thinking involves not only the   
  flow of thoughts but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a  
  configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which  
  it crystallizes into a monad. […] In this structure [the historical materialist]  
  recognizes the sign of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, 
  a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past. (262f., my emphases) 
In Convolute N of the Arcades Project, similarly, Benjamin argues that the “destructive or 
critical momentum of materialist historiography is registered in that blasting of historical 
continuity with which the historical object first constitutes itself” (474), that the “materialist 
presentation of history leads the past to bring the present into a critical state” (471). “What is 
more: every dialectically presented historical circumstance polarizes itself and becomes a 
force field in which the confrontation between its fore-history and after-history is played out. 
It becomes such a field insofar as the present instant interpenetrates it” (470). “Every 
present day,” he contends, 
  is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each now is the now  
  of a particular recognizability. In it, truth is charged to the bursting point   
  with time. […] It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or  
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  what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what  
  has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In   
  other words: image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the  
  present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of what-has-been to the  
  now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural [bildlich]. (462f., my  
  emphases) 
After all I have said here about the sequence shot in Days of ’36, The Travelling Players, and The 
Hunters – about the construction of now-time, about the constitutive performativity in all 
historical praxis, about the production of alternative historical narratives, and about the 
recuperation of a repressed past – the political aesthetics of the Trilogy of History does, I 
believe, resonate powerfully with Benjamin’s thought. The specific kind of cinematic image 
Angelopoulos constructs through the plan-séquence, I would argue, indeed constitutes a 
“constellation saturated with tensions” (Benjamin, Arcades Project 475). The sequence shot in 
the Trilogy of History is a dynamic entity: a political and aesthetic force field pulsating with 
performative energy, mythistoric significance, and the disparate temporalities traversing it. 
“Hence,” Benjamin writes, “the object constructed in the materialist presentation of history 
is itself the dialectical image. The latter is identical with the historical object; it justifies its 
violent expulsion from the continuum of historical process” (475). This, precisely, is how 
cinematic form, historical time, and the politics of aesthetic production form a nexus in 
Angelopoulos’s first trilogy, too: “the time of the cinematic apparatus,” as the Japanese 
filmmaker Nagisa Oshima has written in a perceptive essay on the filmmaker, “becomes 
historical time.” At the heart of Angelopoulos’s “cinematography of hope,” as Oshima calls 
it, there is an indefatigable belief in the cinematic camera’s potential “to command History” 
(Oshima 242). It is this kind of Umfunktionierung of the cinematic apparatus, ultimately, that 
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determines the content of the form of the sequence shot, the meaning of Angelopoulos’s 
grammar of time in the Trilogy of History. 
 
It is one thing to talk about a production model of aesthetics, about historical materialism 
and the dialectical image in Angelopoulos’s work. How to gauge, however, the political and 
aesthetic efficacy of this kind of political aesthetic, especially in the context of a dictatorial – 
or newly post-dictatorial – society on the fringes of Europe in the 1970s? One should not, to 
begin with, overstate Angelopoulos’s optimism. Hope – one of the cardinal virtues of the 
Left – is a precarious category for the filmmaker, a matter of great fragility. The Travelling 
Players, lest it be forgotten, is also a film about a seemingly endless sequence of catastrophic 
events in Greece’s 20th century history. The Hunters ends not with the vindication of the Left 
but with the emphatic burial in the snow of a corpse of history. Hope, then, might be 
something more akin to what Alexander Kluge would call “the devil’s blind spot” (Kluge, 
Lücke): a remainder of confidence, a stubborn insistence, a potential – despite all odds – for 
the faint inklings of an alternative history materializing into something grander. When the 
travelling players for instance, in the very final sequence of the film, are shown at a 
provincial train station, not in 1952 but in 1939 – at the beginning of their journey through 
time – the spectator’s awareness of the trials and tribulations ahead of them is coupled with a 
silent hope that this time, somehow, things will take a better turn. The future, Benjamin 
writes, “[did not turn] into homogeneous, empty time. For every second of time was the 
strait gate through which the Messiah might enter” (“Theses” 263). 
 I do not, however, mean to poeticize hope here, or to lyricize what is, at its heart, a 
very forceful and muscular political aesthetic. Nor do I think that Angelopoulos’s affinities 
with Benjamin should really be sought on the level of a now fashionable messianism, which 
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all too often mistakes an aporetic sense of the future for a messianic sense of time.22 It would 
also be too facile, I believe, to write off Angelopoulos’s politics of form in the Trilogy of 
History as a kind of historical or even post-avant-gardist posturing, a mere “commemorative 
gesture,” in Thomas Elsaesser’s words from a different context, “of preserving and reviving 
an avant-garde tradition in the visual and performing arts, for which Brecht and Benjamin 
stood as the twin symbols for the possible unity between practice and theory during a 
historical moment of opposition and rupture” (“Brecht and Contemporary Film” 173). The 
essence of Angelopoulos’s Brechtianism in these early films, after all, lies not so much in the 
faithful replication of some of the more well-rehearsed techniques of epic theater as in a 
properly Brechtian spirit of ceaseless formal experimentation, in an acknowledgement, that 
is, of the radical historicity of a particular social-historical situation and the specific demands 
the latter makes on the articulation of a concurrent form. It is not, to borrow Peter Bürger’s 
dismissive term, a “neo-avant-gardist” reification of an avant-garde tradition now fully 
relegated to the past that one witnesses in the Trilogy of History but the preservation of a 
properly avant-gardist impulse to dissolve the antinomy between art and politics and to turn 
aesthetic production into political praxis.23 
 This impulse, no less, did produce palpable results. The Trilogy of History is 
undoubtedly part of – it helped instigate, in fact – a process of fundamental political and 
cultural shifts, one of whose key elements was a radical revision and transformation of long-
established historical narratives favoring the anti-communist, royalist, and anti-democratic 
Right. It is no coincidence that Days of ’36, The Travelling Players, and The Hunters fully coincide 
not only with the end and downfall of the military junta but also – in the immediate 
aftermath of the dictatorship – with the legalization of the Communist party, the 
government-supported return of former guerrilla fighters from exile abroad, the abolition of 
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the monarchy in a landslide referendum, and the meteoric rise of Andreas Papandreou’s 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) from its founding in 1974 to a triumphant 
election victory in 1981. We are not concerned here with merely a slight modification of the 
political realities in Greece, with modest shifts in the framework within which politics was 
conducted, but with a profound transformation of this very framework itself. If this – a shift 
in the framework of possibility – is what defines the political act proper, then the Trilogy of 
History itself, in today’s theoretical parlance, constituted a political “event” par excellence: a 
radical act, through a heteronomous aesthetics, of transformative political praxis. 
 The wholesale dismissal of the avant-gardist impulse by critics like Bürger, then, is 
likely to have been appropriate in the context of the fully normalized, advanced industrial 
societies of late modernity in Western Europe. In the case of post-dictatorial Greece, 
however – and as late as in 1977, when The Hunters was made – such obituaries may well 
have been premature. Elsaesser aptly speaks of “the possible unity between practice and 
theory during a historical moment of opposition and rupture” (“Brecht and Contemporary Film” 
173, my emphasis), and Benjamin importantly conceives of his production model of 
aesthetics as one explicitly for societies in transformation. It is precisely such a historical 
moment of opposition and rupture, a society in transformation – a “moment of danger” or a 
“state of emergency,” in the more elusive vocabulary of Benjamin’s “Theses” (255, 257) – 
that Angelopoulos is faced with in the Trilogy of History. The historical process, at this 
particular juncture, can still be conceived of as open. History appears as a domain of 
struggle: a contested and contestable – verfügbar and machbar, in Koselleck’s terminology – 
terrain of action. It is not surprising then, as I have demonstrated at some length now, that 
this concept of historical time as a perpetual and conceptually open Jetztzeit, along with a 
production model of aesthetics, should find their common denominator – their formal 
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sedimentation – in the particular way Angelopoulos constructs the sequence shot in the 
Trilogy of History. History is constituted through the plan-séquence as the ultimate horizon of 
all human praxis – as a terrain for the realization of a transformative kind of human agency 
that fully entails, in mutual imbrication, the workings of the heteronomous spheres of 
politics and art. The constitutive promise of modernity – that an open future can be shaped 
and that history can be made by human subjects – remains intact in these films. 
 
TIME AUTONOMOUS: THE TRILOGY OF SILENCE 
 
It is the radical disavowal of these intertwined models of historicity and aesthetic production 
that characterizes Angelopoulos’s “Trilogy of Silence” of the 1980s. The film immediately 
preceding the trilogy, Megalexandros from 1980, had already registered the director’s 
disillusionment with a real existierenden socialist government and was a radical critique of the 
historical aberrations of leftist leadership.24 But it is in the three films made between 1984 
and 1988 – Voyage to Cythera, The Beekeeper, and Landscape in the Mist – that a fundamental 
departure manifests itself from both the notion of a conceptually open historical now-time 
and from an avant-gardist conception of aesthetic heteronomy. In a stunning reversal, in 
fact, in the Trilogy of Silence Angelopoulos begins to call into question the very concept of 
historical time as such and propagates an autonomous status for the realm of aesthetic 
production: art becomes a sphere of retreat from a history that is no longer considered 
machbar. It is through a significant shift in the content of the form of the sequence shot – a 
transformation of chronotopes – I will argue here, that these processes manifest themselves 
formally in the work of Angelopoulos. 
 Such dramatic transformations do not, of course, occur outside an historical context. 
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If Greece, by Western European standards, had been an anomaly until 1974, it was 
becoming more and more “normal” now, moving from exceptionality towards exemplarity. 
After the implementation of liberal democracy in the wake of the military dictatorship, 
Greece’s accession to the European Union in 1981 was perhaps the most palpable sign and 
the culmination of this continued process of normalization, an unmistakable token of what 
Fredric Jameson has called “the dissolution of an autonomous Greek story” (“Past as 
History” 91). This development, Jameson continues, also coincided economically with “the 
gradual opening of Greece (as of most other national situations) to dependency on the 
invisible force field of the world market itself” (91). From the vantage point of the European 
Left, then, the normalization of Greece meant not only liberation from dictatorship and 
relative political stability but also a full insertion into the dismal world-historical constellation 
of the 1980s. With neoliberalism triumphant across the board, the climate of the day was as 
hostile, politically, to the emancipatory aspirations extrapolated from the project of 
modernity as it was, culturally, to the precepts of political modernism. Indeed, the ever more 
pervasive impact of systemic pressures at the cost of human agency, along with the radical 
functional differentiation in a global capitalist system, seemed to have done away altogether 
with the very conditions of possibility for both transformative political praxis and aesthetic 
and political heteronomy. The drastic shifts in Angelopoulos’s politics of form, I argue 
accordingly, are simultaneously a manifestation of political modernism’s aporetic sense of 
self and a determined effort at keeping in place the critical function of modernist art at a 
moment when aesthetic production has been uncoupled from the notion of societal 
progress.25 
 Is it possible, then, Jameson wonders, “that Greece itself belatedly reached an ‘end 
of history’ already under way elsewhere, after the fall of the junta and the normalisation of 
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parliamentary democracy in the framework of the European Union, and that in this new 
‘posthistorical’ atmosphere the persistent corpse of everything that made modern Greek 
history unique itself was lost from view” (“Past as History” 88)? Angelopoulos’s answer, it 
seems, is in the affirmative. In a remarkable interview from 1985, the director asserts that the 
“world is a chessboard on which man is just another pawn and his chance of an impact on 
the proceedings, negligible. Politics is a cynical game that has turned its back on the 
commitments of the past” (Interviews 49).  
 This is, of course, a radical departure – a veritable volte face – from the Brechtian 
model of history Angelopoulos had espoused in the Trilogy of History; but the director’s 
despondency is fully in sync with a posthistorical malaise that had spread epidemically 
through Western societies in the course of the 1980s. Posthistoire, thus, was not a matter of 
1989 alone: the “end of the future,” to borrow the title of Franco Berardi’s book on the 
question, had already presented with clear symptoms in the late 1970s. Fukuyama himself, 
significantly, had identified the nearly simultaneous overthrow of the dictatorial regimes in 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and the subsequent political normalization in all three countries 
in the mid- to late 1970s, as a crucial step in what he considered the road, notoriously, to 
“the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” (see “End of History?”). Lutz 
Niethammer, in the most wide-ranging analysis of the phenomenon of posthistoire – written 
from an avowedly leftist point of view – even traced the idea back to the beginnings of the 
20th century and followed it through the period after 1945 to a new wave of posthistorical 
thinking in the 1970s. 
 Niethammer’s book Posthistoire: Ist die Geschichte zu Ende? indeed, read in the context 
of Angelopoulos’s work, is highly instructive. Niethammer defines posthistoire in general 
terms as a “nachgeschichtlichen Zustand der Weltzivilisation,” in which history “wie ein 
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großer Apparat funktioniert und Kultur naturhaft erstarrt” (8f.). Most narratives of 
posthistoire – and Niethammer insists on the discursive nature of the phenomenon – are 
predicated on the identification of “anonymen Prozeßstrukturen […], vor denen der 
Einzelne so sehr seine Ohnmacht erfährt, daß er ihnen Allmacht zuschreibt” (69). “Die 
Mehrheit der Autoren,” he argues, “sieht keine Chance mehr, daß das große Individuum 
oder die Avantgarde die Verhältnisse ändern kann […]. Sie entwerfen keine neuen 
Handlungsperspektiven, sondern beklagen die Irrelevanz der alten. […] Wo das führende 
Individuum oder die Avantgarde nichts mehr bewegt, bewegt sich in ihren Augen überhaupt 
nichts mehr.” (70). This is, of course, a highly critical view of the posthistorical discourse, 
and Niethammer is adamant to point out that “Posthistoire ist keine entfaltete Theorie; viel 
eher ist es ein symptomatisches Gefühl” (158), or even a “projektive Entlastung” (163). For 
what kind of history ends here – “Welche Geschichte wird beendet” (70)?  
 It is precisely Koselleck’s verfügbare and machbare history – a universal terrain of action, 
with an open future that can be shaped and made by historical subjects – that becomes 
highly precarious in the posthistorical discourse. “Die Geschichte, die im Posthistoire 
aufhört,” Niethammer writes, “ist eine sinnhafte Gedankenkonstruktion über das 
Weltgeschehen im ganzen,” a history that is characterized by mankind’s capacity 
“Geschichte handelnd zu verändern” (157). The concept of a posthistoire “setzt erstens die 
große, sinnhafte, zielgerichtete Geschichte der klassischen Geschichtsphilosophie voraus 
und zweitens deren voluntaristische Wende: die Durchsetzung von Sinn und Ziel solcher 
Geschichte” (158). Against this background, Niethammer concludes that “Posthistoire wird 
geschichtlich, wenn sie nicht als allgemeine Diagnose, sondern als eine für den 
Perspektivverlust fortgeschrittener Industriegesellschaften spezifische negative Utopie 
gelesen wird” (169). The world of advanced capitalist societies – of which Angelopoulos’s 
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Greece, even if only tangentially so, had become a member in the course of the so-called 
normalization – saw itself confronted, increasingly, with a “sich selbst steuernden System 
[…], das mit marginalen Unterschieden in der politischen Ausprägung virtuell die ganze Welt 
umspannt und sich ungeachtet aller Umstürze und Kriege ständig selbst reproduziert. Dieses 
‘zweite System’ […] löse sich ab von der Natur, von der Erfahrbarkeit der Wirklichkeit, von 
der Zeit als einer sinnhaften Entwicklung und vom Eingriff jedes einzelnen” (163). 
Angelopoulos’s own politics of time from the Trilogy of History, along with his belief in the 
alterability of reality and in collective and individual praxis, seemed increasingly difficult to 
sustain in light of this kind of development. The director’s statement about the world as a 
“chessboard on which man is just another pawn and his chance of an impact on the 
proceedings, negligible” (Interviews 49), hence, is fully symptomatic of the profound way in 
which wide sectors even of the political and cultural Left were affected by the discourse of 
posthistoire. It bespeaks a profound sense of alienation from a history the Left had once 
considered safely on its side. 
 What, then, are the political and, more importantly, aesthetic repercussions of such 
new historical conditions? And can one make the case for a formal sedimentation of this 
posthistorical discourse in Angelopoulos’s work? Niethammer, on his part, identifies as one 
available solution a “Rückzug aus dem Raum der Geschichte” and suggests that the 
“praktische Niederlage wurde in der geistigen Produktion kompensiert” (162) – an 
“Entlastung durch […] Rückzug in die Innerlichkeit” (166). His assertion that “[die] Freiheit 
des Einzelnen sei nicht mehr sinnhaft auf das Gesamtgeschehen zu beziehen, sondern 
realisierte sich allenfalls noch in dessen Nischen, in der erinnernden Phantasie, im Mythos, 
im ‘als ob’” (163) gestures towards a possible new function for aesthetic production once 
heteronomy is considered out of question. And indeed, in the interview I have quoted above 
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Angelopoulos also states that since  
  the normalization set in, we are looking for new approaches, and I have the  
  feeling we are coming back to a kind of existentialism. […] This does not  
  necessarily mean we have to go back to the hero in the primitive sense of the 
  word, but at least to a narrative that puts man in the center. It is not a return  
  to psychology, but a transition from the generalities of the epics to a far more 
  personal cinema, in which the filmmaker is questioning himself and his art.  
  (Interviews 49) 
“I have the feeling,” Angelopoulos concedes in another interview from the late 1980s, “that 
everything around me stands still” (65). History “is now silent. And we are all trying to find 
answers by digging into ourselves, for it is terribly difficult to live in silence. When there is 
no historical development, one is tempted to focus on oneself” (58). There is, he argues, 
nothing left “but to look inside, into one’s own self. To face the identity crisis we’re all 
victims of, or the void surrounding those who dare speak no more because they don’t have 
anything new to say, unless it is to speculate about the end of history” (81). And yet, there is 
a glimmer of hope: “The world,” Angelopoulos announces “needs cinema now more than 
ever. It may be the last important form of resistance to the deteriorating world in which we 
live” (86). Indeed: “I would like to believe the world will be saved by the cinema” (64). 
 It is, I will argue in the following, both this profound sense of alienation from the 
historical present and a belief in the salvaging force of art that finds expression in the 
sequence shots of the Trilogy of Silence. The form of the plan-séquence emerges, 
simultaneously, as the sedimented content of a history in the state of suspension and as a 
promesse du bonheur pointing beyond the realms of history and politics towards an 
autonomous, and redemptive, sphere of aesthetic fulfillment. While in the Trilogy of 
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History, as I have demonstrated above, history was presented as an untranscendable horizon, 
the Trilogy of Silence juxtaposes the historical sphere with a different, purely aesthetic, 
domain: in the sequence shot, accordingly, the historical present is no longer articulated with 
other layers of historical time as part of a now-time but is juxtaposed with an other time – and 
an other space – outside and beyond the domain of history. Instead of a unified terrain and a 
historical Jetztzeit, thus, the sequence shots in the Trilogy of Silence bring into being a 
separate sphere of art with its own aesthetic Eigenzeit. This, precisely, is at the heart of what I 
describe here as a transformation of chronotopes in the work of Angelopoulos. 
 
The Trilogy of Silence is characterized by a marked shift away from the Trilogy of History’s 
emphasis on collective protagonists and profoundly historical subject matter. What moves to 
the center of all three films of the 1980s, instead, is the individual subject and the 
problematic of its status in an alienated world: Voyage to Cythera (1984) presents an exiled 
communist’s return to post-dictatorial – and posthistorical – Greece and his incapacity to 
come to terms with, let alone assimilate to, the realities of contemporary Greek society. The 
Beekeeper (1986) follows a retired teacher’s, and third-generation beekeeper’s, journey to his 
late father’s ancestral village. Landscape in the Mist (1988) accompanies two children through a 
desolate landscape on their futile quest for an absent father. 
! This reinstation of the individual subject – signaled at the very beginning of Voyage to 
Cythera by the almost incantatory repetition of the phrase “It’s me” – coincides with a 
number of thematic and formal developments that will come to dominate in almost all of 
Angelopoulos’s later films. The director continues to use what I have called above the 
“mythical method” but his appropriation of mythological narratives – mediated theatrically, 
as in The Travelling Players, through Aeschylus and Brecht – now replaces the collective story 
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of the House of Atreus in favor of the more individualistic Homeric epos of the Odyssey. 
Characters like the returning exile in Voyage to Cythera or, more obviously, the protagonist of 
the later film Ulysses’ Gaze in their manifold journeys and homecomings thus often evoke the 
figure of Odysseus, that “prototype of the bourgeois individual,” as Adorno and 
Horkheimer significantly argued, “whose concept originates in the unwavering self-assertion 
of which the protagonist driven to wander the earth is the primeval model” (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 35). The individual, existential quest upon which so many of the characters after 
the Trilogy of History embark, indeed, becomes perhaps the most pervasive structuring 
device in Angelopoulos’s narratives from Voyage to Cythera on.26 This development, crucially, 
goes hand in hand with Angelopoulos’s disavowal of more performative models of identity 
and a turn to ontologically stable, “rounded” characters, who are often played now by 
prominent actors of international caliber such as Marcello Mastroianni, Harvey Keitel, Bruno 
Ganz or Michel Piccoli.27 With very few exceptions, in fact, Angelopoulos’s casting shows a 
predilection for older men frequently portraying aging protagonists on the brink of death.  
 This turn to a more individualistic “new anthropocentrism” – as if a Brechtian 
aesthetic weren’t anthropocentric – can also be detected in smaller formal details of these 
films. As if to provide his striving heroes with an epitheton ornans, for instance, with Voyage to 
Cythera Angelopoulos abandons his distaste for extra-diegetic music and begins to make use 
of beautifully crafted musical themes sometimes explicitly attached to a particular character: 
“the old man’s theme,” or “Ulysses’ theme” as musical attributes evoking a certain mood or 
frame of mind. The proliferation of mirrors in which the characters see themselves reflected 
is a further sign of a growing preoccupation with questions of the self. So is, perhaps, the – 
exceedingly rare still, but not entirely absent anymore – use of close-ups. And on several 
occasions Angelopoulos has his protagonists quote lines from poetry: figuring prominently, 
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indicatively, are Rilke, Eliot, and Greece’s George Seferis, all three of them poets of 
existential alienation and, importantly, vigorous champions of aesthetic autonomy. 
 It is, however, through the sequence shot that this sense of alienation becomes most 
palpable in the Trilogy of Silence. The shift from Brecht to Rilke, in fact, perfectly captures a 
radical transformation in the content of the form of the plan-séquence: Brechtian Verfremdung 
turns into a poetics of Entfremdung. That such a transformation is possible in the first place 
also speaks to the political indeterminacy of Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt as such. The 
quintessentially Angelopoulean long takes, long shots, and extended silences in this new 
trilogy are no longer, as in the previous one, markers of history’s performative core, of a 
reflective and commanding gaze onto a historical terrain that can be measured and 
transformed, but of its very opposite: a transcendental homelessness, a fundamentally 
inscrutable world. The plan-séquence no longer places Angelopoulos’s characters in a historical 
terrain of action; it leaves them abandoned, instead, in an alienated present without hope: 
being-in history turns into being-lost from it. It is as if Marx’s dialectical formula had 
suddenly imploded, the second part of the equation – men also “make their own history” – 
eviscerated. Or rather: as if the specter of an eternal same that had already haunted the 
travelling players had finally materialized, the perpetuity of the now no longer inflected by a 
political-historical struggle for the present.   
 Time and again, in the Trilogy of Silence, Angelopoulos’s sequences become 
emblems of man’s forlornness in a hostile universe. The galactic imagery in the title sequence 
of Voyage to Cythera is the prelude to the old man Spyros’s return to Greece: disembarking 
from the massive ferry that has brought him back, Spyros – a dark figure in extreme long 
shot – is rendered a tiny, fragile creature against the background of a huge machine, as if a 
spaceship were releasing an alien from outer space to earth. Spyros’s lonely dance on a 
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cemetery – his back, in extreme long shot, turned to the spectator – is performed against the 
background of a tremendous landscape in the mountains, greyish-green and misty: man is 
confronted here not with a history of his own making but with nature’s elemental forces, and 
above all death. The same is true for the film’s magnificent closing sequence, which – once 
again in extreme long shot and with their backs to the spectator – finds Spyros and his wife 
on a raft slowly but irreversibly floating towards the open sea amid a dark-grey sky and heavy 
rain. The other Spyros, in The Beekeeper, likewise drives his van – here too the indispensable 
long shots – through a grim terrain full of modernism’s emblematic signs of alienation: 
desolate gas stations, fading neon-signs, the fumes of power stations, and industrial 
architecture. And the pitiable children in the trilogy’s last installment – dwarfed by the 
mountains, battered by rain – constantly find themselves in an eponymous Landscape in the 
Mist: their forlornness takes on a veritably metaphysical dimension. All of these images 
bespeak what Angelopoulos has pithily termed the “silence of god” (Interviews 117). So do, of 
course, the terrifyingly long take in which Angelopoulos focuses, from far away, on the 
motionless van in which Voula is raped; and the iconic sequence in which an ancient statue’s 
marble hand – its index finger broken – is lifted out of the sea by a helicopter and left 
dangling over the skyline of modern-day Salonica: this world, Angelopoulos suggests, has 
lost its bearings. 
 Though it can be problematic to take at face value a director’s pronouncements on 
his own oeuvre, Angelopoulos, like many a modernist artist, is a concise and eloquent 
explicator of his work. His assertion that the three films of the Trilogy of Silence deal, 
progressively, with the silence of history, the silence of love, and the silence of god (see 
Interviews 117) captures very well an important aspect of the filmmaker’s artistic production in 
the 1980s. What one can witness here, I would argue, is an increasing metaphysicalization – 
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or better: de-historicization – of both the conceptual problematics at hand and the possible 
solutions offered in these films: a trajectory that leads decisively away from history, not to 
religion proper but to a modernist form, perhaps, of a religion of art. 
 Very much unlike the Trilogy of History, all three films in the Trilogy of Silence 
follow a strictly linear narrative and temporal structure, and all three end – more or less 
explicitly – in death. The old couple in Voyage to Cythera is, quite literally, shipped off to and 
abandoned on the open sea. Spyros in The Beekeeper has himself stung to death by his own 
bees. The children in Landscape in the Mist are, the final sequence strongly suggests, shot to 
death by a border guard. In the climactic moments of all three films, then, the hostility of the 
universe – a sense that there is no place for these characters in a dismal historical present – is 
very much affirmed.  
 And yet: all three endings are also represented as a resolution of – and indeed a 
liberation from – a profound historical impasse, as the overcoming of a dead historical time 
that has long gone out of sync with the aspirations and desires of humanity. Voyage to Cythera, 
as Angelopoulos himself has suggested is a veritable exorcism of history as such (see 
Interviews 41). Spyros’s end, in The Beekeeper, completes a trajectory on which the film’s 
protagonist successively frees himself from the trappings of historical time and harmonizes 
his life with the natural time of beekeeping. The children in Landscape in the Mist, in the 
climactic moment of the entire trilogy, take this development to its logical conclusion and 
are allowed, by Angelopoulos, to find redemption in a realm of pure imagination.  
 Significantly, these steps beyond and outside the spheres of history and politics are 
coded as aesthetic moments. Art plays a generative role in their emergence. The visually 
stunning finale of Voyage to Cythera has Spyros, his wife faithfully by his side, play his violin, 
quietly but insistently, as the raft is moving into the distance. Announcing the dawn of a new 
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day – “I am ready,” responds his wife – Spyros is prepared to make his own voyage to the 
eponymous island of Cythera: the birthplace of Aphrodite, ancient goddess of love; but also 
the setting of Watteau’s pastoral L’Embarquement pour Cythère.28 In the final seconds of The 
Beekeeper, dramatically panning upwards, the cinematic camera itself performs the celestial 
movement that releases Spyros from all earthly bonds. And the beautiful landscape with the 
tree at the end of Landscape in the Mist, of course, had been prefigured on a strip of film. 
 Though it is most emphatically present in these climactic sequences, the notion that 
the aesthetic is a sphere of retreat, and release, from the historical is manifest throughout the 
Trilogy of Silence. In all three films a profound negativity is balanced, if only ever so 
tentatively, by intimations of what Adorno would call the promesse du bonheur of artistic 
imagination.29 Significantly, the site of encounter of these two kinds of realities – the 
alienated and the free – is often the sequence shot itself. Unlike in the Trilogy of History, 
which brought together different layers of historical time through the plan-séquence, in the 
Trilogy of Silence Angelopoulos articulates a dreary historical present with an “unsullied and 
pure” (Interviews 42) realm of imagination that co-exists with but lies outside the present. 
What I have called above a “chronotopic expansion” of the spatio-temporal continuity of 
the sequence shot, then, no longer consists here of an extension of one historical moment 
into another but of the supplementation of the historical present with a time-space that 
transcends it. While the Zeiträume of the Trilogy of History constituted an untranscendably 
historical Jetztzeit, those of the Trilogy of Silence introduce an autonomously aesthetic time-
space of their own. 
 The narrative of Voyage to Cythera is dominated by Spyros’s failed attempts, in the 
wake of his return to Greece, to assimilate into the life of contemporary society and the 
surroundings of his family. As a former guerrilla fighter and political exile, he represents a 
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kind of return of the repressed for the normalized society of post-dictatorial Greece and is 
accordingly labeled – by members of his family, former antagonists, and state officials alike – 
a “shadow,” a “ghost,” “dead” and non-existent. “His presence,” a policeman remarks, 
“creates a problem.” – “Officially, he is not here.” – “They don’t know what to do with 
him.”30 Angelopoulos through his sequence shots creates a cinematic language that signifies 
Spyros’s lack of belonging, that expresses formally the protagonist’s alienation from a world 
he no longer understands and no longer is understood by. But these plan-séquences are also 
punctuated here and there by markers – however faint and short-lived – of a realm beyond 
such alienation: a realm of aesthetics, of artistic imagination, and of creative freedom. 
Spyros’s son, the film director Alexandros, could be considered a sort of hinge between 
these two worlds: In one sequence, some ten minutes into the film, and amid an actress’s 
pronouncement that there is nothing left to believe in, the figure of Spyros is transformed, 
through the director’s imagination, into the protagonist of the latter’s newest project. In 
another, left abandoned on a dark and rainy urban street worthy of Antonioni, Alexandros 
moves his fingers as if he were playing a piano, and a tender melody emerges from the off. 
Both sound and off-space here contribute to the demarcation of an autonomously aesthetic 
sphere within the sequence shot itself. The same is true for the plan-séquence I have mentioned 
above, in which Spyros performs a dance on the cemetery of his ancestral village: the music 
is neither intra-diegetic nor fully extra-diegetic; it materializes, on the contrary, from a place 
that cannot be but Spyros’s imagination. In a similar fashion, when the protagonist of Voyage 
to Cythera returns to the long-dilapidated house of his youth, he finds – after many decades of 
absence – the dinner table set, the scene prepared for an appetizing meal. In each of these 
instances, the sequence shot co-articulates a world of alienation with a consoling, if not 
redemptive, sphere of artistic freedom and creative imagination. 
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 The Spyros of The Beekeeper, too, is met with aural echoes of a more fulfilled past 
during a scene of return to his family’s derelict house. And he, too, is an old man who has 
become estranged from his job as a teacher, from his wife and children, and from his 
political past as a committed leftist. He decides to abandon society, family, and history and 
to return to his ancestral village, retracing his late father’s steps as a beekeeper. His journey, 
accordingly, is not only an individual quest for the father and for a return home but also an 
attempt, as I have suggested above, of overcoming historical time and bringing his life in 
accordance with the cycles and rhythms of natural time. Beekeeping, then, has a twofold 
function in the film: It is, firstly, the marker of a different measure of time beyond and 
outside the historical. As an artisanal activity, secondly, it serves as an emblem for creative 
and authentic human activity in an otherwise alienated world: a thoroughly modernist 
response – think the cult of manual work and the crafts in early-20th century poetry – to the 
universe of technology, machines and power stations that is so negatively depicted in The 
Beekeeper, too. Indicatively, a number of sequences in the film articulate images of Spyros’s 
long journey through a desolate landscape of alienation with the sound of his voice reading 
his father’s diary entries about the state of the beehives and about the course of the natural 
seasons. This, once again, points to the juxtaposition within the plan-séquence of a dismal 
historical present with a free and natural realm of artistic and creative praxis. Spyros’s end in 
his father’s village – he has himself stung to death by his bees – is both the culmination of 
his journey home and the consummation of his quest for harmony with natural, and not 
historical, time. 
 Of all of Angelopoulos’s works, however, even beyond the Trilogy of Silence, it is 
Landscape in the Mist that departs most decisively from history as a direct subject matter and a 
sphere of human praxis. Though this complete absence of a historical dimension proper is 
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itself legible in its historicity – as the point of maximum disillusionment with the historical 
process at large – Landscape in the Mist can justifiably be said to depict a state of alienation as 
the properly existential and universal predicament of the human condition. This is why I 
have described the trajectory of the Trilogy of Silence as one of a gradual, and ever more 
forceful, de-historicization or even metaphysicalization. If Voyage to Cythera signaled, in 
Angelopoulos’s words, the “silence of history,” what one witnesses here is indeed the 
“silence of god”: Alexandros and Voula’s forlornness in a hostile universe, their desperate 
and futile quest for an absent father, has a fully metaphysical dimension. It is, however, 
despite – or rather: precisely because of – the film’s radical poetics of alienation that it also 
provides the spectator with the most emphatic moments of aesthetic fulfillment in the 
Trilogy of Silence. And once again, it is in a number of sequence shots that such moments 
manifest themselves most clearly. 
 In one paradigmatic such sequence, Alexandros and Voula find themselves at a 
police station somewhere in Greece, about to be interrogated. In the preceding scene, a 
police officer had picked them up on a long-distance train and had forced them to 
disembark. This train, so the children had hoped, would have taken them to their unknown 
father in Germany – a father, according to the children’s uncle, of their mother’s invention, 
and a “terrible lie.” The bleakness of the children’s situation, however, is momentarily 
alleviated here by the sudden beginning, outside the run-down police quarters, of snowfall: a 
magic snow emerging from out of nowhere, or rather: from a place, once again, that cannot 
be but that of cinematic imagination itself. The depressing atmosphere in the building that 
had dominated the beginning of the sequence is transformed into one of quiet exaltation, a 
surprised marveling at the sudden occurrence of a moment of pure poetic beauty. It is this 
moment that Alexandros and Voula use to flee from the police station. Once the children 
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are outside, the image literally freezes – a beautiful tableau materializes of people beholding 
the snow – with the exception of Alexandros and Voula, who manage thus to escape. For a 
brief moment, the sadness and hostility of the world so ubiquitous in Landscape in the Mist 
are, quite literally, arrested and supplanted by the poetic force of cinematic imagination. The 
emotional piece of extra-diegetic music at the culmination of this scene further underlines 
this moment of what one could call a spatio-temporal rupture with the historical present. 
 There are several such sequences in Landscape in the Mist in which an aesthetic promesse 
du bonheur shines through Alexandros and Voula’s alienated lives, in which moments of 
unadulterated beauty punctuate the sadness of the children’s unfulfilled quest. In a plan-
séquence some 39 minutes into the film and a little over three minutes long, a starving 
Alexandros begs for some food in a dilapidated taverna but is treated harshly by the 
restaurant’s hostile owner. As Alexandros is clearing the tables – the barman’s condition for 
feeding the five-year old – an old man in poor clothes opens the door, takes out a violin and 
intones a beautiful melody. Alexandros, consoled, applauds as the barman throws the 
violinist out of the restaurant. The scene, similarly, in which the children and their 
companion Orestes discover the piece of film on a heap of trash comes immediately after an 
extended conversation among the three of them about their lack of orientation and their 
uncertainty about the future: “Where am I going?” Orestes wonders. On several occasions, 
too, scenes of almost total desperation are infused with a sense of hope when men in yellow 
raincoats cycle or walk through the image: enigmatic figures that occur throughout 
Angelopoulos’s work after the Trilogy of History – chiffres, most likely, of some kind of 
other, better, life beyond alienation. And, of course, there is the climactic final sequence of 
the film, which I have invoked in the opening paragraph of this chapter: a kind of apotheosis 
of the cinematic medium, an aesthetic redemption of the children’s violent death through 
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the director’s creative imagination. Nowhere in Angelopoulos’s oeuvre is what Adorno calls 
the “Abgrund zwischen der Praxis und dem Glück” bigger than in this scene, and nowhere is 
it more true that the promesse du bonheur of art indeed connotes a kind of fulfillment that lies 
beyond the real, beyond the present and history – a Glück “über der Praxis” (Ästhetische 
Theorie 26). 
 
To seek fulfillment “über der Praxis” also means, of course, to invalidate Benjamin’s 
fundamental question about the position of art not “to the relations of production of its 
time” but “in them” (“Author as Producer” 81). Indeed, as I have said above, the 
fundamental shift of attitude in Angelopoulos’s conception of the role of aesthetics can best 
be described as a radical disavowal of the production model that had characterized the 
Trilogy of History in favor of a model of aesthetic autonomy. It is, accordingly, also a 
transformation of modernist aesthetic practice itself that one witnesses in Angelopoulos’s 
oeuvre between the Trilogy of History and the Trilogy of Silence: away from an avant-
gardist, Marxist modernism associated with Benjamin and Brecht, towards the serene 
negativity of a high modernism that, as I will argue in the following, one can justifiably 
associate with Adorno.31 As Adorno himself would never tire to stress, however, the 
rejection of heteronomy and a concomitant “emphasis on autonomous works” is, of course, 
by no means an ahistorical or apolitical phenomenon: It is, on the contrary, “itself socio-
political in nature. The feigning of a true politics here and now, the freezing of historical 
relations which nowhere seem ready to melt, oblige the mind to go where it need not 
degrade itself” (“Commitment” 89).32  
 This, precisely, is the properly historical determinant for the transformation of 
chronotopes in Angelopoulos’s work – for the momentous developments, that is, in the 
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nexus of cinematic form, historical time, and a politics of aesthetic production I have 
analyzed throughout this chapter. When the sense of a dismal historical present is 
overbearing and both futurity and transformative political praxis become inconceivable, one 
must resort outside a space of historicity to imagine something like redemption. The radical 
shifts in the content of the form of the sequence shot are the formal sedimentation of this 
process: instead of a unified historical terrain, instead of Jetztzeit and an open future as in the 
Trilogy of History, the Trilogy of Silence produces the measure of an aesthetic Eigenzeit that 
runs counter to a history detached from human subjectivity. It is a measure of time – and a 
space of freedom in imagination – that needs to substitute for the loss of the promise of 
modernity itself: that history is machbar and verfügbar. There is a melancholy and highly self-
reflective sequence in Landscape in the Mist that captures perfectly this disenchantment with 
the historical process at large: On a desolate beach under a cloudy sky, the travelling players 
make a cameo appearance, glumly – almost mechanically – reciting their lines from the 
earlier film. They are stuck in a performance of the past, detached from any kind of present. 
“Time,” Orestes comments at one point, “has ruined them.” 
 
LEFT MELANCHOLIA, LATE STYLE, AND THE DISCONTENTS OF SECOND CINEMA 
 
That time – as an all-consuming and impersonal agent – can, in Orestes’s words, “ruin” the 
travelling players points to a dramatic reconfiguration of the notion of historical temporality 
between the Trilogy of History and the Trilogy of Silence. It is, in fact, a clear indicator of 
Angelopoulos’s very revocation of what Niethammer had called the “voluntaristic turn” of 
the philosophy of history. Something issuing from a loss, from an “unavowably crushed 
ideal – an ideal that lives in empty time rather than the time of the Now precisely to the extent that it 
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is imagined to have been killed by time, that it is lost in time”: this is how Wendy Brown 
defines the condition of “left melancholia,” Benjamin’s name, as she writes, “for a mournful, 
conservative, backward-looking attachment to feelings, analyses, or relations that have 
become fetishized and frozen” (Brown 170, my emphases). It is precisely, as I have shown 
above, such an abrogation of now-time – as the perpetual present of an intensely contested 
political history – that underlies the transformation of chronotopes and the radical shifts in 
the politics of form of Angelopoulos’s films.33 The mournful recollection of a political past 
that is irrevocably lost provides a kind of basso continuo to the entirety of the filmmaker’s 
oeuvre from this period: it is at the bottom of Spyros’s failed integration into society in 
Voyage to Cythera, it can be heard in the other Spyros’s lament about his missed “rendezvous 
with history” in The Beekeeper, and it accompanies the transcendental homelessness of the 
children as well as the decrepitude of the remaining travelling players in Landscape in the Mist. 
It is ubiquitous, too, in Angelopoulos’s interviews: Time and again, the director expresses a 
“sadness,” a “profound regret for all that is irremediably lost” (Interviews 47), evoking a 
period when he, along with his entire generation, believed that the world could be changed 
(see Travelling Players, Bonus Material). In a highly instructive passage from an interview in 
2009, Angelopoulos recasts this loss in specifically temporal imagery, as a falling out-of-sync 
with historical time itself:  “Tu connais la phrase d’une chanson de Mikis [Theodorakis] qui 
s’appelle ‘Καβάλα πάμε στον καιρό’… On pensait qu’on était […] ‘à cheval sur le temps’ 
[…] Parce qu’il y avait une perspective historique […]. Il y avait une jeunesse qui croyait à ça 
partout dans le monde. C’est pour ça que cela a donné une joie” (Archimandritis 148).  
 What is at stake here is the question of timeliness – the timeliness not simply of 
Angelopoulos’s practical position vis-à-vis the political and historical present, suffused as it is 
with the left melancholic’s “narcissism with regard to one’s past political attachments and 
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identity that frames all contemporary investments in political mobilization, alliance, or 
transformation” (Brown 169); but also the timeliness of a specific mode of representation, of 
the very modernism that determines Angelopoulos’s attempts at capturing the contemporary 
predicament he believes himself to be in. What is at stake, in short, is the question of 
modernist aesthetic practice at the end of, or in late, modernity: a question about the validity 
of modernism that fully entails the possibility of its being itself an object of fetishistic 
attachment, or at least subject to the forces of reification or outright ossification. 
 It would, however, be unfair to subsume Angelopoulos’s work fully under the rubric 
of left melancholia. His public statements and the thematization of loss and disillusionment 
in his films notwithstanding, nowhere in the Trilogy of Silence – in either form or content – 
does Angelopoulos attempt to resolve this contemporary impasse through anything like a 
nostalgic projection of a more fulfilled past. Rather than framing the discussion in terms of 
the polemic category of left melancholia, then, it might be more instructive to consider the 
concept of “lateness” in general, and “late style” in particular. This, in turn, may also help to 
account for the somewhat surprising return of a properly Adornian autonomy aesthetic in 
Angelopoulos’s later work. 
 Angelopoulos is, fundamentally, an artist of modernity. Sylvie Rollet has aptly written 
that the director “est bien un cineaste de la ‘modernité’ ou, plus exactement, de la ‘méta-
modernité’, si l’on définit celle-ci comme la conscience ‘d’être dans l’histoire’” (Rollet 8). It is 
against history as such that the lived reality of the present is – positively or negatively – 
measured. And it is precisely in Angelopoulos’s attempts at grasping conceptually, and 
representing aesthetically, such an historical experience in its totality that both modernism 
and the legacy of Marxism operate as key determinants of the director’s world-view. This 
also explains Angelopoulos’s obvious disregard for the particularism of the various identity 
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politics that emerged on the political stage in the wake of 1968 and, importantly, the utter 
incommensurability of his aesthetic with a postmodernist celebration of fragmentation, 
difference, irony, parody, the simulacrum, and the mixing of high and low. 
 This continued insistence on totality as, ultimately, the only valid analytic framework 
is, I would argue, precisely what accounts for the affinities between Angelopoulos’s work 
and Adorno’s philosophy. For both of them, such totality is apprehended at a moment when 
Adorno’s proverbial “sundial of the philosophy of history” has advanced to a late stage34, 
when history – in Angelopoulos’s diction – has all but turned silent. Lateness, however, is 
not the prelude to a new dawn, it does not inaugurate a breakthrough to something that 
comes after. Instead, as Edward Said has written in a memorable passage on Adorno, 
lateness “is impossible to transcend or surmount […]; it can only be deepened” (“Late Style” 
4). It is “a thing in its own right, not a premonition or obliteration of something else. 
Lateness is being at the end, fully conscious, full of memory, and also very (even 
preternaturally) aware of the present.”  
 I use the term late style, then, in its ambivalent sense as both an Altersstil – old-age 
style – and a Spätstil – the manifestation of a more generally historical condition of lateness.35 
What manifests itself here is a tension between individual expression and the historical 
situation in which the latter emerges. Late style is both the willful assertion of individual 
subjectivity in the face of the individual’s eclipse and the sedimentation of a historical 
process nearing suspension. As such, it constitutes a peculiar mix of the untimely and the 
timely. It is, in Said’s words, “in, but oddly apart from, the present (Late Style 24). Adorno, in 
his work on Beethoven, interprets the composer’s late style as the point of crystallization of 
the unreconciled – and unreconcilable – relationship between the individual and society.36 
Drawing on Adorno, Said maintains – in a statement that resonates very strongly with my 
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argument here about the Trilogy of Silence – that “this is the prerogative of late style: it has 
the power to render disenchantment and pleasure without resolving the contradiction 
between them” (148). Angelopoulos’s sequence shots – carriers at once of historical 
resignation and the promesse du bonheur of art – are animated by this very field of tension. 
Angelopoulos offers the promise of art as the dialectical other of a history coming to end, 
but in doing so – like Said’s Adorno – precisely “becomes a figure of lateness itself, an 
untimely and scandalous, even catastrophic commentator on the present.” The “increasing 
sense of apartness and exile and anachronism” (“Late Style” 5) that corresponds with such a 
position is as easy to detect, of course, in Adorno’s work – from the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
through the Minima Moralia to the Aesthetic Theory – as it is in Angelopoulos’s Trilogy of 
Silence. 
 Angelopoulos’s turn to a form of philosophical, historical, and aesthetic thought akin 
to that of Adorno, consequently, could be considered emblematic of a certain trajectory of 
Western Marxism or Marxist modernism as such: a trajectory through which Adorno’s 
philosophy, somewhat belatedly and posthumously, comes into its own in the course of the 
1980s. Fredric Jameson’s assessment, in 1990 precisely, captures this peculiar sense of 
timeliness: 
Here at length, in this decade which has just ended but is still ours, Adorno’s 
prophecies of the “total system” finally came true, in wholly unexpected 
forms. Adorno was surely not the philosopher of the thirties […]; nor the 
philosopher of the forties or fifties; nor even the thinker of the sixties […]; 
and I have said that, philosophically and theoretically, his old-fashioned 
dialectical discourse was incompatible with the seventies. But there is some 
chance that he may turn out to have been the analyst of our own period, 
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which he did not live to see, and in which late capitalism has all but 
succeeded in eliminating the final loopholes of nature and the Unconscious, 
of subversion and the aesthetic, of individual and collective praxis alike […]. 
It now seems to me possible, then, that Adorno’s Marxism, which was no 
great help in the previous periods, may turn out to be just what we need 
today. (Late Marxism 5) 
It is for a situation of a “locked social geology so massive that no visions of modification 
seem possible,” accordingly, that Jameson proposes “Adorno as a dialectical model” (251). 
 The transformation of Angelopoulos’s work that manifests itself in the Trilogy of 
Silence, then, does not consist of a revocation of either the Marxist or the modernist legacy 
that had so strongly informed the Trilogy of History; rather, it marks a historically 
conditioned shift on the axis of Marxist modernism itself from the pole occupied by the 
Benjamin and Brecht of “The Author as Producer” to the “late Marxism” – and, for that 
matter, late modernism – of Adorno. This, as I have suggested above, in turn also brings 
about a transformation of the notion of a politics of aesthetic production: If Adorno’s desire 
is not least to “[keep] alive a now unseasonable conception of the deeper political vocation 
of modernism itself” (Jameson, Late Marxism 7) – if indeed, as Said suggests, “[late] style is 
what happens if art does not abdicate its rights in favour of reality” (“Late Style” 4) – then 
Adorno also opposes the kind of political aesthetic Benjamin and Brecht had espoused, a 
political aesthetic, that is, “which stresses and valorizes the function of works of art within 
situations of immediacy, and in the realm of the day-to-day struggle and the Event, rather 
than their deeper expression of social struggle or historical contradiction” (Jameson, Late 
Marxism 223).  
 Within Adorno’s model of aesthetic production art draws its critical – indeed its 
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political – function from its autonomy and negativity; or rather, in the more properly 
Adornian terminology: from its character as determinate negation. “Art,” Adorno writes, “is 
the social antithesis of society, not directly deducible from it” (Aesthetic Theory 10). “Art gains 
its content [Inhalt] through the latter’s determinate negation (192). “[It] becomes social by its 
opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as autonomous art […]. Art’s 
asociality is the determinate negation of a determinate society” (308). “One of the meanings 
of determinate negation,” as Christoph Menke emphasizes, is “its grounding in the negated” 
(Sovereignty of Art 25). The torn strip of film in Angelopoulos’s Landscape in the Mist, 
accordingly, emerges as the perfect emblem for art as such: a photographic negative of the 
world, it is at once the imprint of damaged life and points beyond it.  
 What Menke in a recent study has called “Die Kraft der Kunst,” then, has its locus in 
something altogether different from the notion of productivity that so much energized the 
work of Brecht and Benjamin: “Die Kunst,” Menke writes, 
  ist vielmehr das Feld einer Freiheit nicht im Sozialen, sondern vom Sozialen;  
  genauer: der Freiheit vom Sozialen im Sozialen. Sobald das Ästhetische zu  
  einer Produktivkraft im postdisziplinären Kapitalismus wird, ist es seiner  
  Kraft beraubt; denn das Ästhetische ist aktiv und hat Effekte, aber es ist  
  nicht produktiv. Ebenso wird das Ästhetische seiner Kraft beraubt, wenn es  
  eine soziale Praxis sein soll, die sich gegen die entfesselte Produktivität im  
  postdisziplinären Kapitalismus ins Feld führen läßt; das Ästhetische ist zwar  
  befreiend und verändernd, aber es ist nicht praktisch – nicht “politisch.”  
  (Kraft der Kunst 14) 
 
In order to turn these observations into a more immediately film-historical argument, it is 
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instructive briefly to consider Jameson’s assertion that in “an earlier situation of uneven 
development, Adorno’s dialectic (and so-called Western Marxism generally) could be grasped 
as a specific and restricted First World Marxism, the property of intellectuals, a specialized 
intellectual instrument very different from the ones demanded by underdevelopment or 
socialist construction” (Late Marxism 249, my emphasis). To what extent, one might ask, 
does the trajectory of Angelopoulos’s work itself signify a transition from a kind of Third 
World imaginary and strong affinities with the precepts of Third Cinema to the aesthetics of 
an auteurist “second cinema” firmly rooted in the First World? The question is less abstruse 
than it might initially seem: Angelopoulos himself, after all, in 1970 had argued that the 
“Third World is not limited to Africa and Latin America. If you ask me, it includes Greece 
and Turkey too” (Interviews 5); and on the political level, the official rhetoric of Papandreou’s 
PASOK at around the same time often very explicitly situated Greece – a poor country on 
the periphery of Europe – in the context of a Third World liberationism: “Papandreou 
thought of Greece as ‘[…] a country that is European while partaking of the characteristics 
of the Third World […]’ and which needed a ‘special kind of intervention’” (Karalis 195).37 
 One must be careful, of course, not to overstate the parallels between 
Angelopoulos’s early output and the films and theoretical proclamations of a mainly Latin 
American Third Cinema.38 There are, however, important points of convergence between 
the two that ultimately, I would argue, have their foundation not simply in the comparable 
social-historical and geopolitical position from which these films are articulated but also, 
crucially, in a shared investment by their authors in the kind of Western Marxist cultural 
theory of the early twentieth century that is most closely associated with the names of Brecht 
and Benjamin (see Pines and Willemen 11). My concern here, accordingly, is not primarily 
with the concrete manifestations of Third Cinema filmmaking as such, nor even with 
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Angelopoulos’s – very immediate – influence on a number of Latin American directors of 
this movement. What I am interested in, rather, is the transformation of a shared historical-
philosophical horizon and the way in which a consideration of the affinities between the 
Third Cinema and the Trilogy of History can bring into sharper relief the historical 
conditions for the dénouement of a particular kind of Marxist-modernist experimentalism. 
 There is, to begin with, the strong awareness of the historicity of the formal solutions 
required for a particular social-historical situation, which I have identified above as 
Angelopoulos’s Brechtianism, and what Solanas and Getino call “the constant and 
methodical exercise of practice, search, and experimentation” (Chanan 23). “[Each] art 
form,” García Espinosa writes, “every artistic manifestation, must find its own expression” 
(31). This Brechtian component is further underscored by both a distinctly non-
individualistic framework of analysis and by what Paul Willemen considers “a fighting notion 
of popularity” in the Third Cinema (Pines and Willemen 27): a resolute focus, that is, on the 
struggles of the people against class and foreign oppressors, which in Angelopoulos’s case is 
most prominent, of course, in The Travelling Players. The theme of popular consciousness, 
accordingly, runs as a leitmotif through the various manifestos of the movement, a cinema, 
in Fernando Birri’s words, which “brings […] consciousness; which awakens consciousness; 
which clarifies matters” (Chanan 9). Third Cinema, Solanas and Getino contend – in a 
strong echo of Benjamin – discovers “a new facet of cinema: the participation of people who, 
until then, were considered spectators” (26); it enables, in García Espinosa’s phrase, “to 
transform [spectators] into agents” (30). It does so, however, in sophisticated and complex 
ways: “To my way of thinking,” the Brazilian Glauber Rocha argues, “‘creating simple things 
for a simple people’ involves a lack of respect for the public […] The people aren’t simple 
[…], the people are complex” (15). “For revolutionary art,” Sanjines postulates, 
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“communication must be pursued through the stimulation of reflection” (34).  
 These arguments are all present in Teshome Gabriel’s notion, in a seminal essay, of a 
“popular memory,” which the critic identifies as one of the defining characteristics of Third 
Cinema as such. Popular memory, Gabriel argues in what strongly reverberates with what I 
have said here about Angelopoulos’s Trilogy of History, always “considers the past as a 
political issue. It orders the past not only as a reference point but also as a theme of struggle 
[…]. [It] is a ‘look back to the future’, necessarily dissident and partisan, wedded to constant 
change” (“Popular Memory” 53f.). Third Cinema “[delves] into the past, not only to 
reconstruct, but also to redefine and to redeem what the official versions of history have 
overlooked” (57). In Solanas and Getino’s words, “revolutionary cinema […] attempts to 
intervene in the situation as an element providing thrust or rectification” (Chanan 23, authors’ 
emphasis), it undermines the “inner duality of the intellectual” and overcomes the 
“separation of politics and art” (17). What all of this bespeaks, of course, is precisely the 
profoundly avant-gardist concept of a politics of aesthetic production that also animates 
Angelopoulos’s Trilogy of History: “Insert the work as an original fact in the process of 
liberation,” Solanas and Getino demand, “place it first at the service of life itself, ahead of 
art; dissolve aesthetics in the life of society” (20, authors’ emphasis).39 
 I have dwelt at some length on these parallels between Third Cinema and 
Angelopoulos’s early work also because what I have said here is intimately linked to the 
question of chronotopes and the strong nexus I have identified throughout this chapter 
between cinematic form, historical temporality, a politics of aesthetic production, and the 
historical and social struggles of societies in a state of transition. Willemen indeed, in an 
assessment of another essay by Gabriel, titled “Towards a Critical Theory of Third World 
Films,” has argued that “the various non-Euro-American cinematic regimes organise time 
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and space in their own specific ways,” that “non-Euro-American cinema is characterised by a 
different chronotope” (Pines and Willemen 15). Chronotopes, Willemen notes, “are time-
space articulations characteristic of particular, historically determined conceptions of the 
relations between the human, the social and the natural world, i.e. ways of conceptualising 
social existence” (15f.). Significantly, Gabriel himself explicitly links the existence of “a 
different concept of ‘time’” in the Third Cinema, “a time which is not strictly linear or 
chronological,” to the frequent use of long takes and panning shots (“Towards a Critical 
Theory” 45). 
 Though neither Willemen nor Gabriel offer much detail in terms of a discussion of 
specific films or directors, the relevance of their arguments for my analysis of 
Angelopoulos’s work is hard to miss. In the latter, the plan-séquence emerges as the key formal 
principle through which the political history of Greece is constructed as a unified, 
contestable, and contested terrain, as a political-historical Zeitraum charted by means of a 
popular memory “necessarily dissident and partisan” (Gabriel, “Popular Memory” 54), a 
popular memory that indeed seeks “to redefine and to redeem what the official versions of 
history have overlooked” (57). That the chronotopes of the Trilogy of History represent 
time and space as national, thereby, and that the presence of the foreign – whether as Nazi 
occupation or British and American patronage – is almost exclusively conceived of as 
intrusive, further underscores the affinities with a Third Cinema “carried forth under the 
banner of a national cinematography which is ‘realist, critical and popular’” (Chanan 10).40 In 
both the Trilogy of History and the Third Cinema this aesthetic circumscription of historical 
time and space as national, I would argue, is determined dialectically by the very peripherality 




 Significantly, it is important to add here, the national is also the predominant, though 
not exclusive, category for the reception, distribution and production of Angelopoulos’s 
early films. Reconstruction, Days of ’36, The Travelling Players, and The Hunters, at least initially, 
were all screened to a clearly defined national audience at Greek theaters. Their quality and 
success, it is true, would soon open the doors for Angelopoulos to participate in festivals 
abroad and ultimately to be acknowledged internationally as a Greek auteur, but none of 
these films were made, originally, for an international audience of auteurist filmmaking. The 
important role of the Thessaloniki Film Festival in the distribution of the director’s early 
work, likewise, predated the festival’s status as an international venue of “global art cinema” 
in general and as a hub for Balkan transnationalism in particular. And, crucially, up until The 
Hunters inaugurated a phase of international co-productions after the fall of the dictatorship, 
Angelopoulos’s films were produced neither through such international co-operation nor 
through a national film industry aligned with the dictatorial regime of the times, but mainly 
through private funding by wealthy individuals in Greece: a fascinating case of an 
Umfunktionierung, in the properly Brechtian sense, of bourgeois capital for the sake of radical 
political-aesthetic practice. 
 
By the time Angelopoulos made the Trilogy of Silence, all this had drastically changed and 
his work had firmly transitioned into the First World. If the material involvement of the 
German television channel ZDF and the French INA in the making of The Hunters had 
already established the model of international co-production that would mark all of 
Angelopoulos’s subsequent films, and if the Golden Lion for Megalexandros at the Venice 
Film Festival in 1980 fully consecrated the director as a filmmaker of international standing, 
Voyage to Cythera, The Beekeeper, and especially Landscape in the Mist were all produced, 
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distributed and received as works of a major European auteur, albeit of Greek provenance. 
This is true to such an extent that Angelopoulos, until his death in 2012, had literally 
monopolized the status of Greek auteur on the international film circuit, a fact that is 
underscored by a string of accolades – unparalleled in Greek film history – awarded to his 
works at the most prestigious festivals of international cinema.41 
 I have suggested above that the shift in Angelopoulos’s work between the Trilogy of 
History and the Trilogy of Silence was also conditioned historically by the social-political 
transformation of Greece after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974. On the one hand, this 
meant the country’s gradual integration into a firmly European and, by extension, global 
geopolitical setting, culminating in Greece’s accession to the European Union in 1981. On 
the other hand, and especially from the vantage point of the Left, it also signified Greece’s 
insertion into the dismal political, social, and economic realities of neoliberal hegemony 
during the 1980s. Returning once again to Jameson’s argument about “the dissolution of an 
autonomous Greek story [and about] the gradual opening of Greece (as of most other 
national situations) to dependency on the invisible force field of the world market itself” 
(“Past as History” 91), I want to ask here to what extent such a trajectory – especially in its 
material dimension – becomes legible in Angelopoulos’s films themselves. 
 In a sense, this is to turn on its head my previous analysis of the form of the Trilogy 
of Silence and of Angelopoulos’s aesthetics of autonomy in terms of determinate negation, 
and to subject them instead to an Adornian reading of an entirely different kind, one that 
follows the traces of reification in even the most ambitious works of art. I am interested, that 
is, in the way in which a particular style can be said to become a marketable property in the 
most rarefied sectors of a global culture industry. This is precisely what I meant when I 
raised above the possibility of a fetishization or reification of modernist aesthetic practice in 
 
! 91 
late modernity. What is stake here is the degree to which Angelopoulos’s reception as an 
auteur of European art cinema raises a set of expectations that the director, in turn, is willing 
to fulfill. The question in the title of this chapter – “What Does the Auteur Produce?” – thus 
resurfaces in a manner altogether different from the Benjaminian inflection it had taken in 
the Trilogy of History, namely as an issue of what Timothy Corrigan has called the 
“commercial performance of the business of being an auteur” (“Commerce of Auteurism” 98, 
author’s emphasis). 
 There are, once again, intriguing parallels between the evolution of Angelopoulos’s 
work and that of the Third Cinema. In an essay titled “Authorship, globalization, and the 
new identity of Latin American cinema,” Marvin D’Lugo has argued that at a time when 
“international co-productions with European producers and state agencies have increasingly 
dominated Latin American film production,” filmmakers from this region were “forced to 
negotiate their own political and artistic visions in accordance with the commercial demands 
of global film finance arrangements” (D’Lugo 103). Fernando Solanas, for instance, one of 
the figureheads of the politically radical Third Cinema of the 1960s, “[by] the 1980s, after his 
exile in France, […] had become one of the principal advocates of international co-
productions of authorial cinema that for some suggested a reversal of his earlier political 
stance” (108). By the mid-1980s, D’Lugo contends –the period of Angelopoulos’s Trilogy of 
Silence – Solanas and other prominent Latin American filmmakers “were all positioned in 
similar ways as authorial icons representing their respective national culture within the global 
market. In each case, their well-established reputations as oppositional, anti-status quo, 
resistance figures had become refigured as national auteurs, principally through international 
film festivals” (110). 
 Angelopoulos’s turn from collectives to the individual subject in the Trilogy of 
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Silence and after thus can be read in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it bespeaks a shift 
to what Fredric Jameson has called a “conception of the modernist text as the production 
and the protest of an isolated individual.” It manifests itself, that is, as a “symptom and a 
result of [a] cultural crisis” (“Reification and Utopia” 135) in which the notion of collective 
and transformative political praxis has become deeply precarious. On the other hand, 
however, such individualism also provides a category of reception more amenable to the 
relatively select audience of international art film, a kind of audience that is far removed 
from Willemen’s “fighting notion of popularity.” In this sense, Angelopoulos’s cooperation 
with iconic actors from the auteurist tradition – internationally recognizable figures such as 
Marcello Mastroianni, Jeanne Moreau, Bruno Ganz or Michel Piccoli – can also be 
considered a kind of marketing strategy designed to ensure the films’ widest possible 
distribution in the global market for art cinema.42  
 A kind of reification of a (largely modernist) cultural tradition indeed could be 
argued to pervade all of Angelopoulos’s films from the Trilogy of Silence onwards. This 
often manifests itself as a specific form of textual referentiality, a knowing display of 
sophistication that seems to channel the cultural cachet of Angelopoulos’s audiences by 
providing what Horkheimer and Adorno call “the veneer of culture they need for purposes 
of prestige” (Dialectic of Enlightenment 122). The author as producer, as it were, turns into a 
provider of cultural capital. I am referring here to the constant references throughout 
Angelopoulos’s later work to the names of, and works by, important modernist poets such 
as T. S. Eliot, Rainer Maria Rilke, Paul Celan, George Seferis and C. P. Cavafy, or filmmakers 
such as Eisenstein, Dreyer, and Chaplin.  
 The use and function of poetic intertexts in Angelopoulos’s work, indeed, is 
instructive because it illustrates the problematic aspects of the director’s wider appeal to an 
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aesthetics of autonomy: the way, that is, in which any such appeal, in late modernity, 
threatens to devolve into a reified version of autonomy, a “purposelessness,” in Adorno’s 
polemic formulation, “for purposes dictated by the market” (Dialectic of Enlightenment 128). In 
the emblematic scene in Landscape in the Mist, for instance, in which a marble hand with a 
fragmented index finger emerges out of the sea – itself a clear reference to the “broken 
statues” so ubiquitous in the work of Seferis – the stunned Orestes suddenly exclaims the 
opening line from the first of Rilke’s famous Duino Elegies: “Wer, wenn ich schriee, hörte 
mich denn aus der Engel / Ordnungen?” (Rilke 689). Similarly, amid the catastrophe of 
Sarajevo during the ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the film archivist 
played by Erland Josephson in Ulysses’ Gaze is shown to pen down, in evident anguish, lines 
from Rilke’s poem “Ich lebe mein Leben in wachsenden Ringen”: “Ich lebe mein Leben in 
wachsenden Ringen, /die sich über die Dinge ziehn. / Ich werde den letzten vielleicht nicht 
vollbringen, / aber versuchen will ich ihn. / Ich kreise um Gott, um den uralten Turm, / 
und ich kreise jahrtausende lang; / und ich weiß noch nicht: / bin ich ein Falke, ein Sturm / 
oder ein großer Gesang” (201). In Eternity and a Day, finally, the dying poet Alexandros and 
his protégé, an Albanian street child struggling to make a home in Greece, have an 
encounter – in a sudden manifestation of something akin to magical realism – with Greece’s 
national poet, the 19th century writer Dionysios Solomos. Solomos had come to Greece from 
the Ionian Islands as a native speaker of Italian: his command of Greek, in Angelopoulos’s 
words, “was very limited, he went out, roaming around the country, collecting words he had 
never heard before and dutifully writing them all up in his notebook. […] The notion of 
paying for every new word he acquired was my own invention. The metaphor is clear. Our 




 The appearance of the Romantic Solomos and the high modernists Rilke and Seferis 
is no coincidence: all three were high priests of aesthetic autonomy. For Angelopoulos, then, 
to craft a poetic idiom – whether in poetry or the cinema – means to assert oneself against a 
hostile and alienated world, the individual’s last refuge from politics, history, and the demands 
of economic life.43 The inclusion of poetic intertexts into the fabric of Angelopoulos’s films, 
in this sense, is perfectly in line with the director’s larger conception of aesthetic production 
from the Trilogy of Silence onwards. But there are other, more conspicuous, examples of 
such intertexts, which undermine – or at the very least cast a different light on – the alleged 
purity of autonomous aesthetic practice. What I am alluding to here is a number of instances 
in which such intertextual references are imposed on the film as external enhancements or a 
kind of poetic embellishment. In such moments, what may still have functioned as integral 
elements of the cinematic text in the cases of Rilke and Solomos is now, in Adorno’s phrase 
from his essay on the fetish-character in music, “falling apart into diffuse culinary moments” 
(“Fetish-Character” 273). The film director A. in Ulysses’ Gaze, during his journey through 
the Balkans, repeatedly intones lines from T.S. Eliot’s Four Quartets, small asides in the vein 
of “In the beginning is my end.” While the director embarks on a ship, his friend utters a 
verse from Seferis: “The first thing god made was the journey.” And Thanassis Vengos’s taxi 
driver, in the same film, once again uses a quote from Seferis to make a rather trite and 
sentimental point about the decline of Greece. 
 Is it going too far to detect in these moments precisely the kind of “half accidental 
allusions [or] completely latent similarities and associations” Adorno so much decries in his 
critique of “regressive musical language” (“Fetish-Character” 293)?44 Aren’t these, too, 
“reified bits and pieces [snatched] out of their context and [set] up as a potpourri” (281)? 
What is striking about these poetic intertexts in Angelopoulos’ later work is that they 
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invariably derive from the most canonical texts in the, primarily modernist, cultural sphere45, 
that indeed they often are taken from the very opening lines of the “greatest hits” of 
modernist poetry, already circulating widely, and in sometimes grotesquely distorted form.46 
It would be one thing for Angelopoulos to cite, or functionally to integrate, a poem by Paul 
Celan into one of his films: Celan, in fact, a highly individualistic and hermetic poet whose 
work, simultaneously, is indelibly marked by the disasters of personal and collective history, a 
writer with an unflinching desire to create a poetic idiom that bears the traces of “[passing] 
through its own answerlessness, [passing] through frightful muting […] and [coming] to light 
again” (Celan 395), could perhaps have been an ideal point of reference and source of 
inspiration for the disillusioned Angelopoulos of the Trilogy of Silence and after. Instead, in 
Eternity and a Day, the director once again confines himself to the invocation of a reified 
piece – the opening lines, in fact – from a poem in Celan’s collection Die Niemandsrose. 
 I have discussed this aspect at some length here because it seems to me to illustrate 
not simply the “imperceptible introduction of commodity structure into the very form and 
content of the work of art itself” (Jameson, “Reification and Utopia” 132) but also a 
fundamental reconceptualization of what constitutes, for Angelopoulos, the oppositional 
nature of aesthetic production at large. The destruction of the formal integrity of the poems 
used by Angelopoulos through the process of quotation, to begin with, leads to a form of 
consumption in which for the consumers, as Adorno and Horkheimer write, “the use value 
of art, its essence, is a fetish, and the fetish – the social valuation which they mistake for the 
merit of works of art – becomes its only use value” (Dialectic of Enlightenment 128). This, in 
turn, precisely constitutes the work of art as a commodity: “The delight in the moment,” 
Adorno argues in the context of music, “becomes an excuse for absolving the listener from 
the thought of the whole […]. No longer do the partial moments serve as a critique of that 
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whole; instead, they suspend the critique which the successful esthetic totality exerts against 
the flawed one of society […]; they no longer produce their own in place of the reified one, 
but show themselves complaisant to it” (“Fetish-Character” 273).47 
 Angelopoulos’s reliance on what Pierre Bourdieu would call “legitimate works of art” 
(see Bourdieu, Distinction) – those with a strongly classifying social function – thus creates a 
sense of distinction, of “being there and being in the know, [of] enhanced prestige” 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 128). The implied audience of these films consists of a socially 
distinguished set of consumers of sophisticated art, conversant with what Thomas Elsaesser 
describes as “the cultural tastes of privileged minorities” (“Postheroic Narrative” 703), 
including the canon of European modernism. The oppositional structure of such products – 
“culinary delights,” in Adorno’s polemical phrase (“Fetish-Character” 274) – is therefore no 
longer predicated on a Brechtian notion of anti-culinary art, of structural Umfunktionierung or 
a production model of aesthetics, but on the very categories of taste, artfulness, distinction, 
and refinement. This is precisely how the use of poetry in Angelopoulos’s later films ties in 
with the larger shift in the director’s conception of aesthetic production that I have 
described throughout this chapter. What these films oppose is not the nexus of bourgeois 
capital, the ruling classes, and historical oppression, but the alleged impurity and vulgarity of 
mass culture. They fully partake, thus, in the self-mythologization of a European “second 
cinema” and in what Elsaesser labels the “precarious self-construction of European 
[auteurism] as the good ‘other’” of the “first cinema” of Hollywood – “one of the many 
binaries that pits art against commerce, auteur against star, critical prestige against box 
office” (“Postheroic Narrative” 705). Angelopoulos’s statements, in 1996, that American 
films are “like an empire” (Interviews 92) and that there is only “a small elitist minority still 
looking for that encounter” between “the creative artist and its audience,” in this context, are 
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telling. “But the vast majority is favouring the American movies,” the director contends, 
“which, as far as I am concerned, are not films but just images printed on celluloid” (95). 
That high art in general and art cinema in particular, that indeed the very concept of 
aesthetic autonomy is untainted by commercialism, the commodity, and reification is, of 
course, one of the principal self-delusions of late modern artistic production, one that 
Adorno never tired to expose. 
 Returning to the principal unit of analysis in this chapter, the question emerges 
whether the same logic of reification can also be detected in the construction of chronotopes 
and the plan-séquence. I would answer this question – though cautiously so, and not fully – in 
the affirmative. In a film like Landscape in the Mist, the chronotopes could be argued to 
bespeak a kind of timeless universalism: detached from the specific spatial and temporal 
parameters of a national historical condition, they are very much in tune with both a wider 
network of distribution and the larger frame of cultural references that increases the 
marketability of such a film as a product of international art cinema. More importantly 
however, I would argue that the sequence shot in Angelopoulos’s later films occasionally 
suffers from a form of creative exhaustion, or rather from a kind of complacency or even 
self-indulgence, an aesthetic self-sufficiency verging on the l’art-pour-l’art. Jameson at some 
point speaks of a specifically modernist tendency towards “autonomization,” “the lavish 
surrender to the present of the sentence or the camera, the gag of the performance, or the 
perception of the lyric moment” (“Past as History” 87). What I mean to suggest here is that 
the form of the plan-séquence often seems to become detached from any content: hollowed 
out, as it were. What used to be a “technique” – in Benjamin’s sense – in the service of a 
politics of form thus is gradually transformed into the more immutable category of 
individual style, the hallmark of high modernist aesthetic production. The sequence shot 
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becomes, quite literally, the trademark of Angelopoulos’s oeuvre as a whole, that which 
marks a film as his own, as one by an important modernist auteur. In this sense precisely one 
can certainly speak of elements of a reification of the sequence shot in the director’s later 
work.48 
 I have, however, warned against exaggerating this kind of critique or turning it into a 
categorical denunciation of all of Angelopoulos’s later output. For there is a different, much 
more sympathetic reading of all three aspects I have discussed on the preceding pages: the 
production and distribution of these films through channels of international cooperation, the 
elitist framework of reception, and the aesthetics of the plan-séquence. Such a reading would 
leave intact a genuinely adversarial element of aesthetic production in Angelopoulos’s work, 
a move that certainly to me seems justified. International co-production, then, would not 
mean Angelopoulos’s willing submission to a homogenized global market for art cinema but 
his continued defiance of a national film industry that, after 1974, had merely substituted 
dictatorial censorship with heavy – and only marginally less ideological – forms of state 
patronage.49 Angelopoulos’s elitism, rather than as an elevated form of consumerism, could 
be conceived of once again as a sedimentation of the very political and historical aporia I 
have described at much length in my discussion of the Trilogy of Silence. “The elitist 
isolation of advanced art,” Adorno writes, “is less it’s [own] doing than society’s” (Aesthetic 
Theory 344). And the stubborn insistence on the form and value of the plan-séquence would 
signify not a reification of style but an assertion of individuality after its eclipse50, and a 
genuine attempt at “keeping time in place” or slowing down: a refusal to give up on models 
of intellectual and reflective filmmaking and spectatorship in an era of frenzied cultural 
acceleration, the breakneck speed of mainstream film, and split-screen cutting.51 
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 This also brings me back to the question of late style. Karen Leeder has argued that 
“[despite] their interest in the relationship between the artist and society, [both Adorno and 
Said] invest in the biographical singularity of ‘genius’ to a degree that eclipses that social 
context” (Leeder 8). Though Leeder, in my opinion, draws the contrast between singularity 
and historical context too starkly here – instead of foregrounding the dialectical relationship 
between the two – her critique of the construction of (male) genius and authorship is well 
taken. Nevertheless, it is precisely in the context of the threatening eclipse of subjectivity and 
agency that such heroic gestures of an individuality stubbornly asserted must be seen. This is 
the empowering dimension of the concept of the modernist auteur in late modernity. The 
most obvious feature of Angelopoulos’s style – its extreme lack of pace – is crucially part of 
this. Slowness – a form of belatedness, or rather: a demonstrative kind of being-late – 
manifests itself here as a refusal to catch up with and succumb to the frantic rhythms of 
contemporary life: Late style – that is, slow style – as modernism’s protective shield against 
the onslaught of late modernity.52 
 
FUTURES PAST: A THIRD ANGELOPOULOS? 
 
 
I have talked extensively about late style and lateness as constitutive elements of 
Angelopoulos’s modernism in the Trilogy of Silence, and even about a political and creative 
exhaustion that infiltrates his work in the course of the 1980s. Well before 1989 – the 
epochal date more commonly associated with the notion of an “end of history” – a 
posthistoric structure of feeling begins to underlie all of Angelopoulos’s films. I would like 
to ask then, in the concluding section of this chapter, to what extent Angelopoulos’s work 
after 1989 could be said to offer a new or different vision of history, an opening perhaps 
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towards the future and a wider terrain of human praxis, an invigorated sense even of the 
relevance of a political aesthetic in the age of globalization. And could such a development, 
if it indeed exists, become legible through yet another transformation of chronotopes, 
another change in the formal structure of the plan-séquence? If a true shift of paradigm 
occurred between the Trilogy of History and the Trilogy of Silence, could the case be made 
for a third Angelopoulos, too? Despite what I will describe as an intriguing development in 
the articulation of the sequence shot I am, to anticipate my answer, skeptical. 
 I am saying this despite the fact that Angelopoulos’s films of the 1990s and the 
2000s do break away from the abstract universalism of a film like Landscape in the Mist and 
seem to find a new interest in the political history of the 20th century and, crucially, in a new 
kind of spatiality that interrogates, and even transcends, the limits of the national. The 
Suspended Step of the Stork (1991) deals with the mysterious disappearance of a prominent 
politician and his rumored re-surfacing in an inhospitable border zone populated by 
refugees. Ulysses’ Gaze (1996) tracks a Greek-American filmmaker’s journey through the 
Balkans and the traumatic history of the region on his quest to find three reels of film 
produced by the legendary Manakis brothers in the early days of cinema. In Eternity and a Day 
(1998), a terminally ill poet spends the last days of his life in the company of an Albanian 
street-child, a refugee from Greece’s poor neighboring country.53 In The Weeping Meadow 
(2004) and The Dust of Time (2008) – two parts of an envisaged new trilogy – Angelopoulos 
follows the lives and diasporic wanderings of an initially wealthy Greek family through 
several generations, from their expulsion from Odessa in the wake of the Russian Revolution 
and their suffering of dictatorship and civil war in Greece, through Russian and North 
American exile, to New Year’s Eve in Berlin on the last day of the old millennium. 
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 A palpable sense here emerges of the hardships of migration, the uprooting of old 
communities, and the frequently brutal effects of policing the European Union’s Eastern 
borders. The Suspended Step of the Stork opens with an image of a helicopter circling the 
drowned corpses of refugees in the Mediterranean. A village is cut in two by a river doubling 
as the frontier between one country and another. In Eternity and a Day, police forces chase 
from the streets of Thessaloniki the Albanian children who try to make some money by 
cleaning the front windows of cars. Later, human traffickers sell the children to affluent 
Westerners. In both Eternity and a Day and Ulysses’ Gaze, Angelopoulos creates forceful 
images of deportations and of people glued, desperately, to the fences and walls securing 
national territory in hostile borderlands. In the latter film, the long history of a thriving 
Greek community in Constanta is brought to end amid the social and historical 
transformations in Romania after World War II. And in The Weeping Meadow and The Dust of 
Time, the constant upheavals of 20th century history – of revolutions, totalitarianism, 
dictatorships, and war – uproot a Greek family of means from their lives in vibrant Odessa 
and disperse them across the continent and beyond, under often dire conditions of life. 
“Emigration and diaspora, refugees chased away from their own home-land, crossing 
borders and seeking shelter, these are among the most burning social issues of our time,” 
Angelopoulos asserts in an interview from 1991 (Interviews 76). 
 And yet: I find it hard to argue that these films are at their core about these issues, in 
the sense that they offer a cinematic meditation on – let alone a sustained analysis or critique 
of – concepts such as borders, the nation state, diaspora, and migration. It is true: 
Angelopoulos fully acknowledges the existence, even importance, of all of these issues, and 
he does not turn a blind eye on Greece’s turn, in post-communist Europe, from a country of 
emigrants to a country of immigration, its transformation, as Vrasidas Karalis writes, “from a 
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homogeneous nation-state to a heterogeneous multicultural society” (Karalis 237). 
Angelopoulos’s films, in this sense, hint at questions about Greece’s new and growing 
population of minorities, at its anxieties about illegal immigration and resurging 
nationalism;54 they can be seen, partly, in the context of the attempt in the 1990s and after 
“by successive governments to mobilize the world-wide Greek diaspora” (Clogg 227); and 
they are in dialogue with a wider current in Greek cinema which “[after] 1995 [saw] the 
attempt to reconnect with the geopolitics of the Balkans and Eastern Europe [become] one 
of [its] dominant concerns” (Karalis 250).55 In addition, they could also be argued to channel 
an academic and larger cultural predisposition, prominent since the 1990s, for an 
engagement with matters of migration, diaspora, transnationalism, globalization and a post-
national condition. Above all, however – and this is where my critique sets in – all of these 
issues are subsumed, and submerged, under what is the paramount sentiment of all of 
Angelopoulos’s latest films: a fundamental disillusionment with the politics and history of 
the 20th century, the mournful recollection of a catastrophic past, and – through a 
problematic reframing of political history as tragedy – the sad predicament of the human 
condition at large. Angelopoulos, tellingly, has argued that “we are all migrating birds;” he 
has spoken about a “real home, the one place where a person feels he really belongs to,” 
about a “kind of existentialism you will not find in my earlier films” (Interviews 77). The main 
character in The Suspended Step of the Stork, he says, contends that “‘Being a refugee is an 
internal condition more than an external one.’ Later on he also says, ‘We’ve passed the 
borders but we’re still here. How many frontiers do we have to pass to get home?’” (83). 
Borders, indeed, Angelopoulos adds, “for me are not geographical concepts […]. Borders 
are simply divisions, between here and there, between then and now. In [Eternity and a Day] it 
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is a question of a division between life and death” (106). “The battle,” ultimately, “is always 
the battle of the self” (111). 
 The sense that history has not delivered its promise, that it has disastrously turned 
against humanity, is indeed ubiquitous throughout these films. Mastroianni’s character in The 
Suspended Step of the Stork, the vanished politician, is the author of a book titled The Melancholy 
of the End of the Century. In a majestic long take in Ulysses’ Gaze, a broken statue of Lenin is 
shipped down the river Danube, as if in a funeral procession for one of the grand ideologies 
of 20th century European history. “Why,” the poet in Eternity and a Day wonders in an 
encounter with his ailing mother, “did nothing turn out as we expected it? Why do we have 
to rot, helpless between pain and desire? Why did I live my life in exile?” In the same film, a 
tired man sits in a bus after a demonstration, hunched down with a red banner lifelessly 
dangling in his hand. The protagonist Eleni, in The Weeping Meadow, laments that she is “an 
exile. A refugee, and exiled from everywhere.” And in The Dust of Time – a fully appropriate 
title in itself – Bruno Ganz’s character, on New Year’s Eve at the close of the century, offers 
a resigned toast “to the dust of time that falls on everything, both grand and small.” “What 
happened?” he asks. “We dreamed of another world. How was it all lost?” To which his old 
friend from exile, Michel Piccoli’s character Spyros, responds: “As someone said, ‘On a été 
balayé par l’histoire.’” 
 The notion of historical time and of a history completely detached from the will of 
human subjects, of course, also implies a larger model of historical praxis in which any sense 
of human agency has been completely liquidated. If one were to return to Koselleck’s 
notions of Verfügbarkeit and Machbarkeit and his distinction between Erfahrungsraum and 
Erwartungshorizont one could argue that in all of these films a catastrophic space of experience 
cancels out a horizon of expectation for the future. With no history left to make, 
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Angelopoulos’s work remains arrested in a disastrous past. Mastroianni’s politician, 
accordingly, evacuates the field of politics. The director’s journey in Ulysses’ Gaze charts a 
short 20th century that begins and ends in Sarajevo, with the overture of World War I and 
the civil wars of the 1990s respectively: a cyclical repetition of murderous violence and death, 
the vicious circle of a history from which there is no escape.56 Eleni, symptomatically, 
throughout much of Angelopoulos’s last two films, is left speechless and reduced to tears in 
the face of a seemingly endless sequence of traumatic experiences. 
 What I have described above as moments of a fetishization of style could thus be 
said to find its correlative in Angelopoulos’s later work in a fetishization of history itself, in 
Marx’s sense precisely of the commodity fetish as one that obscures the social relations 
between human beings. There is much to admire still, visually, in all of Angelopoulos’s films: 
stunning set pieces, magnificent cinematography, and an incomparable sense for 
composition. But often, and especially in the last two films, these seem to be in the service 
of a form that is merely there to dazzle, one that only bears a tentative relationship to the 
particulars of an often incongruous or even haphazard content, and one that hardly amounts 
to the successful articulation of an aesthetic totality. An extended sequence in The Weeping 
Meadow in which Eleni and her lover return to their ancestral village – a showpiece for 
Angelopoulos’s visual inventiveness, with the weakest of motivation through the plot of the 
film – is paradigmatic in this context. In the same way, the political history that occurs in 
these films is no longer interwoven with the lived reality of the characters. Instead, it is 
reified, negatively, into a bad “thing” that befalls them from outside. Nothing is left of the 
dialectic concept of history in Angelopoulos’s first trilogy, and very little either of the 
negative dialectic in the Trilogy of Silence. This is precisely what I mean when I speak of a 
fetishization of history itself.   
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 If anything, Angelopoulos’s last films deepen the sense of impasse that had already 
manifested itself so strongly in the Trilogy of Silence. It is no surprise that the notion of art, 
of the creative imagination, or even of organic life as a solution to this impasse, or at least a 
form of solace, remains very strong throughout the director’s later work. In The Suspended 
Step of the Stork, the politician invokes the importance of moments of silence that “allow us 
to hear the music behind the noise of rain.” He mentions “plants that love the silence. They 
are born and grow in the darkness.” Apart from his encounter with Solomos, the poet in 
Eternity and a Day, in the conversation with his mother, also explains that the only moments 
of return from his existential exile are those in which he is “given the joy to speak my own 
language.” In The Weeping Meadow, the few moments of bliss that lighten up the characters’ 
experience of loss, alienation, and historical trauma are almost invariably related to Eleni’s 
lover’s involvement with a group of musicians and his sublime skills on the accordion. And 
in yet another magnificent scene in Ulysses’ Gaze, a foggy Sarajevo during a ceasefire 
necessitated by the weather becomes the spectacular setting for what is a kind of general 
mobilization of the arts against the inhumanity of war: from everywhere, it seems, people 
emerge into the open to perform music, to stage a play and to dance on the streets: a youth 
orchestra intones a beautiful melody, and a group of actors declaims Shakespeare’s Romeo and 
Juliet. The moment is short-lived and soon gives way to a resumption of the violence of civil 
war, but Angelopoulos here does provide the spectator with a moving sequence – certainly 
one of the most powerful in all of his later work – in which artistic production, as a 
fundamental other of alienated life, asserts its force. 
 Interestingly, this celebration of the function of art is preceded by a scene in which 
the film director and the archivist Levi finally succeed in what had eluded them before: the 
restoration of the three original reels of film by the Manakis brothers. Earlier in Ulysses’ Gaze, 
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A. had described them as the Balkan’s “first film, the first glance; a lost glance; a lost 
innocence.” This notion of the restorative function of art, of a return to an original 
innocence or lost harmony, is also what sets apart Angelopoulos’s latest films from both the 
Trilogy of History with its resolute concept of a political-historical now-time and from the 
Trilogy of Silence with its refusal to counter an alienated present with a nostalgic projection 
of a more fulfilled past. It is, I would argue, a genuinely regressive element in Angelopoulos’s 
grammar of time – a testament, ultimately, to the director’s inability to valorize his aesthetic 
in and through the present. In Ulysses’ Gaze, the quest for the reels is complemented by the 
director’s stated desire to make time “whole again.” In Eternity and a Day, the poet is 
desperate to arrest and seize a single moment of bliss from his life in the past. And in both 
The Weeping Meadow and The Dust of Time, Eleni and her lover Spyros share the secret of a 
mystical “source of the river” to which they want to return: The Dust of Time, indeed, ends 
with a drop of water magically appearing on Eleni’s hand as she lies dying on the last day of 
the century in a bedroom in Berlin. 
 
What is the place of the plan-séquence in all of this? I would want to begin with a caveat and 
argue that in light of Angelopoulos’s view of history and his existential conception of 
borders and migration, it would be too facile to read the sequence shot as a kind of 
Rancièrian “re-distribution of the sensible” through which political and geographical 
divisions are overcome in an aesthetic re-structuring of space,57 and too reductive to see in 
them merely a kind of concerted effort at a Deleuzian “deterritorialization.”58 The case for a 
transformation of chronotopes or chronotopic re-alignment however can be made, I think, 
if one focuses on the temporal axis of the time-spaces Angelopoulos constructs in his last 
films. It is precisely the director’s fixation on the past that can be said to constitute the new 
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content of the form of the plan-séquence. What I mean to suggest here is that the present is 
still articulated through the sequence shot with other layers of time, but neither, like in the 
Trilogy of History, as a political-historical now-time, nor, as in the Trilogy of Silence, with 
the autonomous time of aesthetic imagination. Instead, what shares a common chronotope 
here is the present and a past that is not, as in the Trilogy of History, the “present past” of a 
contested now-time but a past – or rather: remembered – past. The sequence shot, indeed, 
becomes a space of memory. 
 I would like to offer three paradigmatic instances of such plan-séquences in order to 
illustrate my argument. In Ulysses’ Gaze at one point the film director A. returns to the house 
in the Romanian city of Constanta where he grew up as a member of a wealthy Greek family 
of the diaspora. The astonishing sequence I am concerned with here – more than ten 
minutes long – begins with the director entering the house as a grown-up. A party has 
begun, and he is greeted by a woman who turns out to be his grandmother, at a time when 
she was still alive. Past and present are thus firmly intertwined from the outset of the 
sequence. The camera follows A. and his mother through the house as they are welcomed by 
numerous other members of the family. “The whole family,” A. says. Talk can be heard of 
the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps and of the delayed freeing of Mauthausen. 
“Wasn’t it New Year’s too when they took him away?” one woman asks about an as yet 
unidentified man. “He’s coming,” someone suddenly exclaims as the camera completes a 
movement of 360 degrees, and a man enters the house and embraces A.’s mother. “Father, 
how long it’s been,” A. utters, before an awkward embrace. The tension loosens when 
someone shouts “Happy 1945!” and music, singing, and dancing commence. With the 
camera now in a fixed position, these continue until a little later when two men in hats enter 
through the front door. Mockingly moving along to the tune of the piano, they approach 
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another man in the room and lead him out of the house. The music changes to a different 
melody, and the arrested man proclaims a “Happy 1948!” With the music in the background 
and A. looking on, his mother begs her husband to “take us away from here.” As the singing 
and dancing from before resumes on a somewhat happier note, A. asks his mother for a 
dance and someone in the background exclaims that “you got the permit at last.” A brief 
conversation ensues about the exodus from Constanta of about 80 families of Greek, Jewish, 
and Armenian descent. “Are you glad to be going to Greece?” the director is asked. With A. 
having exited the frame, the front door once again opens and the house servant comes in, 
announcing in Romanian that “the People’s Confiscation Committee is here.” A number of 
men enter the house and move up the stairs in the hallway. One of the family members 
admonishes the party to “ignore them” and wishes everybody a “Happy 1950!” Once again, 
music, singing, and dancing resume as the men from the Confiscation Committee carry away 
pieces of furniture from the house. When they are done, they return inside and confiscate 
the piano: amid a shocked silence, the instrument is taken away. A.’s father then implores 
everyone to gather for “a photograph. A last photograph.” As various members of the 
family enter the frame, he notes that “Here in this land, by these waters we lived happily for 
many centuries.” Once the group is ready to take the picture, A.’s mother calls her son, and 
the director – now as a child – joins his family for the photograph, with the camera zooming 
in on his face. 
 In the final sequence of Eternity and a Day, the dying poet Alexandros has entered his 
old house by the beach, now vacated and dilapidated. After strolling through the empty 
house, he reaches a bedroom, and a door opens to a balcony overlooking the sea, on which 
an elegant elderly lady sits in front of a stroller. Music can be heard and people seen dancing 
on the beach. The camera focuses on the group of people and a woman in a white dress 
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emerges from their midst. “It’s Alexandros,” she says and approaches the camera on a small 
boardwalk leading to the house, with an accordion playing the title theme of the film. The 
poet enters the frame and walks towards the woman, and they begin dancing slowly to the 
music. After a while, the camera zooms in on the couple and the poet announces that he will 
not go to the hospital. As they walk towards the sea, their backs to the camera, Alexandros 
says that he wants to make “plans for tomorrow.” “What is that,” he asks her, “the 
tomorrow?” To which she replies, caressing his face, “eternity and a day.” The woman 
vanishes from the frame and the poet, desperately, exclaims that he did not understand: “I 
didn’t hear you.” She repeats her words from the off but the poet is left alone on the beach, 
looking forlorn. “Transition to the other shore,” he says as he commences a monologue that 
includes a passage from a poem by Celan: “Dein / Hinübsersein heute Nacht. / Mit Worten 
holt ich dich wieder, da bist du, / alles ist wahr und ein Warten / auf Wahres.” The sequence 
ends, after more than seven minutes, with the poet uttering the words that the young 
Albanian refugee had taught him: little flower, stranger, I, and very late. As the camera 
zooms in on Alexandros’s back in the last image of the film, once again the voice of the 
woman is heard from the off, beckoning him to come. 
 In The Weeping Meadow, a mourning Eleni has just learned of the death of both of her 
sons on opposing sides of the Greek Civil War. A woman who had taken care of her after 
Eleni had seen the corpse of one of her sons takes her to what she calls a “forbidden zone,” 
a plain field by a river: “This is where the battle happened,” the woman says. “The soldiers 
here, the guerrillas over there.” The camera moves away from the women and a jeep enters 
the frame. The jeep then exits the frame again and the camera captures the women as they 
sit hiding by the edge of the field. From the off, a male voice can be heard, shouting “I’m 
looking for Yorgis,” the name of one of Eleni’s sons. As the women disappear from the 
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frame again, a soldier carrying a rifle and a white cloth enters the image, again calling for 
“Captain Yorgis.” When the latter replies “Who is looking for me?” the soldier answers that 
it is “Yannis, your brother.” As the two encounter each other on the field – one in a soldier’s 
uniform, the other in a guerrilla’s – Yorgis remarks that “It’s the war, Yannis. It changed us.” 
They exchange words about the fate of their mother, then embrace and shake hands, crying, 
before both go separate ways to rejoin their units. Yannis removes the white cloth from his 
rifle. The image then blurs and extra-diegetic music commences as the woman’s voice can be 
heard from the off: “They parted, then the battle continued. All the guerrillas that escaped 
disappeared across the border. Your other son, ma’am, lies over there.” The image becomes 
clear again and a crying Eleni, at the end of a sequence shot that lasted almost seven 
minutes, is seen running towards where her killed son is said to have fallen. 
 Different sentiments, of course, are at the heart of each of the three sequences I 
have discussed here: a complex mix between nostalgia for a lost way of life and the trauma 
of displacement and uprooting; the bittersweet recollection of that one moment of bliss 
against which the rest of life seems meaningless; and the devastating memory of a civil war 
that has ruined an entire generation. What all three plan-séquences have in common, however, 
is their staging of an overwhelming space of experience, a past so “big,” as Angelopoulos has 
said, “that it chokes the present” (The Beekeeper, Bonus Material) and – by extension – any 
conceivable sense of the future too. This liquidation of futurity through a crushing past can 
be considered the key structural principle of Angelopoulos’s grammar of time in the last 
films of his oeuvre. 
 It has, to my knowledge, not been acknowledged anywhere yet that Angelopoulos’s 
turn to the past and to remembering coincides rather precisely with a contemporaneous shift 
towards memory studies in the academic sphere and a veritable “memory boom” (Huyssen, 
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Twilight Memories 5) in late 20th and early 21st century cultural production at large. Though I 
would not want to draw Angelopoulos fully into the orbit of memory culture proper, this 
congruity is nevertheless fully in sync with the argument I have been making in this chapter 
about the nexus of cinematic form, historical time, and a politics of aesthetic production. 
Andreas Huyssen identified in the 1990s “a major and puzzling contradiction in our culture,” 
in which the “undisputed waning of history and historical consciousness […] and the various 
discourses […] about posthistoire have been accompanied […] by a memory boom of 
unprecedented proportions” (Twilight Memories 5). This “shift from history to memory” and 
the contemporary “obsession with memory,” Huyssen concluded, is “a sign of the crisis of 
that structure of temporality that marked the age of modernity with its celebration of the 
new” (6). What is at stake in the debate about history and memory, is not least “a 
fundamental crisis in our imagination of alternative futures” (Huyssen, Present Pasts 2), “a 
significant entropy of our sense of future possibilities” (25).  
 Turning to the sphere of aesthetic production more specifically, Huyssen also speaks 
of the “end of a certain utopian aesthetic umbilically linked with the age of classical 
modernity,” of the fact that “the structure of temporality that underwrote the historical 
avant-garde’s futurist claims is no longer the same” (Twilight Memories 96). The trajectory of 
Angelopoulos’s work that I have charted throughout this chapter, then – from the Trilogy of 
History through the Trilogy of Silence to the last films – could be seen as paradigmatic for 
this becoming-precarious of a modernist and avant-gardist conception of history and art: it is 
a continuous artistic negotiation of the problematic of what I have called above the promise 
of modernity, Koselleck’s offene Zukunft and the Verfügbarkeit and Machbarkeit of history, in 
and through aesthetic production. In its somewhat different temporal parameters – 
conditioned by the particular historical context of Greece – the director’s oeuvre thus also 
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offers an illustration and confirmation of Huyssen’s theses from a perspective that 
transcends the context of the northern transatlantic. If the notion of art as transformation, 
however, had still been intact in Greece after its early point of exhaustion in Western Europe 
around 1968 (see Huyssen, Twilight Memories), by the late 20th century both fundamentally 
converged in a profound crisis of modernism. 
 Huyssen, of course, warns against a reductive reading of these phenomena and 
cautions that “the shift from an exclusive future orientation to the memory pole […] is no 
reason at all to leave the discursive field of utopia to its conservative liquidators” (Twilight 
Memories 89). 
In its search for history, the exploration of the no-places, the exclusions, the 
blind spots on the maps of the past is often invested with utopian energies 
very much oriented toward the future. The reasons for such a shift from 
anticipation to remembrance are far from evident, and they may vary from 
case to case. Nor is it evident what the glance back in time, the search for 
history may mean in political terms. […] Nostalgia […] is not the opposite of 
utopia, but, as a form of memory, always implicated, even productive in it 
(88). 
In the case of Angelopoulos, I find very little of such utopianism. His later work constitutes, 
as it were, a litany of the 20th century’s catastrophes, devoid of an eye for Kluge’s blind spot 
of the devil, and without a vision for the future. Angelopoulos, in fact, acknowledges as 
much: “After the end of ideologies, at the end of the century, we are living in a parenthesis 
to the History of Europe and Western civilization, a parenthesis characterized by a ‘lost 
vision,’ a vision that seeks and waits and does not know what to latch onto” (Stathi, 
Angelopoulos 194). The director’s last works, in this sense, can certainly be said to lend 
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expression to a late modern European sensibility that has, in Thomas Elsaesser’s words, 
“failed to consider the possibility of a postheroic narrative” after the end of the heroic phase 
of modernism. “[Instead], it has turned obsessively towards the past, towards 
commemoration and collective nostalgia” (“Postheroic Narrative” 708). Huyssen’s 
imperative that “it is time to remember the future” (Present Pasts 29) is certainly not a 
sentiment at the core of Angelopoulos’s latest films. 
 
If the future is past for Angelopoulos, the trajectory of the director’s oeuvre inevitably also 
raises the question – the distinct possibility even – of modernism itself having exhausted its 
stock of answers for the future, of modernism itself, indeed, having become a thing of the 
past. It is an interesting question, therefore, to what extent the global financial crisis and the 
predicament of Greece in the first two decades of the 21st century could have prepared the 
ground for a new political phase in Angelopoulos’s work – perhaps even for a new political 
aesthetic proper. Angelopoulos’s last film, allegedly, was meant to be about the crisis, and to 
include, importantly, a scene in which an old warehouse provides the setting for a 
performance of a play by Brecht. What would the director now have made of Brechtian 
modernism, the form of modernism with which everything had begun some forty years 
earlier in the Trilogy of History? The answer was brutally cut short: Angelopoulos died in a 
road accident in 2012 while shooting on the set of his new film. What survived this untimely 





1 While Bordwell (“Visual style”; Figures Traced in Light), Ruggle, and Stathi (Space and Time) provide some of the 
most incisive discussions of the sequence shot in Angelopoulos’s oeuvre, references to this technique are 
virtually ubiquitous in scholarship on the filmmaker. None of the critics, however – with the notable, yet 
relative in their scope, exceptions of Jameson (“Past as History”) and Biro – address the issue of what I 
perceive to be a radical shift in the content of the form of the sequence shot. This, I would suggest, is at least partly 
due to an overemphasis on the notion of modernist style, to the detriment of a discussion of form. Bordwell, 
paradigmatically, opens his article on Angelopoulos in a book aptly titled the Last Modernist by saying, “I take 
Angelopoulos to be a modernist director” (“Visual style” 11), in order then to offer a wide-ranging and 
complex discussion of “Angelopoulos and visual style” (my emphasis), arguing that “Angelopoulos is also a 
modernist in creating a trade mark, a recognizable, self-conscious style which he carries from film to film” (12, my 
emphases). Interestingly, however, when he turns to the question of a “two-phase periodization” (23), Bordwell 
refers almost exclusively to issues related to content in order to delineate the fault lines between the two phases 
he detects in Angelopoulos’s work. Similarly, Walter Ruggle in his excellent book-length study of 
Angelopoulos’s films remarks, “dass die alten Erzählformen den neuen Inhalten nicht zum Opfer fallen 
müssen” (114). Both passages, I would argue, are reductive in their lack of attention to the very nature of form 
– in Adorno’s terminology – as sedimented content. 
  
2 The French term plan-séquence is not consistently rendered in English. Uses of the original French can be 
found alongside translations such as “sequence shot” or even “one-shot sequence.” For the sake of 
consistency, I will be using the term “sequence shot” here, and occasionally – for stylistic purposes – revert to 
the French original.  
 
3 Against some of Bazin’s detractors, it must be stressed that his theory of the plan-séquence is by no means a 
simplistic appeal to a reductive realism or even sheer mimeticism. In “The Evolution of the Language of 
Cinema,” in fact, Bazin argues that it is montage that “by its very nature rules out ambiguity of expression.” A 
combination of sequence shots and depth of focus in the construction of the cinematic image, on the other 
hand, can “[reintroduce] ambiguity into the structure of the image” (What is Cinema? 36). The absence of 
montage, Bazin continues, can “give back to the cinema a sense of the ambiguity of reality” (37). “It is 
montage, that abstract creator of meaning, which preserves the state of unreality demanded by the spectacle,” 
Bazin writes in “The Virtues and Limitations of Montage” (45). What is problematic here, obviously, is the 
stark binarism between sequence shot and depth of focus on the one hand and montage on the other. 
   
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in English from texts not originally in English are my own 
translations. 
 
5 I should note here the sometimes subtle but important conceptual difference between a mere long take and a 
sequence shot proper, during which – as Reisz and Millar argue – a whole scene is “shot in one take without cuts” 
(Technique of Film Editing 401). See also Ruggle: “Noch heute wird der Begriff der Plansequenz oft falsch 
verwendet, denn bis eine einzelne Einstellung den Status einer Sequenz erlangt, braucht es mehr als bloss ihre 
lange Dauer” (Ruggle 36). 
 
6 Walter Ruggle, with a slightly different inflection, keenly observes that “chronologische Kontinuität ist […] 
aufgehoben zugunsten einer analytischen Kontinuität, die innere Abläufe sichtbar macht” (Ruggle 38). 
 
7 See Koselleck, “Über die Verfügbarkeit der Geschichte” (Vergangene Zukunft 260-277), and the Introduction to 
this dissertation. 
 
8 In my understanding of different models of aesthetic production, I am partly drawing on a chart provided by 
Andreas Huyssen in his seminar at Columbia University, “Aesthetics under Siege: The Frankfurt School.” 
 





10 My own definition of now-time, in this sense, departs from a strictly Benjaminian conception of the term, 
especially in its lack of emphasis on a messianic dimension. I will comment below in more detail on the 
affinities of Angelopoulos’s work with Benjamin’s theory of Jetztzeit. 
 
11 For the question of censorship, see Karalis, ch. 4. 
 
12 For a more detailed list of historical events referenced in the film, see Jordan. 
   
13 Eliot writes, in his review of Joyce’s Ulysses, that in “using the myth, in manipulating a continuous parallel 
between contemporaneity and antiquity,” Joyce finds “a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a 
significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history” (Eliot 129). 
 
14 See Puchner for an account of modernism’s constitutive relationship with “anti-theatricality.” 
 
15 Isabelle Jordan, in her article “Pour un cinéma épique,” discusses the links between Brecht and Angelopoulos 
in more detail. For Brecht’s own writings on the theater and his extensive remarks on the epic theater in 
particular, see the volume edited by John Willett. 
 
16 I should clarify here that the collaborative nature of Brecht’s epic theater is far less pronounced in 
Angelopoulos’s works. Despite The Travelling Players’ heavy insistence on its popular and even folkloric 
perspective on history, and notwithstanding Angelopoulos’s characterization of the film as a “popular epic” 
(Interviews 19), Angelopoulos shows little interest in an actual collaborative involvement by the people in the 
process of filmmaking. In my opinion, however, this does not invalidate my contextualization of the Trilogy of 
History within the production model of aesthetics espoused by Brecht and Benjamin. Firstly, the director fully 
subscribes to Brecht’s concept of an analytical spectatorship – his call “for the spectator to become the 
filmmaker’s partner in the creative process” (Interviews 12), in fact, echoes Benjamin’s assertion that “this 
apparatus is better, the more consumers it is able to turn into producers – that is, readers or spectators into 
collaborators” (“Author as Producer” 89). More importantly – and this is the key point of my argument here – 
the way Angelopoulos conceives of the position of aesthetic production within production at large and within 
the wider realms of history and politics is fully in sync with Brecht and Benjamin. I will elaborate on the tension 
between cinematic auteurism and a production model of aesthetics below in my discussion of Angelopoulos’s 
affinities with the “Third Cinema” in Latin America. 
 
17 In one sequence in The Travelling Players, one of the actors moves down a street in 1952, only to reach a town 
square in 1939: in the off, loudspeakers announce a visit, in the company of Metaxas, of the Third Reich’s 
propaganda minister Goebbels to the ancient city of Olympia. 
 
18 The British soldier with the bagpipe is an allusion to the forceful support British troops lent to right-wing 
forces in the so-called “Battle of Athens” of December 1944, in which communist and resistance forces and 
the right violently clashed in the capital in a fight over the political future – and domination – of the country. 
  
19 To cite just one example: In one sequence, the hotel owner starts walking along a lake by his estate in 1977, 
only to end up at an American military camp in 1949 a little further on his way. It is at the military camp that he 
obtains the license to run the hotel, which is the setting of the New Year’s celebration in 1977. 
  
20 This amounts to the longest average shot length, or ASL, in any of Angelopoulos’s films. The ASL in The 
Travelling Players – by all accounts already a very “slow” film – is about 101 seconds. Days of ’36 has an ASL of 
around 48 seconds. 
  
21 For a more detailed discussion of the reception of Benjamin’s work in late modernity – especially in its 
emphasis on the more messianic tenets of his thought – see the chapter on Heiner Müller in this dissertation. 
  
22 For a discussion of the problematic aspects of this kind of messianism, see again the chapter on Heiner 





23 Bürger, in his Theorie der Avantgarde, famously notes, “daß die Avantgarde heute bereits historisch ist” (79), 
and “daß die von den Avantgardisten intendierte Aufhebung der Kunst, ihre Rückführung in die Lebenspraxis, 
de facto nicht stattgefunden hat.” “Die Neoavantgarde,” he argues, “institutionalisiert die Avantgarde als Kunst 
und negiert damit die genuin avantgardistischen Intentionen. […] Neoavantgardistische Kunst ist autonome 
Kunst im vollen Sinne des Wortes, und das bedeutet: sie negiert die avantgardistische Intention einer 
Rückführung der Kunst in die Lebenspraxis” (80). 
  
24 For a wide-ranging discussion of this tantalizingly complex film, see Ravetto-Biagioli. 
 
25 See Thierry de Duve, “Die kritische Funktion der Kunst und das Projekt der Emanzipation”: “Rufen wir uns 
noch einmal in Erinnerung, worin diese kritische Funktion im wesentlichen bestand, solange die Moderne 
währte bzw. (was auf ungefähr das gleiche hinausläuft) solange die Avantgarde von der Geschichte getragen 
wurde. […] [Sie sah] es als ihre Pflicht an, dem ästhetischen oder künstlerischen Feld jegliche Art von 
Autonomie hinsichtlich des ethischen oder politischen Feldes fortwährend abzusprechen. Auf Seiten des 
Künstlers konnte die Freiheit, Formen – oder auch Anti-Formen – zu gestalten, niemals bloß formal und 
autonom sein […], sondern musste zumindest für den Ansporn stehen, ähnliche Schritte in Richtung Freiheit 
auch in den Gebieten der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte zu unternehmen. […] Die Frage – ist künstlerisches 
Schaffen in der Lage, eine kritische Funktion beizubehalten, wenn sie von einem emanzipatorischen Projekt 
abgeschnitten ist – verlangte nach einem ‘Ja’ oder ‘Nein’ als Antwort. […] Die Revisionisten sagten ‘nein’, die 
letzten Partisanen der Avantgarde sagten ‘ja’. Erstere bezahlen durch das Aufgeben jeglicher ethischer 
Ambition für die Kunst, letztere durch ein Gefühl der Hoffnungslosigkeit” (26f.). 
   
26 See also Elsaesser: “The European auteur cinema basically knows three kinds of heroes who are close cousins: 
Odysseus, Orpheus and Parzifal – in other words, quest heroes, wanderers […]” (European Cinema 49). 
 
27 Angelopoulos’s casting in Voyage to Cythera of Manolis Katrakis, one of the most famous Greek actors of his 
generation – but also an iconic figure of the Greek Left who had been interned as a political prisoner at the 
infamous Makronissos camp – can already be seen in this context. 
 
28 More ambiguously, of course, there is also Charles Baudelaire’s poem “Voyage au Cythère.” 
 
29 “Art’s promesse du bonheur means not only that hitherto praxis has blocked happiness but that happiness is 
beyond praxis. The measure of the chasm separating praxis from happiness is taken by the force of negativity 
in the artwork” (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 15). 
 
30 Spyros, in this sense, is a younger relative of the dead guerrilla fighter in The Hunters.  
 
31 Adorno himself, of course, had never conceived of a cinematic form of this kind of modernism. 
 
32 See also, especially, Adorno’s “Rede über Lyrik und Gesellschaft” in Noten zur Literatur.  
 
33 See, in this context, Niethammer, who quotes from a passage by Peter Brückner: “Diese eindimensionale 
Realität ist nicht mehr, wie in der langsam vergehenden geschichtlichen Periode, Raum und Zeit für Parteien, die 
miteinander konkurrieren, sie ist selbst Partei” (14, my emphasis). 
 
34 See fn. 32. 
 
35 For a comprehensive discussion of the genealogy of the term “late style,” especially in a German context, see 
Leeder. 
 
36!See especially Adorno’s brief piece on Beethoven’s “Spätstil” (Adorno, Beethoven 180-184). 
!
37 For PASOK’s position see also Clogg 176. 
 
38 The heavy emphasis on documentary modes of representation in the Third Cinema, for instance, is absent 




notion of a full collaborative involvement of the people in the process of filmmaking. The idea expressed by 
the Bolivian filmmaker Jorge Sanjines in “Problems of Form and Content in Revolutionary Cinema” of “a film 
made by the people through an author” (Chanan 35) is as foreign to Angelopoulos’s concept of directorial 
control as is Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino’s polemic, in “Towards a Third Cinema,” against the “myth 
of irreplaceable technicians” (Chanan 24). (This is underlined, not least, by Angelopoulos’s life-long 
collaboration with the cinematographer Giorgos Arvanitis or the production designer Mikes Karapiperis.) Julio 
García Espinosas’s influential call “For an Imperfect Cinema” that is “no longer interested in quality or 
technique” (Chanan 33), likewise, is fundamentally at odds with Angelopoulos’s fastidious attention to the 
formal construction of his films. 
For an overview of the theoretical positions of Latin American Third Cinema, see the collection of manifestos 
gathered in the volume Twenty-five Years of the New Latin American Cinema, edited by Michael Chanan. 
 
39 García Espinosa, in an even more radical formulation, calls for a “poetics whose true goal will be to commit 
suicide, to disappear as such” (Chanan 31). 
 
40 The Nazi limousine and the British soldier with the bagpipe in two of the sequence shots from The Travelling 
Players that I have discussed at some length in this chapter are good examples. Regarding Angelopoulos’s focus 
on a Greek national history, Maria A. Stassinopoulou has criticized that the film “ne mentionne pas […] les 
événements de l’histoire international qu’on peut considerer comme essentiels pour interpreter la guerre civile 
en Grèce” (Stassinopoulou 33). Though Stassinopoulou’s critique is valid, one could argue against this that 
Angelopoulos does not so much ignore this aspect as focus on Greek history as a particular manifestation of an 
international, or indeed universal, historical struggle. 
 
41 These include the Golden Lion and the FIPRESCI award for best film in Venice in 1980 for Megalexandros; 
the best screenplay award and another FIPRESCI award for best film at Cannes in 1984 for Voyage to Cythera; 
the Silver Lion for best director in Venice in 1988 and the European Film Academy’s “Felix” award for the 
Best European Film of the Year in 1989 for Landscape in the Mist; the Grand Prize of the Jury at Cannes in 1995 
for Ulysses’ Gaze; and the Golden Palm at Cannes in 1998 for Eternity and a Day. 
 
42 Interestingly, D’Lugo also mentions “the use of international actors in leading roles” – among them 
Mastroianni in María Luisa Bemberg’s De eso no se habla – as a way “to expand the potential foreign market” 
(115) for recent Latin American film productions. 
 
43 The Rilke poem Josephson quotes in Ulysses’ Gaze, indicatively, is from an 1899 collection titled “Das Buch 
vom mönchischen Leben.” 
 
44 “No less characteristic of the regressive musical language is the quotation,” Adorno writes (“Fetish-
Character” 273). 
 
45 Jameson’s assertion that Angelopoulos “eschews the […] easily canonical” (“Past as History” 85), in this 
context, is manifestly wrong. 
  
46 Hence, Angelopoulos’s penchant in his interviews for using the same quotations or texts again and again in 
order to illustrate different arguments, or similarly, the “second hand” use of quotations. The passage from 
Plato quoted at the opening of Ulysses’ Gaze, for instance, is used as an epigraph by Seferis in his long poem 
Mythistorema (see Seferis); the verses from Rilke’s Duino Elegies that are uttered in Landscape in the Mist may have 
entered Angelopoulos’s film through the modernist Greek poet Odysseus Elytis, who cites exactly the same 
passage in one of his essays in the collection Carte Blanche. In the same essay, Elytis also quotes a passage from 
Solomos that Angelopoulos reverts to in Eternity and a Day. 
     
47 The musical leitmotifs often associated with specific characters in Angelopoulos’s later films, indeed, could 
be analyzed in the same light. Adorno’s work on the leitmotif in Wagner’s music would probably support such 
a reading (see Adorno, Wagner). It is noteworthy that Angelopoulos had not used any extra-diegetic music at all 
in the Trilogy of History. Similarly, one could go as far as arguing that the deliberate restraint – the Brechtian 
anti-culinarism – of the mises-en-scène of the early films contrasts with a slightly more elaborate use of set design 





48 Though my earlier discussion of “late style,” incidentally, could be argued to point in that direction, I think it 
would be too far-fetched to detect in Angelopoulos’s late work what Adorno described as a peculiar approach 
to formal conventions constitutive of Beethoven’s late style (see Adorno, Beethoven 180-184).   
 
49 See in more detail Karalis, chapters 4 and 5. “Indeed, state assistance was so extensive that Rafailidis 
observed that between 1975 and 1985 film production ‘de facto 100 percent belonged to the state’” (Karalis 
181). “After 1986, Greek cinema seemed to have totally collapsed. All films were produced by the Greek Film 
Center, bound by the clientelistic policies of the Socialist Party” (218). 
 
50 See Jameson, Postmodernism, and Adorno, Beethoven. 
 
51 One could also cite an anecdote of Angelopoulos’s in this context, in which the American director Sydney 
Pollack asks him how he manages to have grey skies throughout his films. “I wait for them,” Angelopoulos 
responds, prompting Pollack to reply that American film budgets would never allow for such a wasteful 
approach to time (see Archimandritis 53f.). 
 
52 For the relationship between lateness and slowness, see also Fuchs.  
 
53 The three films have been described as part of a “Trilogy of Borders.” 
 
54 See also Clogg, ch. 7. 
 
55 For a discussion of Angelopoulos’s work in the context of the history and culture of the Balkans, see 
especially Calotychos. 
 
56 In his interview with Archimandritis, Angelopoulos says that “le siècle a commencé de façon étrange par 
Sarajevo et se termine par Sarajevo. […] [Ce] siècle qui avait des guerres, qui avait tout ce que vous voulez de 
terrible, c’était en même temps plein de promesses, mais à la fin il y a une déception total. C’est-à-dire c’est 
incroyable de commencer et finir par Sarajevo, comme si l’Histoire n’existait pas” (Archimandritis 172).  
 
57 An argument along these lines can be found in a dissertation by Lucie Dugas titled L’Esthétique de l’espace dans 
le cinéma d’auteur à l’époque de la mondialisation. 
  
58 Irini Stathi, in an essay titled “Aspects du voyage dans l’oeuvre de Théo Angelopoulos : le poète-nomade 
dans le brouillard du Temps,” argues that “[le] voyage philosophique moderne proposé par Angelopoulos est 
[…] fondé sur la négation obstinée de tout espace conventionnel” (97). In “Territoires et lignes de fuites,” 
Élodie Lélu contends that “[tous] les films d’Angelopoulos traitent de la ‘deterritorialisation’ au sens de 






EMPTY TIME, HISTORICAL APOSIOP(OI)ESIS,  
AND THE MESSIANIC PROMISE IN THE  
LATE POETRY OF HEINER MÜLLER 
___________________________________ 
 
Was du nicht wissen wolltest ZEIT IST FRIST 
- Heiner Müller 
!
                                                                                        I would say that the messianic is not the end of time, but the                             
              time of the end. […] [It] is the time that contracts itself and                   
       begins to finish – or, if you prefer, the time that is left 
between time and its ending. 
- Giorgio Agamben 
 
 
“Von Krankheit kann man immer sprechen,” the narrator of Christa Wolf’s novel 
Nachdenken über Christa T. argues at one point (Wolf 82), casting doubt on the notion that her 
friend, the eponymous protagonist of the book, died – quite simply – from leukemia. Wolf’s 
novel, of course, remains ambiguous and abstains from a crude symbolism that would 
merely translate Christa T.’s death in the GDR into a death from the GDR. But the young 
woman’s demise does seem entangled, in crucial ways, with the social-historical juncture at 
which it happens: one can sense, in short, a striking congruity between the two. It is precisely 
this congruity between a life’s end and the course of history – what Edward Said has called 
an “abiding timeliness” (Said 3)1 – that also characterizes the last phase of Heiner Müller’s 
career. There is something resoundingly, even perversely, à propos about the writer’s death – 
or should one say: the writer’s dying – from cancer of the esophagus in 1995, just six years 
after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, five years after German re-unification, and only four years 
after the final dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
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 There is no doubt, I will argue in this chapter, that Müller’s poetry from the years 
between 1989 and 1995 emphatically also traces a movement – an inexorable movement – 
towards death, decay, and endings, personal as much as historical. And yet: to read it in 
exclusively teleological fashion, as the mere constatation of an end, would be misguided. It 
would, in fact, feed a certain kind of triumphalism that sees in Müller’s late poetry the 
manifestation of an apocalyptic eschaton whose truth content resides in the definitive silencing 
of a voice and, along with that, the end of a history that is articulated through and with this 
voice. Müller’s poetry, however, never quite “makes it” to the end. (It is impossible, after all, 
to say “I am dead now.”) In this sense, his last poems – even his very last poem – do not 
signify the end, or death, or silence, but mark an aposiopesis. An elliptical figure, aposiopesis is 
imbued with a temporality that is quite different from that of death or dying: it keeps time in 
place, it demarcates a lingering-on; it delays, in fact, or defers death. Simultaneously, 
aposiopesis creates a space that someone other can fill, imbue with meaning, bring to life 
again, and thus take as the point of departure for a new kind of critical praxis. To write into 
being, then, an aposiopesis, or to do aposiopoiesis2, as I will argue Müller does, means poetically 
to enact a new time-space or chronotope: an attempt at propelling one’s poetry, marked 
though it is by death and finitude, into the future, to keep history in flow. 
 
Müller’s poetry, it is worth noting here, to this day remains a largely under-studied aspect of 
his work. Some twenty years after the writer’s death, 17 years after the publication of the first 
volume of Müller’s Werke, Werke 1: Die Gedichte by Suhrkamp, and in the wake of a new and 
expansively annotated edition of Müller’s complete poems in 2014, titled Warten auf der 
Gegenschräge: Gesammelte Gedichte, not much has changed in this respect. Jürgen Sang’s 
assertion from 1994 that “a serious and thorough treatment of Müller’s lyric is a 
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Forschungsdesiderat” and that the “published [secondary] materials and newspaper articles [on 
Müller’spoetry] go hardly beyond feuilletonistic commentaries” (Sang 259) is, essentially, still 
valid in 2015. Indicatively, of the staggering almost 1,800 pages in Florian Vaßen’s three-
volume Bibliographie Heiner Müller, published in 2013, only some thirteen pages are devoted to 
material on Müller’s poetry, most of it newspaper articles or readings of one single poem, 
namely “Mommsens Block.” 
 The resolute focus in this chapter on Müller’s late poetry, then, is also a response to 
this form of critical neglect. More importantly, however, I want to counter here an implicit, 
and often explicit, tendency to consider Müller’s poetry a mere side product, or – after 1989 
– an addendum, appendix or postscript to a dramatic oeuvre that had already reached its 
point of culmination before the Fall of the Berlin Wall, and that ended conclusively with 
Müller’s only piece of writing for the theater after 1989, Germania 3 Gespenster am toten Mann. 
My argument is that aposiopoiesis allows Müller in his late poetry to perform a historical 
opening towards the future – however precarious and problematic – that had become all but 
unthinkable within the parameters of Müller’s dramatic output. It is, in this sense, also a 
rather surprising “transformation of chronotopes” that manifests itself in this late body of 
work. And it is in the peculiar thematics and above all the formal properties of a specifically 
poetic procedure that this new or alternative approach to historical time and the space of 
historicity materializes. As Müller writes in one of his Entwürfe aus dem Nachlass:3 
  Unter dem Raum unter der Zeit 
  Unter dem Raum der Geschichte 
  Unter der Zeit des Menschen 
  Ist der Raum ist die Zeit des Gedichts (432) 
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 This notion of an intrinsically aesthetic time, of course, once again brings to the fore 
the question about the scope and limitations of a modernist political aesthetic after 1989. My 
concluding discussion at the end of this chapter of the profound affinities between what I 
call aposiopoiesis and different modes of messianic thinking at the turn of the 20th century has 
to be seen in precisely this context. Both Müller’s late poetry and the different invocations of 
a messianic promise I will discuss here are as much political-aesthetic strategies proper as 
they are symptoms of a profoundly ambivalent moment in historical time. This ambivalence 
– indeed: the aposiopetic charge of this moment – is perhaps nowhere more concisely 
expressed than in the Werke edition’s chapter heading to Müller’s late poetry, which comes 
by the label of “1989…” (W 229). 
 
KOMMT ZEIT KOMMT TOD: EMPTY TIME 
 
“Kommt Zeit kommt Tod” (166): the phrase from the long poem “Mommsens Block” 
could be considered a leitmotif for the poetry Müller wrote between 1989 and 1995, a 
remarkable corpus of some 90 poems4 that revolve, almost obsessively, around notions of 
death, ending, illness, and decay. Roughly two thirds of the poems, indeed, explicitly 
thematize death or dying, often in violent fashion. The semantic field around Tod, tot, sterben 
is perhaps the strongest linguistic marker of Müller’s late poetry. Of the remaining texts, 
hardly any are free from a sense of finality. “Staub” (89, 166), “Abschied” (89, 366, 428), 
“Abgrund” (94, 181), “fin de partie” (372) and similar formulations are ubiquitous, as are 
temporal adjectives and adverbs such as “letzte” (185, 378), “last” (in English, 90), and 
“endlich” (156), or negative statements like “nicht mehr” (155, 374), “Nichts mehr” (339) or 
“Nichts Neues” (178). 
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 Müller, importantly, never clearly distinguishes between historical time and the 
existential time of individual life. What matters for him is a temporal trajectory that leads 
ineluctably to death: “Aus der Geschichte lernen heißt das Nichts lernen,” he writes in 
“Besuch beim älteren Staatsmann.” “In allen Sprachen / Heißt die Zukunft Tod” (163). 
“Pflicht ist der Tod,” he states in the poem “Sehstörung” (360). “Der Tod,” indeed, “Ist das 
Einfache sterben kann ein Idiot” (186). And in “Gespräch mit Yang Tschu dem 
Pessimisten,” one reads, in rhyme that is either clumsy or neatly captures a sense of the banal 
Folgerichtigkeit of death:  
     Er ist sterblich 
  […] 
     Und wozu  
  Da wir doch wissen nur der Tod ist erblich  
  Das Leben ist ein Witz er ist der Clou  
  Leb wie du willst oder leb nach der Schnur  
  Unsterblichkeit ist gegen die Natur (359) 
 The notion of a life lived nach der Schnur – Müller repeats it in almost identical fashion 
in the poem “Römerbrief” (361) – implies a chronological time that relentlessly progresses to 
its inevitable point of culmination, death and nothingness. Müller speaks of “[Reisende] ins 
Nichts” (378), “Waiting for doomsday” (370). In “Welcome to Santa Monica,” “Ein 
sterbender Mann betritt das Hotelfoyer / Wo andre Sterbende ihre Zeit totschlagen / Kurz 
oder lang zwischen Geburt und Tod” (191): The laconic phrase “andre Sterbende” here 
suggests that to the extent that anyone lives, one is always already dying, too. Empty time – 
“Leerzeit Ein Tag wirft mich dem andern zu” (376) – at its very core has death inscribed in 
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it. Indeed, there is “eine tote Zeit, skandiert mit / Fütterung Beischlaf Drogen Geschwätz: das 
Leben” (327, my emphases).  
 The relentlessness of this trajectory that an der Schnur binds life to death is further 
underscored by Müller’s decision to date most of the poems from this period – a practice he 
had used much less consistently or not at all before 19895 – as well as, crucially, by his 
instructions to the editors of his complete works that the poems be published in a single 
volume following the principle of “brutale Chronologie” (Werke 1, 334). While some remain 
undated, most pieces in the Werke edition now bear the year – “1991” (W1, 236, 240, 242), 
“1992” (243, 244), “1993” (267, 268, 274, 275), “1994” (289, 291, 297, 298), “1995” (315, 
316, 317, 322) – or month and year of their conception – “Dezember 1992” (263), “Oktober 
1993” (272), “Oktober 1994” (281), “August 1995” (318).6 Some also offer a place name – 
“Frankfurt, 3.10.1992” (254), for instance, or “Baden-Baden, Oktober 1995” (321) – and 
many even give a precise date: “16.8.1992” (246), “21.10.1993” (269), “29.11.1994” (283).  
 In her afterword to Warten auf der Gegenschräge, Kristin Schulz points to a “Verfahren 
der funktionalen Datierung” in Müller’s poetry: “Die Datierungen, die Müller seinen Texten 
zuwies (auf den Fassungen im Archiv oder in Publikationen) […] sind jedoch nicht immer 
korrekt, sondern zugleich Teil einer Werkpolitik” (465). While I agree with Schulz’s notion 
of a politics of dates – the symbolic combination above of Frankfurt, the financial center of 
the Federal Republic, with October 3, the official date of German re-unification, is a good 
example – I would want to qualify her assertion that “Müller ist der eigenen (kursorischen) 
Idee, seine Werke ‘brutal chronologisch’ zu ordnen, selbst nie gefolgt […]. Die Einbettung 
der Texte in ihren jeweiligen geschichtlichen Zusammenhang blieb […] entscheidend und 
hatte zeit seines Lebens Vorrang gegenüber jeglichem Zwang zu philologischer 
Chronologie” (462). It is, I will argue here, precisely not a philological but indeed a 
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werkpolitische decision on the part of Müller to highlight this aspect of existential and 
historical time: Leben nach der Schnur, brutale Chronologie, empty time running its course – what 
Müller presents, indeed, as a mutual imbrication of progress and death. 
 It is no coincidence, then, that precise dating occurs most frequently in Müller’s very 
late poems – in those texts, that is, in which an impending death forces itself onto Müller’s 
writing ever more powerfully. The last such poem, consequently, dated “12.12.1995” (W1 
325) in the Werke edition and titled, in a longer version in the Schulz edition, 
“B[eschreibung] e[ines] T[odes] death in progress” (G 430), comes extremely close to the 
writer’s own death less than three weeks later. “Ich kaue die Krankenkost der Tod schmeckt 
durch,” the poem begins. Schulz’s parenthetical transcription of Müller’s abbreviated 
handwriting, thereby, also alludes to the material trace of a progressive weakening that 
becomes legible in the manuscripts of Müller’s late poetry: first as what Müller himself labels 
an “Ende der Handschrift” (380) in one of his poems – an increasingly illegible and insecure 
scribbling by hand – then as an extremely fragmented form of writing by typewriter, riddled 
with typographical errors.7 “Die Hand konnte den Schreibgriffel nicht mehr halten,” Müller 
writes about his proxy Seneca in the poem “Senecas Tod” (155), a moment that foreshadows 
the Roman philosopher’s ultimate silence, “(sprachlos endlich) / Als er dem Tod 
entgegenging im Dampfbad” (156). In “Ende der Handschrift,” Müller then writes: 
  Neuerdings wenn ich etwas aufschreiben will 
  Einen Satz ein Gedicht eine Weisheit 
  Sträubt meine Hand sich gegen den Schreibzwang 
  (Dem mein Kopf sie unterwerfen will) 
  Die Schrift wird unlesbar Nur die Schreibmaschine 
  Hält mich noch aus dem Abgrund dem Schweigen 
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  Das der Protagonist meiner Zukunft ist (380)8 
 There is a compelling immediacy here with which Müller – terminally ill at this stage, 
“der trübe rest an schläuchen aufgehängt” (384) – gives himself over to empty time and 
engages, in poem after poem of this very latest phase of his career, with an impending death. 
Empty time emerges as the very agent “meines Todes der schon im kalender steht” (425). 
“Leere Zeit / Erfahrung der L[eeren] Z[eit] / Mit jedem Tick der Uhr leert sich die Zeit” 
(628), a typewritten note to the poem “Leere Zeit” reads. In a draft to the poem 
“Rechtsfindung,” Müller speaks of the “Erfindung der Uhr / Die den Tod anzeigt” (623). 
“M[ein] Tod wird kommen,” he writes (427). “Ich bin kein Nazitank mein Krebs weiß 
Bescheid” (426), the aptly titled “Zeitgedicht” announces. 
 In many of his latest poems, Müller reaches a level of formal and linguistic 
concentration that condenses the experience of dying into a tightly wrought formal entity. It 
is, in a very traditionally poetic sense, a form of mastery over death that Müller achieves 
here, without abandoning himself to the illusion of transcending, overcoming or reverting a 
process whose end will, no matter what, come. “Das,” Müller says in an interview with 
Alexander Kluge, “geht aber eigentlich nur mit ganz dichten Texten, lyrischen. Mit Prosa 
geht das ganz schwer. Das muß sich reimen. Das muß sehr dicht sein oder sehr geformt, 
dann hilft es gegen die Schmerzen. Aber es muß eben sehr geformt sein” (Werke 12 595). 
And so, elliptical, mostly nominal, sentences devoid of ornament, without punctuation or 
even capitalization, move rhythmically and paratactically – in verse form and alternate rhyme 
– towards an irreversible end. 
  im schädel königreiche universen 
  der trübe rest an schläuchen aufgehängt 
  ein sack chemie den krebstod auf den fersen 
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  ein wirbelsturm in einen staub gezwängt 
 
  zu stillem rasen aus den eingeweiden 
  giftwälder blühn landschaften in orange 
  schlaflos die nacht vom tag nicht mehr zu scheiden 
  der tod wird heimat göttliche mélange (384) 
What awaits one, time and again, in these poems is the realm of “nichts” (367). Several of 
these texts – among them “Besuch beim älteren Staatsmann” (163f.), “Sterbender Mann mit 
Spiegel” (346) and “Römerbrief” (361) – are veritable incantations of nothingness, 
proclaiming a threefold “nichts nichts nichts” (164) or offering three consecutive verses 
beginning by “Nichts” (346). “Nichts mehr lieben und niemand ist gut Für den Einsamen 
hat der / Tod keine Schrecken Keine Heimat braucht wer im Nichts wohnt” (339). 
 “Nichts” is also the culmination of “Leere Zeit” – perhaps the most paradigmatic 
poem of Müller’s for all I have, so far, discussed in this chapter: 
  Leere Zeit 
 
  Meinen Schatten von gestern 
  Hat die Sonne verbrannt 
  In einem müden April 
 
  Staub auf den Büchern 
 
  In der Nacht 
  Gehn die Uhren schneller 
 




  Warten auf nichts 
 
  31.12.94 
Here too, then, empty time has run its course: “Leere Zeit” (367) – written, almost to the 
day, a year before the poet’s own death – describes an inexorable movement, symbolized by 
the fast-moving clock, from a past (“gestern”) long gone, through a present in which 
history’s rigor mortis is already palpable (“Staub auf den Büchern / […] Kein Wind vom 
Meer”), to a future which can no longer be thought (“Warten auf nichts”). Is it mere 
coincidence, thereby, that Müller speaks of “einem müden April” – modernism’s very cruelest 
month? What the poem, at any rate, evokes is nothing less than what could be called the dead 
end of progress. 
 
DEATH IN PROGRESS: PITFALLS OF HISTORICAL TIME 
 
It is precisely Müller’s conjunction of death and progress that provides an immediate link 
between the poetic articulation of the poet’s own dying and a larger political-historical 
dimension immanent in his late poetry. It is through this conjunction that Müller’s late 
poetry moves beyond the mere memento mori of “Kommt Zeit Kommt Tod” and turns into a 
poetic form of political critique. “Leere Zeit,” of course, directly refers to Benjamin’s notion 
of “empty, homogeneous time” in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and the 
Arcades Project, and thus to a radical critique of a form of historical thinking that is predicated 
on the concept of progress. It is this critique that Müller actualizes for the political and 
historical context of the period around and after 1989: a period that – somewhat in 
shorthand – can be identified as that, on the national level, of the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
dissolution of the GDR, and German re-unification under the aegis of the Federal Republic; 
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and of the end of the Cold War, the alleged victory of the markets, and the widely 
proclaimed “end of history” as such on a world-historical scale. 
 This historical setting is crucial: For Wolf, writing in 1968, the fate of her protagonist 
Christa T. was simultaneously a moment of “Wann, wenn nicht jetzt?” (Wolf 73, 88, 183), in 
the leitmotif-like formulation that punctuates and concludes the novel. Christa T. stood for a 
historical krisis in the original sense of the term: a critical moment of decision in which, 
nonetheless, a utopian potential was still manifest. For Müller, on the contrary – writing in 
the immediate after-Wende years – this utopian dimension seemed no longer accessible. This 
shift in perspective, importantly, was determined by the very similar position Wolf and 
Müller occupied within the specific context of the GDR: They were not, of course, 
propagandists of the state; nor, however, were they outright dissidents or heretics. Their 
shared position vis-à-vis the official GDR was one of complex solidarity and broad ideological 
alignment. It is always also as an intrinsic response to or as a reverberation of the specific 
parameters of a GDR cultural politics that one must read both writers’ poetic and political 
outlook. And so what I will say here in the following about Müller’s late poetry can never be 
disengaged from the poet’s prominent position as a member of the intellectual establishment 
of the GDR. This is true for Müller’s rhetoric of provocation, which constitutes an 
aggressive, and sometimes auto-aggressive, response to various forms of bundesrepublikanische 
hegemony in the wake of 1989; but it also underlies a certain trajectory of retreat, a 
movement by which the outward- and forward-looking attitude that Wolf – despite all odds 
– had still adopted is gradually transformed into a form of historical hermeticism, a kind of 
persistent mulling that does not allow Müller to seek new political horizons for a 
transformed historical terrain. That Müller, in this passive-aggressive way, ultimately remains 
wedded to the context of the GDR – that the future here barely ever materializes as a tangible 
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category – constitutes one of the more profound limitations of his late poetic work. It does 
not, however, invalidate his often very salient critique of the political present he inhabited. 
 When asked by Kluge, “Wenn du erklären solltest, ob der Beruf, den du ausübst, 
mehr ein Land- und Zeitvermesser ist oder ein Prophet, was würdest du sagen?” Müller 
responded that “Ich würde eigentlich aus Eitelkeit sagen, ein Prophet, das wäre aber ganz 
falsch. Ich würde, wenn ich ehrlich bin, sagen: Ich bin ein Landvermesser” (Werke 12 443). A 
focus on the present condition, then, also characterizes Müller’s late poetry: a resolute 
engagement with the social, historical and political realities after 1989 that often takes the 
form of an impassioned critique of “THE HORROR THE HORROR THE HORROR” of 
what Müller refers to, citing Gottfried Benn, as a “Schaurige Welt kapitalistische Welt” (92). 
It is an “Ekel am Heute und Hier” (170), as Müller writes in “Mommsens Block,” that 
animates his writing in this period. The nod to Kafka and the Landvermesser K., in this sense, 
also gestures towards the futility of all endeavors in the present, whether historical or 
existential. 
 Müller’s critique – though less emphatically so in his poetry than in his interviews – 
also harks back to an orthodox Marxism and doctrinal politics in the GDR that had long 
become obsolete: In the ironically titled “Selbstkritik” section of the poem “Fernsehen,” 
written in the period of the Wende, Müller states, 
  Meine Herausgeber wühlen in alten Texten 
  Manchmal wenn ich sie lese überläuft es mich kalt Das 
  Habe ich geschrieben IM BESITZ DER WAHRHEIT 
  Sechzig Jahre vor meinem mutmaßlichen Tod 
  Auf dem Bildschirm sehe ich meine Landsleute 
  Mit Händen und Füßen abstimmen gegen die Wahrheit 
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  Die vor vierzig Jahren mein Besitz war 
  Welches Grab schützt mich vor meiner Jugend (90f.) 
Müller, however, had also considered the Berlin Wall “eine Zeitmauer” (Werke 12 39): 
“Wenn ich vom Übergang Friedrichstraße zum Bahnhof Zoo in Westberlin fahre,” he had 
argued before the Fall of the Wall, “fühle ich einen großen Unterschied von Zivilisationen, 
von Epochen, von Zeit. Es gibt da verschiedene Zeitebenen, verschiedene Zeit-Räume. Man 
fährt da wirklich durch eine Zeitmauer” (quoted in Karschnia and Lehmann 9). “Was in 
Osteuropa einschließlich der DDR gescheitert ist,” in this sense, was also “ein Versuch, die 
Zeit anzuhalten” (Werke 12 39). “Man kann ja jetzt das, was da weggefallen ist, also der 
Eiserne Vorhang, alles was dafür steht, die Mauer, als Instrumente der Verlangsamung eines 
historischen Prozesses betrachten” (Werke 11 643), Müller explains in another conversation 
with Kluge. And so what he is concerned with in his late poetry, I would argue, is less the 
demise of the GDR and its political-ideological underpinnings as such – “Zerstoben ist die 
Macht an der mein Vers / Sich brach” (372) – and more a new regime of time, history, life 
(and death) in a West vying, increasingly successfully, for hegemony. What is at stake here is 
the complex, and sometimes paradoxical, enmeshment of capitalist acceleration and 
historical stasis in the “end of history,” of growth and degradation, of – once again – 
progress and death. 
 The poem “Ahnenbrühe,” dated 1992 in the Werke edition, is paradigmatic: 
  Ahnenbrühe 
 
  Tödlich der Menschheit ihre zu rasche Vermehrung 
  Jede zweite Geburt ein Tod zu wenig Mord ein Geschenk 
  Jeder Vulkan eine Hoffnung Lob den Taifunen 
  […] 
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  Die Massaker sind Investitionen in die Zukunft 
  Gott ist kein Mann keine Frau ist ein Virus 
  Krankheit die dich gewöhnt an die Demut 
  Des Fleisches unter dem Boden 
      Im Keuchen der Bronchien 
  Die Stimme des Jüngsten Gerichts 
      Im SPIEGEL Berichte 
  Über die weltweit wachsende Schwierigkeit 
  Bei [d]er Entsorgung unsrer versickernden Reste 
  […] 
  Verseucht mit Medikamenten verpestet von Fortschritt 
  Verwüsten wir tot UNSRE Umwelt UMWELT 
  Was für ein Wort WIR SIND DIE STRAHLENDE MITTE 
  Wie anders lebt man wissend daß man ein Gift ist 
  Lebt man anders Braucht der Mensch den Menschen 
  TOD DEN ENKELN Besser wir kehrten die Zeit um 
  Unser Besitzstand der Tod und keine Geburt mehr (343) 
The opening line of the poem – “Tödlich der Menschheit ihre zu rasche Vermehrung” – 
invokes the catastrophe of a rapidly, and fatally, growing world population. What is 
particularly noteworthy, however, is its coupling of the economic term Vermehrung, or 
accumulation, with the adjective tödlich. This inaugurates a series of such pairings throughout 
the poem, including the combination of Geburt and Tod, of Vulkan and Hoffnung, of Lob and 
Taifunen, of Massaker and Zukunft, of Gott and Virus. The year 1992, as “Ahnenbrühe” 
demonstrates in its further course, presents a setting of Tod, Mord and Massaker, of Virus and 
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Krankheit, of Toten and Totengräbern, in short: an apocalyptic scenario in which “Die Stimme 
des jüngsten Gerichts” can already be heard. In a sense, in its relentless progression towards 
the final verse, ending in “Tod und keine Geburt mehr,” with its propulsive rhythm and 
enjambements, the poem itself enacts the accumulation of catastrophes Müller speaks about. 
What is crucial, thereby, on the level of content is that the times and spaces of nature emerge 
here as an avenging force against an enterprising humanity and its detrimental impact on 
“UNSERE Umwelt.” “Ahnenbrühe,” like so many other of Müller’s late poems, ends with 
death and the end of time, with nothing more to come: it is, however, explicitly progress – 
degradation by progress, “verpestet von Fortschritt” – which has brought about this demise. 
Not incidentally, of course, the final line of the poem – equating Tod with a Besitzstand – adds 
the notion of property to those essential terms of capitalist production – growth, 
accumulation, investment – that had appeared earlier in “Ahnenbrühe” as carriers of decay. 
 This articulation of capitalist values with the notion of death is constant in Müller’s 
late poetry: The dead and dying – veritable zombies – are busy doing commerce: 
“Stewardessen trippeln / Durch den fliegenden Sarg,” the “travel notes” about a 
“NACHTFLUG FRANKFURT TOKYO” demonstrate: “Die Leichen / Schlafen / 
MORGEN FRÜH WENN GOTT WILL / Die Geschäfte” (337). And on the other end of 
a globalized world, in a poem already mentioned above and set in Santa Monica in 1995: 
“Ein sterbender Mann betritt das Hotelfoyer / Wo andre Sterbende ihre Zeit totschlagen / 
Kurz oder lang zwischen Geburt und Tod / Mit Geschäften” (191). In a world, Müller 
suggests, in which “ZUM GELDE DRÄNGT AM GELDE HÄNGT DOCH ALLES” 
(181)9, all aspects of movement – acceleration, progress, circulation, traffic – become 
wedded to suffering and death. “Auf dem Bahnsteig zwischen den Zügen thront / Ein 
junger Mann sein Reich ein Abfallkübel,” the “travel notes” begin: “Sein / Gesicht leer keine 
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Freude kein Schmerz: / Er ist aus dem Rennen” (337). “Europa Der Stier ist geschlachtet 
das Fleisch / Fault auf der Zunge der Fortschritt läßt keine Kuh aus,” one reads in “Ajax 
zum Beispiel” (180). “Eine Frau beim Warten auf Grün an der Kreuzung / Prüft ihre 
Fingernägel Ein Bild aus der Werbung / Zehn Minuten später wird sie tot sein” (351): This, 
it seems, is the normal course – “Stadtverkehr,” the poem is titled – of contemporary city 
life. 
 Time and again, Müller’s late poetry evokes the inhumane flipside of capitalist 
splendor, the historical violence of an allegedly post-historical moment, “den Schrecken / 
einer sauberen Welt” (159). In “Müller im Hessischen Hof,” “Der schlafende Penner vor 
ESSO SNACK&SHOP,” “Ausbeutung,” “Hunger” and “Armut” are juxtaposed with “Im 
Hotelrestaurant die Unschuld der Reichen / Der gelassene Blick auf den Hunger der Welt” 
(157). “Die Kleidung (ist) verdreckt Wahrscheinlich / Stinkt er / sein langes Haar zum Zopf 
gebunden,” the young man who is “aus dem Rennen” is described by Müller (337). “Birth of 
a Soldier,” written in 1993, presents the image on a TV screen of “ein Soldat aus England / 
Beim Leichenzählen in einem bosnischen Dorf” (176), pointing towards a genocidal war in 
the very peaceful haven of Europe after 1989. Once again, the “birth” of a soldier here is 
synonymous with the act of “Leichenzählen.” 
 Müller is explicit about what he considers the exigencies of the present condition in 
his interviews, too. In a conversation with David Hannak in 1991, he states that “der Krieg 
der Armut gegen den Wohlstand […] ist sicherlich das große Problem der nächsten hundert 
Jahre” (Werke 12 73). “Das Feindbild [des Sozialismus] ist nun verschwunden, jetzt braucht 
man daran nicht mehr zu denken. Die Marktwirtschaft kann nun asozialer gestaltet werden” 
(76). “Der Kapitalismus [hat] keine Alternative mehr,” he argues in another interview from 
the same year, “keinen Feind außer sich selber. Und das verspricht eine interessante 
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Entwicklung. Im Zusammenhang mit Armut und Elend in vielen Teilen der Welt, mit der 
Bevölkerungsexplosion, mit den ökologischen Katastrophen” (57). Indeed, “Vom Ende der 
Geschichte zu reden, ist natürlich Schwachsinn. Das gilt ohnehin nur für die, die schon in 
der Geschichte sind. Aber draußen stehen eine ganze Menge, die noch gar nicht in die 
Geschichte eingetreten sind” (113). It is difficult to evaluate to what extent Müller ironizes 
or actually embraces this kind of Eurocentric rhetoric about whole world regions lying 
outside of history. What does however become clear here, once again, is the way in which a 
large-scale historical catastrophism is fuelled by the political-historical developments around 
and after 1989. And so, amid “dem großen / Weltbürgerkrieg der noch dauert” (G 328), as 
Müller writes, the “Klage des Geschichtsschreibers” from the past, in one of Müller’s 
“Roman poems,” is alien to the poet in the period after 1989: 
  Klage des Geschichtsschreibers 
 
  Im vierten Buch der ANNALEN beklagt sich Tacitus 
  Über die Dauer der Friedenszeit, kaum unterbrochen 
  Von läppischen Grenzkriegen, mit deren Beschreibung er 
  Auskommen mußte, voll Neid 
  Auf die Geschichtsschreiber vor ihm 
  Denen Mammutkriege zur Verfügung standen 
  Geführt von Kaisern, denen Rom nicht groß genug war 
  Unterworfene Völker, gefangene Könige 
  Aufstände und Regierungskrisen: guter Stoff. 
  Und Tacitus entschuldigt sich bei seinen Lesern. 
  Ich meinerseits, zweitausend Jahre nach ihm 
  Brauche mich nicht zu entschuldigen und kann mich 
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  Nicht beklagen über Mangel an gutem Stoff. 
 
  16.8.92 
 As a Landvermesser of the present condition, Müller in fact sees himself confronted 
with a kind of excess of reality, a negative exuberance that puts enormous pressure – and 
radically calls into question – the very act of poetic production. Time and again, in his late 
poetry, the will to form – verse, meter, rhyme – competes with an external reality that 
threatens to break all form or, worse still, to turn form into complicity, complacency, lie. 
Late in 1995, Müller writes: 
  Vor meiner Schreibmaschine dein Gesicht 
  Dein Auge das mich fragt Was willst du sagen 
  Gegen die Welt Wie kannst du sie ertragen 
  Was willst du tun daß sie zusammenbricht (381) 
“Im aktuellen Gemisch aus Gewalt und Vergessen” (184), the “schlafende Penner” of 
“Müller im Hessischen Hof” “Widerlegt die Lyrik der Revolution.” “Die Lügen der Dichter 
sind aufgebraucht / Vom Grauen des Jahrhunderts” (157). “Ungereimt / Kommen die 
Texte die Sprache verweigert den Blankvers” (158). Müller evokes “Die Schwierigkeit / Den 
Vers zu behaupten gegen das Stakkato / Der Werbung” (184). And there is, of course, his 
own case of writer’s block, mirrored in “Mommsens Block” some 100 years before, in light 
of a similar “Ekel am Heute und Hier”: Referring to a conversation he overheard between 
“zwei Helden der Neuzeit,” “Lemuren des Kapitals Wechsler und Händler” (170), Müller 
admits: 
  Und als ich ihrem Dialog zuhörte gierig 
  […] 
  Tierlaute Wer wollte das aufschreiben 
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  Mit Leidenschaft Haß lohnt nicht Verachtung läuft leer 
  Verstand ich zum erstenmal Ihre Schreibhemmung (171) 
But Müller also expresses unease, a concern about the efficacy and sincerity of a political 
critique voiced through the medium of poetry. “Mein Platz ist zwischen den Stühlen,” he 
writes in “Müller im Hessischen Hof,” “Wissend länger als ich / Wird die Ausbeutung 
dauern an der ich teilhabe / Länger als ich der Hunger der mich ernährt”: “Ich fahre im Taxi 
vorbei Ich kann es mir / Leisten,” he says about “Der schlafende Penner vor ESSO 
SNACK&SHOP” (157). And so what I have referred to above as a will to form is always 
refracted in Müller’s late poetry through his view of a political and historical reality that 
collides with and threatens to invalidate this poetic impulse. This process, in turn – this 
ambivalence – is inscribed in the very shape of Müller’s poems. Rhyme, verse and meter 
here, like in the “tod wird heimat” text I have quoted above, can function as a defiant 
assertion of the poetic against the violence of the real; or – conversely – as in the lines about 
a life “an der Schnur / Unsterblichkeit ist gegen die Natur,” they can signify a formal 
surrender to, a compliance with the necessities of a preordained – and ineluctably fatal – 
course of events. Rhyme, as in “Ajax zum Beispiel,” can suddenly impose itself at the very 
end of a poem, in a desperate attempt to hold together, to counter a reality, described earlier 
in the poem, that is profoundly out of joint; or, however, like in “Fernsehen,” poetic form 
can fizzle out altogether, as if resigning itself to its weakness in light of an overbearing reality 
that overcomes it. The poetic impulse, in short, in Müller’s late poetry is never an academic 
play of words, a mere exercise in prosody or literary tradition, but always manifests itself as a 




 What I have said in this section about the relationship between the problematic 
nature of the notion of progress, Müller’s view of the exigencies of historical reality after 
1989 and his ambivalence about poetic form finds full expression in the poem 
“Lernprozess”: 
  Lernprozess 
 
  Lernen lernen nochmals lernen (Lenin): 
  Noch sehe ich wenn ich über die Straße gehe 
  Um Zigarren zu kaufen den Bettler am Straßenrand 
  Oder die Frau aus Bosnien mit dem Kind auf dem Arm 
  Neben der Mülltonne sitzen und meine Hand 
  Zuckt in der Tasche nach Kleingeld Aber der Mensch ist 
  Das lernende Tier Ich lerne Bald schon 
  Werde ich keinen Bettler mehr sehn und kein Elend 
  Es gibt keine Bettler Es gibt kein Elend 
 
  21.10.93 (352) 
Once again here the linear progression of a learning process – and along with it the poem 
itself, through the direction of its form – moves towards a negative outcome: from “Noch 
sehe ich” to “Werde ich keinen […] mehr sehen,” from consciousness to the cigar smoker’s 
oblivion, denial and complacency – “Es gibt keine Bettler Es gibt kein Elend” – with 
inequality, injustice, and the ravages of contemporary history.10 At the same time, however, it 
is of course the very poem itself that also undermines the Lernprozess it embodies and thus 
critically draws attention to yet another form of enmeshment of a linear and progressive 
trajectory on the one hand – signified by the concept of learning – and one of degradation 
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and decay on the other. It is precisely this complex amalgamation of two different kinds of 
movement – two different forms of temporality – that will also be crucial for my discussion 
of what I have called above historical aposiopesis in Müller’s late poetry. 
 
Before I get to my argument about a historical opening towards the future in Müller’s late 
poetry, however – a point that, I concede, must seem rather far-fetched after all this talk 
about ends and decay, about the death drive of Müller’s poetry in this period – I want to 
discuss briefly another element of this “first temporality.” This will bring Müller’s poetry 
closer to the model of historical time espoused by his late dramatic output: a model, as I 
contend in this chapter, that Müller’s poetry ultimately departs from in a precarious and 
problematic affirmation of futurity. 
 In his late poetry, I have argued above, Müller engages what he considers a 
profoundly, and disastrously, historical predicament, one that belies – as he suggests in “Klage 
des Geschichtsschreibers” – all talk about the end of history. History, as it were, is operating 
still, and actively at work. This work, however, is either the work of death or the work of a 
“Marktwirtschaft,” as Müller argued in the conversation with David Hannak, whose “Prinzip 
und System” it is “Zukunft zu verhindern” (Werke 12 76).11 Historical time, then, in Müller’s 
late poetry manifests itself either as an accumulation, a piling-up – “Trümmer und 
Leichenberge” (179) – of a series of catastrophic events or, as Müller calls it in another 
interview, as the “[ewige] Gegenwart des Kapitalismus” (Werke 12 40).12 What this suggests is 
precisely what I have called above the paradoxical enmeshment of capitalist accumulation, 
acceleration, growth and progress on the one hand and historical stasis on the other: a 
condition that finds perhaps its best expression in Paul Virilio’s term of an inertie polaire or – 
in its more striking German version – a rasender Stillstand.13 It is no contradiction, therefore, if 
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Müller – amid all his critique of the frenetic trajectories of the present – in an interview with 
Kluge also speaks of the fact that “eine Grunderfahrung jetzt ist doch, daß die Zeit stillsteht, 
daß sich nichts bewegt. Oder man weiß jedenfalls nicht, wohin sich etwas bewegen könnte 
oder sollte” (Werke 12 625). Contemporary history, Müller says, is “ein Tanz, […] der 
eigentlich Bewegung vortäuscht. Aber das Zentrum bleibt gleich” (622). Norbert Otto Eke 
aptly speaks of a “Bedrohung der auf das Nichts zusteuernden Beschleunigung” in an essay 
titled “Zeit/Räume. Aspekte der Zeiterfahrung bei Heiner Müller” and continues by quoting 
Müller himself: “Das letzte Stadium dieser Beschleunigung,” the poet argues, significantly, 
“ist die Vernichtung der Zeit” (145). And so ultimately, in Müller’s late poetry too, posthistoire 
is looming large: not, of course, in its evangelistic variation, as Fukuyama’s “good news” 
about the end of history, but as a disastrous liquidation of the future – as the cancelling out, 
that is, of what I have called earlier in this dissertation modernity’s constitutive promise of 
an open future. Much like the triumphalistic variant of Fukuyama and his likes, thereby, 
Müller’s cataclysmic vision of a posthistoire, too, leaves little room for nuance. 
 In a series of poems, then, Müller evokes the presence of a catastrophic past amid 
the futureless present of a capitalist world in which – here, a brilliant formulation articulating 
historical stasis and commodification – even “die Zeit / Steht als Immobilie zum Verkauf” 
(181). In “Ajax zum Beispiel,” for instance, Müller writes: 
  Im Hotel in Berlin unwirklicher Hauptstadt 
  Mein Blick aus dem Fenster fällt 
  Auf den Mercedesstern 
  Der sich im Nachthimmel dreht melancholisch 
  Über dem Zahngold von Auschwitz und andern Filialen 
  Der Deutschen Bank auf dem Europacenter 
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  […] 
  Und manchmal aus den Kellern deines Wohlstands 
  Flüstert die Asche singt das Knochenmehl (180) 
“Seife in Bayreuth,” which it is worth quoting at some length here, is an even more forceful 
example: 
  Seife in Bayreuth 
 
  für Daniel Barenboim 
 
  Als Kind hörte ich die Erwachsenen sagen: 
  In den Konzentrationslagern wird aus den Juden 
  Seife gemacht. Seitdem konnte ich mich mit Seife 
  Nicht mehr anfreunden und verabscheue Seifengeruch. 
  Jetzt wohne ich, weil ich den TRISTAN inzeniere 
  In einer Neubauwohnung in der Stadt Bayreuth. 
  Die Wohnung ist sauber wie ich noch keine gesehen habe 
  […] 
  Die Dusche, MADE IN GERMANY, kann Tote aufwecken. 
  […] 
  Hier ist Ordnung, auch das Grün hinter dem Haus 
  In Ordnung, die Straße still, gegenüber die HYPOBANK. 
  Als ich das Fenster aufmache zum erstenmal: Seifengeruch. 
  Das Haus der Garten die Stadt Bayreuth riechen nach Seife. 
  Jetzt weiß ich, sage ich gegen die Stille 
  Was es heißt in der Hölle zu wohnen und 
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  Nicht tot zu sein oder ein Mörder. Hier 
  Wurde AUSCHWITZ geboren im Seifengeruch. 
 
  15.8.92, als in Bayreuth eine Demonstration für Rudolf Heß verboten wurde. 
  (153) 
In both poems, the Landvermesser Müller surveys a historical terrain in which time has 
become spatialized. In “Ajax zum Beispiel,” the newly re-unified Berlin turns into a 
landscape that accommodates, at once, Mercedes, Auschwitz, Deutsche Bank, and the 
shopping mall Europacenter, as well as “Wohlstand,” “Asche” and “Knochenmehl.” In 
“Seife in Bayreuth,” likewise, a “Neubauwohnung” in Wagner’s city is the point of 
convergence for the capitalized signposts of the poem – TRISTAN, MADE IN 
GERMANY, HYPOBANK and, once again, AUSCHWITZ – bringing together in one 
space (Bayreuth and the poem itself) German cultural production, German industrial 
production, capitalist economy, and the Holocaust.14 The combination of place, date and 
occasion in the last line of the poem – even though the demonstration was eventually 
“verboten” – reinforces the image of Bayreuth as the location of a timelessly calamitous 
history. 
 In passages like these, Müller’s rhetoric of provocation is pushed to its very 
extremes. One may, indeed, want to question not only the poetic but also the analytic force 
of such writing. It is a facile kind of luridness that manifests itself here, a sort of gory chic 
that often misses the mark entirely. When Müller, for instance, writes in “Müller im 
Hessischen Hof,” “An den Schaltern der Weltbank / Riecht das getrocknete Blut wie kalte 
Schminke” (157) or asks, in “Besuch beim Älteren Staatsmann,” “Und welches Volk in 
Europa wäre nicht glücklich / Heute mit fröhlicher Mehrheit unter dem Hakenkreuz” (163), 
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then political critique in the poetic medium is replaced by the crudest form of 
sensationalistic pamphleteering. 
 This, incidentally, also explains why – though this may be considered a problematic 
approach – I have occasionally conflated in this chapter Müller’s poetry with his statements 
in interviews and public appearances. My argument would be that the guiding element for 
my discussion throughout this chapter has been Müller’s poetry, and that I have used the 
statements more as illustrative material. Though Müller’s public pronouncements, in 
addition, are perhaps more emphatically and consistently provocative than his poetry – 
Müller is reveling here in his role as irritant and troublemaker – it would be difficult to argue 
that the poetry is consistently more “sophisticated” or “refined” in its articulation of a 
political critique; nor is it possible – as the passages I have just quoted illustrate – to say that 
Müller’s poetry is always devoid of mere rhetorical bravado and empty posturing. 
Importantly, however, my argument below about a “second temporality” in Müller’s work 
after 1989 rests almost exclusively on a reading of his poems. What I consider the most 
interesting, and ultimately subversive, aspect of Müller’s late work, then, seems to reside in 
its specifically poetic properties. 
 After this brief aside, I return here to the question of a spatialization of time: It is in 
this sense that Müller can speak of a “GEOGRAFIE” (90) when he exercises an historical 
form of “Fernsehen” in the eponymous poem. It is a geography of time, a landscape of 
history that is presented here. That Müller performs as a Landvermesser only and never as a 
Prophet; that his perspective includes a dismal present and a catastrophic past but rarely ever 
the future, thereby, is precisely what accounts for the affinities between Müller’s late poetry 
and his late dramatic output. In the latter too, from Der Auftrag through the aptly titled 
Verkommenes Ufer Medeamaterial Landschaft mit Argonauten to the very late Germania 3 Gespenster 
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am toten Mann, Müller consistently makes use of a spatialization of time. What is at the heart 
of this technique, importantly, is a certain evolution or transformation of Müller’s own 
dramatic concept of Überschwemmung, or flooding.  
 In an interview with Horst Laube in 1975, Müller argued, 
  Ich habe, wenn ich schreibe, immer nur das Bedürfnis, den Leuten so viel  
  aufzupacken, daß sie nicht wissen, was sie zuerst tragen sollen […]. Man muß 
  jetzt möglichst viele Punkte gleichzeitig bringen […]. Und es geht nicht mehr 
  einfach so, daß man ihnen eine Information gibt und sagt, jetzt gibt es aber  
  auch noch das. Es geht, glaube ich, nur noch mit Überschwemmungen.  
  (Gesammelte Irrtümer 1 20) 
If Überschwemmung, then, had initially been conceived of by Müller as a rather general 
dramatic procedure – concerned, above all, with a certain kind of response on the side of the 
spectator – by the time of the later dramatic works it had taken on a specific historical-
philosophical content. Überschwemmung – in the form of a co-articulation of multiple layers of 
time in one and the same theatrical and textual space – manifests itself here, quite literally, as 
a flooding of the historical terrain, as indeed a kind of “swamping” of the historical 
landscape. What one witnesses here, in Koselleck’s terms, is the absolutization of a 
catastrophic space of experience and thus the canceling out of any horizon of expectation 
for the future.15 And so, in Der Auftrag for example, Müller writes of a “Landschaft, die keine 
andere Arbeit hat als auf das Verschwinden des Menschen zu warten” (Werke 5 33).16 
Speaking, in this context, of an “Einvernahme der Zeit in den Raum” (Lehmann 77) in an 
essay about “Das Entgleiten der Geschichte” in Müller’s drama, Hans-Thies Lehmann has 
argued that “[im] Zusammenhang der Verräumlichung steht die sonderbare Faszination 
Müllers durch das Bild der Landschaft, die zum Emblem katastrophisch beendeter 
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Naturgeschichte gerinnt im ‘Auftrag’” (78). In his “Anmerkung” to Verkommenes Ufer 
Medeamaterial Landschaft mit Argonauten, indeed, Müller states that “LANDSCHAFT MIT 
ARGONAUTEN [setzt] die Katastrophen voraus, an denen die Menschheit arbeitet. Die 
Landschaft mag ein toter Stern sein, auf dem ein Suchtrupp aus einer andern Zeit oder aus 
einem andern Raum eine Stimme hört und einen Toten findet” (Werke 5 84). Eke, 
accordingly, has spoken of a form of drama in which history “als subjektiv verantworteter 
Emanzipationsraum zu entschwinden [droht]” (“Zeit/Räume” 138). In Germania 3 Gespenster 
am toten Mann, finally – Müller’s last dramatic text and the only one written after 1989 – the 
spectator witnesses a perverse kind of historical revue in which Thälmann and Ulbricht, the 
Nibelungen, a soldier in the civil war in ex-Yugoslavia and, of course, Hitler and Stalin are 
the props in a historical landscape of perennial death, destruction and violence. The zoom-
out with which the drama ends, the Gagarin quote “[DUNKEL GENOSSEN IST DER 
WELTRAUM SEHR DUNKEL]” (Werke 5 296), has – aptly, I would argue – been read as 
the “Kulminationspunkt einer Sicht auf Geschichte, die keinerlei Hoffnung mehr zu bieten 
scheint” (Eckhardt 97). It is, then, in the very technique of Überschwemmung – a technique that 
also invades some of Müller’s late poetry – that a “Tendenz zum universellen Horror als 
epochenübergreifendem Phänomen,” in Eckhardt’s words (93), manifests itself. Slavoj 
Zizek, in a short piece on Müller, has called this a succumbing “to the temptation of 
catastrophism” (“Out of Joint”).17 And indeed, when told by Hannak that “[in] Ihren 
Werken wird oft berichtet, daß das Leben ein Schlachthaus ist. Nur die Schlächter und 
Intriganten sind erfolgreich im Kampf ums Überleben. Dieses Modell funktioniert seit 2000 
Jahren und mehr” and when asked, “Hat sich bis heute etwas geändert? Gibt es einen Anlaß 
zum Optimismus?” Müller, in 1991, responded: “Ich würde es nicht so auf die Spitze treiben 
wie in diesen Formulierungen, weil es Formulierungen aus Stücken, in bestimmten 
 
! 146 
Zusammenhängen, sind. Aber eigentlich sehe ich keinen Grund zum Optimismus” (Werke 
12 69). 
 
BESSER WIR KEHRTEN DIE ZEIT UM: COUNTER-TIME AND APOSIOPESIS 
 
If the course of time is one of death, decay, and illness, and if there is “[kein] Grund zum 
Optimismus,” then what is the valence of that eigentlich, the residue of hope encompassed – if 
ever so tentatively – in that word? “Besser wir kehrten die Zeit um” (343): Müller’s wish at 
the end of “Ahnenbrühe” describes what is at stake in his late poetry. “Das Entscheidende,” 
he tells Frank Raddatz, “ist der Umgang mit der Zeit” (Werke 11 605). This, if you like, is the 
wager: Is it possible, if not to turn back time, then at least to halt an inexorable movement 
towards death? Or rather: not even to halt, but temporarily to suspend or to defer, to 
decelerate this process, as if gasping for one more breath of fresh air. “Atemluft ist gleich 
Zeit, ja,” Müller responds to Kluge’s question, “Und Zeit würde man ja immer in Atemform 
darstellen können, nicht?” (Werke 12 626). To interrupt the trajectory of death or what I 
have called here a first temporality in Müller’s late poetry, consequently, does not mean to 
suspend time, but on the contrary, to keep time in place, to salvage time, to prevent it from 
running its course. It is precisely this desire – a messianic desire, as I will argue below – that 
imbues Müller’s death-driven poetry from the years after 1989 with a second, an additional 
temporality, a counter-time that works against or cuts through that all-pervasive trajectory of 
death, illness and decay I have described throughout this chapter.  
 This counter-time, importantly – here again, Said’s notion of an “abiding timeliness” is 
manifest – is as much existential as it is political. “[Die] Zeit anhalten heißt ja auch Zeit 
gewinnen und heißt den Untergang aufhalten und das Ende aufhalten oder verzögern,” 
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Müller argues in a conversation with Kluge in 1990, prompting the latter to respond, “Was ja 
das Leben tut. In dem Sinne ist das ganze Leben ein einziger Bremsvorgang” (Werke 11 644). 
But Müller, discussing the “Problem zwischen Verlangsamung und Beschleunigung” also 
speaks – and here the barrier between the existential and the political is removed – about 
“diese tradierte Vorstellung von Revolution als Beschleunigungsmoment. Vielleicht stimmt 
das gar nicht, vielleicht geht’s immer darum, die Zeit anzuhalten, um Zeitverlangsamung” 
(643). One cannot miss here, of course, the strong echo of a Benjaminian register, of empty 
time and messianic time, of revolution and standstill18, and thus of a project that is explicitly 
also conceived of as a politico-theological one. And indeed, Müller pushes this discussion even 
further, provocatively, towards a properly religious dimension when he explains the 
enmeshment of existential and political time during the conversation with Raddatz I have 
already referred to above: 
  Das Entscheidende ist der Umgang mit der Zeit; Zeit des Lebens, Zeit des  
  Sterbens, Zeit des Todes. Die bewußte Wahrnehmung des Ablaufs von Zeit  
  hält niemand aus – also muß Zeit “totgeschlagen”, und das heißt nicht  
  weniger als: Todesangst verdrängt werden, zum Beispiel mit Arbeit. […]  
  Wenn man allein ist mit der Uhr, kann man die Tatsache der eigenen   
  Sterblichkeit nicht verdrängen. Also macht man etwas, um die Uhr nicht zu  
  sehen. Man bildet ein Kollektiv und sucht sich eine Utopie. […] Wenn man  
  die kommunistische Utopie auf ihren religiösen Kern zurückführt, ist sie ein  
  Unsterblichkeitsglaube. Die Kommunarden in Paris haben 1871 auf die  
  Uhren geschossen. Das war der revolutionäre Impuls – die Zeit anzuhalten,  
  darin steckt der Wunsch nach Unsterblichkeit (Werke 11 605f.). 
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I will return to the theological moment in Müller’s politics of time in the final section of this 
chapter. What I want to emphasize at this stage is a logic of aufhalten, verzögern and 
Verlangsamung, of suspension, deferral and deceleration, through which a space is carved out 
– a Spielraum – for the individual and historical subject to occupy, to become active in.19 Eke 
aptly speaks of a “mit der Vorstellung der Rückgewinnung von Zeit als politischem 
Handlungs- und Gestaltungsraum […] [verbundenen] ‘Zeit’-Begriff” (“Zeit/Räume” 138). It 
is precisely in this sense that one can speak of new kinds of Zeiträume or indeed of a 
transformation of chronotopes here. At the heart of this logic, thereby, Müller crucially sees 
“zum Beispiel […] Arbeit” – doing, making, indeed: poiein. 
 
The interplay of different temporalities, the working-against-each-other, as it were, of life 
and death, is evident in “Herzkranzgefäß,” one of Müller’s most famous poems from this 
period: 
  Herzkranzgefäß 
 
  Der Arzt zeigt mir den Film DAS IST DIE STELLE 
  SIE SEHEN SELBST Jetzt weißt du wo Gott wohnt 
  Asche der Traum von sieben Meisterwerken 
  Drei Treppen und die Sphinx zeigt ihre Kralle 
  Sei froh wenn der Infarkt dich kalt erwischt 
  Statt daß ein Krüppel mehr die Landschaft quert 
  Gewitter im Gehirn Blei in den Adern 
  Was du nicht wissen wolltest ZEIT IST FRIST 
  Die Bäume auf der Heimfahrt schamlos grün (154) 
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The poem is, beyond doubt, also a memento mori, yet another brutal reminder not simply of 
mortality but of an inevitable and, worse still, imminent death, a death amid an indifferent 
nature (“Die Bäume […] schamlos grün”). Already, “die Sphinx zeigt ihre Kralle” – a poetic 
career will soon be terminated: “Asche der Traum von sieben Meisterwerken.” The end is 
looming large. And yet: This poem is still written, this heart still beating, this 
“Herzkranzgefäß” still giving life. The crucial line “Was du nicht wissen wolltest ZEIT IST 
FRIST,” then, is powerful in its ambiguity. It brings to attention, quite mercilessly (“Was du 
nicht wissen wolltest”) a deadline (Frist): an end that will, no matter what, come. But Frist of 
course, in German, also denotes the Zeitraum – the time-space – before the deadline is 
reached, and more still, an Aufschub: a postponement, extension, deferral. “ZEIT IST 
FRIST,” accordingly, is also an admonition (“Was du nicht wissen wolltest”) against apathy 
and fatalism, against complacency and the “[erhabnes] Gefühl,” as Müller writes in “Besuch 
beim älteren Staatsmann,” “Daß die Welt an uns vorbeigeht und es macht nichts” (164). 
 This instantiation of a Frist, this structure of suspension that leaves a residue of hope 
and calls for life – to say “eigentlich sehe ich keinen Grund zum Optimismus” is itself an 
example – can be found throughout Müller’s late poetry. Time and again, poems that seem 
to be running their course in empty time, an der Schnur, towards death, are interspersed – 
“shot through,” in a more emphatically Benjaminian diction – with a second, different 
temporality. In “Gespräch mit Yang Tschu dem Pessimisten,” for instance, which I have 
already quoted above, this dual temporal structure is made very obvious at the beginning of 
the poem through a dialogic (“Gespräch”) arrangement of the opening verses. As the text 
proceeds, however, the lines meld increasingly and the two competing temporalities become 




  Gespräch mit Yang Tschu dem Pessimisten 
 
  Lohnt es den Leib zu pflegen 
      Er ist sterblich 
  Damit er länger dauert 
      Und Wozu 
  Da wir doch wissen nur der Tod ist erblich 
  Das Leben ist ein Witz er ist der Clou 
  Leb wie du willst oder leb nach der Schnur 
  Unsterblichkeit ist gegen die Natur 
  Das Leben 
    Nimm es nicht zu ernst mein Sohn 
  Das Leben ist nicht neu + bleibt sich gleich 
  Mit Freuden + mit Leiden Arm + Reich 
  Ordnung + Wirrsal bis zur Kremation 
  Besser die kurze als die lange Weile 
  Der Tod ist auch nicht neu Stirb ohne Eile 
  Das Grab kann warten Sterben ist ein Nu 
  Nimm es nicht ernst Es ist ein Witz wie du (359) 
Empty time sees itself confronted here with a counter-time of suspension and deferral. The 
poem, it is true, emphatically speaks about mortality (“sterblich”), about life as “ein Witz,” 
lived “nach der Schnur / Unsterblichkeit ist gegen die Natur.” But it also, once again, sets a 
Frist that not only delimits but also prolongs life. And so not only living but “Sterben,” in 
the end, is “ein Witz” too: “Stirb ohne Eile / Das Grab kann warten.” Significantly, the 
rhymed responses to the question “Und wozu” – “Das Leben ist ein Witz [der Tod] der 
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Clou,” “Das Grab kann warten Sterben ist ein Nu / Nimm es nicht ernst es ist ein Witz wie 
du” – encompass both temporalities at once, linked through rhyme while diverging in their 
semantic valence. In a short text from 1992, similarly, the emphatic “TOT IST / TOT” in 
the two penultimate lines is immediately followed, in the last line of the poem, by the 
statement “Der Tod ist ein Irrtum” (160). In another short poem too – written late in 1994, 
and less playful and more somber than “Gespräch mit Yang Tschu dem Pessimisten” – 
Müller uses a dialogic structure to perform a poetic avowal of life in the face of a certain 
death: 
  dialog 
 
  was hast du von mir einem kranken der manchmal 
  dich ansieht von weit 
     idiot was weisst du von liebe (365) 
Here, like in other poems, it is the poetic description of love – the time, indeed, of love – 
that constitutes a counter-time against death: “In deinen Augen grau / Wächst meine 
Kindheit stirbt / Mein Tod,” Müller writes in “LiebesErklärung (declaration of love)” (342). 
 Time and again, in Müller’s late poetry, a “rendezvous mit dem tod” (364) is not 
carried through to its logical conclusion, death, but interrupted through the poetic enactment 
of a not yet. “Das Grab kann warten” (359). Müller’s poetry, in this sense, itself resembles the 
“Operation / die mein Leben gerettet hat” (186) of which the poet speaks in 1994. What is 
at stake, each time, is a last Frist, the opening of a minimal Spielraum out of which, 
potentially, something new can still emerge. Ibsen, in a poem from December 1994 – “Mit 
dem Sprengstoff in seinem zu schweren Gehirn” – carries with him his own death, but this 
death is a “Tod Der ihm Zeit läßt / Für ein Spätwerk” (188). In another poem from the 
same period, the poet dreams about his entering a “Traumwald, der zum Sterben winkt” 
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when suddenly he beholds an armored child: “Und in dem Lidschlag zwischen Stoß und 
Stich / Sah mein Gesicht mich an: das Kind war ich” (190). Even the “Sterbender Mann mit 
Spiegel” in the eponymous poem from 1992 still qualifies his incantations of certain 
nothingness with a conjectural “[nach] menschlichem Ermessen,” “Wahrscheinlich,” and 
“Was immer das sein mag”: 
  Nach menschlichem Ermessen werden wir 
  Einander nicht wiedersehen Wir brauchen uns 
  Nichts mehr vorzumachen Es kommt Wahrscheinlich 
  Nichts Neues mehr sondern es kommt Wahrscheinlich 
  Nichts Was immer das sein mag (346) 
 Importantly, however, what I have called here a structure of suspension is not 
confined to Müller’s personal or existential poems alone, in which he engages with the 
realities of an approaching death. It can, on the contrary, also be found in his more 
immediately historical texts. Müller’s image of the present condition is of course, as I have 
demonstrated in this chapter, one of unmitigated negativity. But here, too, there is a residue 
of hope, an almost indefatigable belief in the transformative potential of human praxis – a 
potential, to be sure, that is buried but perhaps not dead yet. Once again, an amalgamation 
of two different forms of temporality, a remainder or residue of hope with which a rhetoric 
of despair is “shot through,” rendering Müller’s poetry itself a “Wechselbad zwischen 
Hoffnung / Auf eine andere Geschichte und der Verzweiflung” (357). Müller’s speculations 
about a “Weg in die bessere Zukunft,” it is true, are immediately qualified in the poem 
“Fernsehen” by the addition “Oder in keine.” But there will only be keine Zukunft, crucially, 
“wenn wir sie ausspein” (90): it is still up to us to shape the future. 
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 This is an important point: Müller’s model of history, I would argue, ultimately 
remains predicated on notions like agency and praxis. However negative, even catastrophic, 
his view of the present, there is little indication in Müller’s work of a conflict between human 
self-determination per se and systemic pressure. It is actors – the “Lemuren des Kapitals 
Wechsler und Händler” (170) of “Mommsens Block,” the “Geschäftsreisende” who carve 
up Asia (“Asien verteilen,” 92) in “Herz der Finsternis nach Joseph Conrad” – who still 
determine the course of history. And so death, decay and illness are also manifestations of a 
form of human depravity and historical corruption that is, at least in principle, reversible. 
There is no fatum, preordained by god, the stars or “markets.” Still, “Es fürchten die Götter 
/ Das Menschengeschlecht” (348). As Müller writes in 1994: 
  Galilei betrachtet die Sterne. Sie kümmern sich nicht 
  Um den Zufall der Menschhheit. Ein Experiment 
  Zwischen Engel und Bestie Der Ausgang 
  Hängt von andern Umständen ab 
  Als von den Bahnen der Sterne […] (276) 
And so the future, for Müller in the period after 1989, is ultimately above all a question of a 
form of historical insight that has temporarily been blocked and superseded by the 
evangelists of the market. It is in this sense precisely that for once in “Fernsehen” Müller 
seems to relinquish his role as a historical Landvermesser in order to practice, quite literally, a 
kind of Fern-sehen, a prophetic gaze into a future-to-come. Müller writes in prose about the 
work of the stage designer Gunter Rambow: 
  Wegmarken durch den Sumpf, der sich schon damals zu schließen begann  
  über dem vorläufigen Grab der Utopie, die vielleicht wieder aufscheinen  
  wird, wenn das Phantom der Marktwirtschaft, die das Gespenst des   
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  Kapitalismus ablöst, den neuen Kunden seine kalte Schulter zeigt, den  
  Befreiten das eiserne Gesicht seiner Freiheit  
 
  1990 (W 233) 
 
I have deliberately not addressed the issue of Heiner Müller’s own illness, the performance of 
his own dying, in much detail because I wanted to avoid a facile and reductive separation of 
his late poetry into the existential and the historical, into the private on the one hand and the 
political on the other: Müller’s poetry is a praxis that transcends such binaries. To say this 
also saves me – now that I will come to Müller’s death – from the banal, and ultimately 
pathetic, assertion that the poet “lives on” in his poetry. For something more is at stake in 
Müller’s explicit thematization of his dying, something integrally related to the historical 
predicament I have more amply described above. And so it is, I want to argue here, in this 
very structure of to-come-ness – of a future à venir, as Derrida would have it – that the 
existential and the political coincide in Müller’s late poetry. 
 This is where the figure of aposiopesis comes into play. Müller’s poetry, I have 
argued, incessantly gestures towards, and even flirts, occasionally, with death: “Nach der 
letzten / Endoskopie in den Augen der Ärtze / War mein Grab offen Beinahe rührte mich / 
Die Trauer der Experten und beinahe / War ich stolz auf meinen unbesiegten / Tumor,” 
Müller writes in a poem titled “12.12.1995” (W 325), less than three weeks before the end of 
his life. But his poetry never makes it to the end. It is precisely by writing obsessively about 
death that Müller draws attention to the fact of life, denies death, and therefore enacts, 
poetically, the very “not yet,” the Frist that also characterizes his more overtly historical and 
political poems of the period. Müller’s rendering of Pasolini’s “Frammento alla morte” 
(“Fragment an den Tod”) speaks of “In m[einer] Brust eine schwarze Wut die Poesie” (193) 
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and addresses death with a defiant “du machst mich besonders, gibst mir die Gewißheit, zu 
leben” (192), “denn nun bist du wirklich mir nah, eingeschlossen / in meinen Zorn, meinen 
dunklen / Hunger, mein[e] Angst – bist du fast ein neues Leben” (193). More importantly, 
however, the impossibility of saying “I am dead now” opens up a space, however minimal, 
between the last of Müller’s poems and death, and that, indeed, is the elliptical space of 
aposiopesis, the Spielraum that renders these poems more than a mere writing-into-being of 
an end. That Müller’s poems almost never close with any kind of punctuation mark, that he 
refuses, quite literally, to put a final period here, is another formal manifestation of this kind 
of suspension or deferral. This, significantly, is how the “Fragment an den Tod” ends: 
  […] Einziger Weg, 
  der mir bleibt  ……………………………………… 
  ……………………………………………………… (194) 
 Whose Spielraum, then? Aposiopesis, as I have hinted above, is a fundamentally 
dialogic figure, one that forces us to respond to a silence that is not the silence of death or of 
the end of time but a lingering silence that keeps time in place. “Das letzte Programm ist die 
Erfindung des Schweigens” (185), Müller writes in “Ajax zum Beispiel,” and he 
acknowledges, in “Ende der Handschrift,” the “Schweigen / Das der Protagonist meiner 
Zukunft ist” (380). But he also emphasizes the peculiar historical modality of these poems, 
their specific temporal trajectory, or “Bewegungszustand,” in the historical process: they are, 
Müller argues, “einsame Texte, die auf Geschichte warten” (Werke 1 331). The conceptual 
gesture of doing aposiopoiesis, then, points towards a reinstation of history, towards an 
historical effectivity or actuality that is preserved and kept in place and thus propels these 
poems into the future, despite their undeniable death-drive. To write poetry for “1989…” 
(W 229), in this sense, means to deny the historical telos of 1989 as much as Müller’s own telos 
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in 1995. But the living-on, the survival of history and poetry, effectivity and actuality – in 
short: the future – for Müller depends on someone other’s filling the elliptical space of such 
aposiopesis in order to work on, and with, the very history one can find there. Theo Buck 
has aptly spoken of a “distanziert vorgeführte geistige Bewegung, in semantische Dichte 
überführt,” of a “sprachlichen Spielraum, der für den Rezipienten zu einem dialektisch-
widerständigen Denkraum werden soll” (Buck 132). It is in an – anonymous yet – other20, 
then, that Müller places his hope, however faint, for a kind of praxis that may ultimately lead 
– let’s use the term here – to redemption. This, I would argue, precisely is the significance of 
Müller’s oft-quoted poem “Glückloser Engel 2”:21 
  Glückloser Engel 2 
 
  Zwischen Stadt und Stadt 
  Nach der Mauer der Abgrund 
  Wind an den Schultern die fremde 
  Hand am einsamen Fleisch 
  Der Engel ich höre ihn noch 
  Aber er hat kein Gesicht mehr als 
  Deines das ich nicht kenne (94) 
 
THE MESSIANIC PROMISE: MÜLLER AND BENJAMIN, AGAMBEN, DERRIDA 
 
“Glückloser Engel 2,” of course, like “Leere Zeit” before, is yet another clear reference to 
the work of Benjamin in Müller’s late poetry. The figure of the angel, thereby, embodies the 
ambivalent mix of catastrophe and hope, of history and theology that also animates 
Benjamin’s own famous notion of a “weak messianic force.” Müller, in fact, is very explicit 
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about the Benjaminian dimension in his later work. In an interview from 1991, titled “Jetzt 
sind eher die infernalischen Aspekte bei Benjamin wichtig,” he states: “Die Engel tauchen ja 
immer auf, wenn man keine Chance mehr sieht, daß eine Hoffnung sich realisiert. Dann 
braucht man solche Figuren; das ist auch bei Benjamin so. Engel sind Figuren jenseits von 
Hoffnung und Verzweiflung” (Werke 12 110). “Ich glaube,” Müller continues, “daß 
Benjamin durch den theologischen Akzent im Moment wichtiger ist als beispielsweise 
Adorno. Das ist ein Glutkern mit Hoffnung. Es gibt immer noch Hoffnung durch das 
Theologische. Auf Dauer ist die Verbindung von Theologie und Politik wahrscheinlich die 
einzige Hoffnung” (113f.). “[Ich] glaube,” he reiterates in an interview with Kluge in 1992, 
“es wird keine Politik ohne Theologie auskommen in Zukunft” (156).22 It is not least a form 
of historical identification that is at work here, of Müller as Benjamin, espousing a 
messianism for the period after 1989. 
 What I want to argue here, then, is that Müller’s practice of what I have called above 
aposiopoiesis in his late poetry is tantamount to the poetic enactment of precisely this kind of 
messianic promise. In order to demonstrate the mutual imbrication of literary practice, a 
philosophical-theological concept of temporality, and a concomitant political dimension, 
accordingly, in this section I will briefly bring Müller’s work in dialogue with two important 
figurations of the messianic in late 20th- and early 21st-century (political) philosophy. These 
are, firstly, Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of the philosophical content of messianic time 
and, secondly, Jacques Derrida’s application of a messianic mode of thinking to the specific 
political-historical context of the period around 1989. There are profound and significant 
affinities between the works of Müller, Agamben and Derrida – affinities, ultimately, that 
have their shared roots in a highly ambivalent sense of the future in the very period around 




Agamben, in his book The Time That Remains is concerned with the “structure of messianic 
time” (1) as it manifests itself in the Pauline epistles. Significantly, following Agamben, for 
Paul it is a “contraction of time, the ‘remaining’ time” that constitutes “the messianic 
situation par excellence” (6f.). In a key passage that reverberates extraordinarily strongly with 
what I have said throughout this chapter about time in Müller’s late poetry, Agamben writes 
about the temporal structure of the messianic, distinguishing between the apostle and the 
prophet, between messianic and apocalyptic time. It is worth quoting at length here: 
  But the apostle must be distinguished from another figure, with whom he is  
  often confused, just as messianic time is confused with eschatological time.  
  The most insidious misunderstanding of the messianic announcement does  
  not consist in mistaking it for prophecy, which is turned toward the future,  
  but for apocalypse, which contemplates the end of time. The apocalyptic is  
  situated on the last day, the Day of Wrath. It sees the end fulfilled and  
  describes what it sees. The time in which the apostle lives is, however, not  
  the eschaton, it is not the end of time. If you want to formulate the difference  
  between messianism and apocalypse, between the apostle and the visionary, I 
  think you could say, using a phrase by Gianni Carchia, that the messianic is  
  not the end of time, but the time of the end […]. What interests the apostle is  
  not the last day, it is not the instant in which time ends, but the time that  
  contracts itself and begins to end (ho kairos synestalmenos estin; 1 Cor. 7:29), or  
  if you prefer, the time that remains between time and its end. (Agamben 62) 
It is in precisely this way – if one were to take seriously in philosophical terms Müller’s 
claims to a poetic messianism – that one could conceive of the poet’s notion of a Frist, of 
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what I have called in this chapter a certain form of suspension, a residue, a poetics of ends 
and endings that simultaneously keeps time in place. Messianic time, Agamben argues – as 
“the time that time takes to come to an end” (67) – is “neither chronological time nor the 
apocalyptic eschaton. Once again, it is a remnant, the time that remains between these two 
times” (62). This is the transformative time of aposiopesis, in which two temporalities 
amalgamate, come to clash with each other, form – in Benjamin’s term – a constellation: It is 
a kind of time that, as Agamben writes about messianic time, is a “part of secular time which 
undergoes an entirely transformative contraction” (64). Agamben speaks of “an additional 
time” (67): This additional time “is not another time, it is not a supplementary time added on 
from outside to chronological time. Rather, it is something like a time within time” (67). It is 
the very generation – in and through the poetic text – of something akin to this kind of 
counter-time that I have tried to elucidate throughout this chapter in my discussion of the 
“two temporalities” in Müller’s late poetry. Significantly, Agamben himself closes his 
discussion of messianic time with the close reading of a poem, designating lyrical poetry as 
such “a miniature model of messianic time” (82). “The poem” he argues in what could be an 
epigraph to Müller’s late poetry, is “a temporal machine that, from the very start, strains 
towards its end. A kind of eschatology occurs within the poem itself. But for the more or 
less brief time that the poem lasts, it has a specific and unmistakable temporality, it has its 
own time” (79). Müller too, of course, repeatedly points to this form of Eigenzeit, like in the 
poem evoking “die Zeit des Gedichts” (432), which I have quoted at the very beginning of 
this chapter, or when in 1990 he tells Kluge that “die Kunst hat eine andere Zeit oder läuft 
in einer anderen Zeit als die Politik oder die Geschichte” (Werke 11 656). And so ultimately, 
one could argue, what Müller and Agamben share is not least a conception of the poem, in 
Agamben’s somewhat hyperbolic formulation, as “a soteriological device which […] 
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transforms chronological time into messianic time” (Agamben 82). Müller’s notion of his 
poetic oeuvre as one that simultaneously forms part of and transcends the time of “brutale 
Chronologie,” indeed, further underscorses this point. 
 
If Agamben is primarily concerned with the more immediately philosophical content of 
messianic time, Derrida, in his Specters of Marx, mobilizes the figure of the messianic in the 
specifically political and historical context of the epochal transformations around 1989 that 
also provide the backdrop to Müller’s late poetry.23 What I am interested in here are the 
striking affinities between the kind of historical opening Müller envisages and the – 
contemporaneous – performative invocation of a historical “promise that can only arise in 
[…] a diastema” (Derrida 81), of a “historicity as future-to-come” (92) in Derrida’s text.24 
Derrida conceptualizes a “messianic opening to what is coming, that is, to the event that 
cannot be awaited as such, or recognized in advance therefore, to the event as the foreigner 
itself, to her or to him for whom one must leave an empty place, always, in the memory of 
the hope” (82). Diastema, the event as the foreigner, empty place: Once again, I want to 
invoke here the space of aposiopesis in Müller’s late poetry, the transferal of historical 
agency onto an anonymous yet other in “Glückloser Engel 2.” Müller speaks of the fact that 
under current historical conditions the utopian can only manifest itself in form of a 
“Leerstelle” (quoted in Schneider 59). Importantly, for Müller “[das] utopische Moment liegt 
in der Form […] und nicht im Inhalt” (quoted in Biccari 36). And indeed, in Derrida too, 
one can find a radical emphasis on form, on the “formal structure of promise,” the 
“formality of a structural messianism” (74), on – Derrida’s rhetoric at its most Derridean 
here – “the necessarily pure and purely necessary form of the future as such, in its being-
necessarily-promised, prescribed, assigned, enjoined, in the necessarily formal necessity of its 
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possibility” (92). It is a radical form of indeterminacy that for Derrida underlies the 
messianic promise: 
  an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a  
  necessarily indeterminate, abstract, desert-like experience that is confided,  
  exposed, given up to its waiting for the other and for the event. In its pure  
  formality, in the indetermination that it requires, one may find yet another  
  essential affinity between it and a certain messianic spirit. (112) 
The “effectivity or actuality” of the promise, then,  
  will always keep within it, and it must do so, this absolutely mesianic [sic]  
  hope at its heart, this eschatological relationship to the to-come of an event  
  […], of an alterity that cannot be anticipated. Awaiting without horizon of  
  the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer […],   
  welcoming salutation accorded in advance to the absolute surprise of the  
  arrivant. (81) 
And so for Derrida too, the messianic, “as thinking of the other” (74), must be directed 
towards an other whose face is the very face “Das ich nicht kenne” of Müller’s late poetry. 
Whatever agent of historical praxis may emerge in a future-to-come, accordingly – Derrida 
speaks, in the most tentative terms, of a “New International” – can, in the present, only be 
“without status, without title, and without name” (106f.) and must necessarily belong “only 
to anonymity” (113). It is not going too far, perhaps, to argue that what manifests itself in 
Derrida’s text – a form of speech that “defers, deferring […] just so as to affirm, to affirm justly, 
so as to have the power (a power without power) to affirm the coming of the event, [the] 
future-to-come itself” (19) – is something fundamentally akin to what I have called above 




POLITICAL TEMPORALITY PROPER OR EXTREME FORM OF ANTI-POLITICS? 
THE MESSIANIC IN AESTHETICS 
 
What then, I want to ask here in conclusion, are the practical implications of this kind of 
messianism for the notion of a political aesthetic? What is art’s position in – or for – history, 
politics and society when form becomes the carrier of a messianic promise? That this 
question is still worth asking has to do with the fact that Müller himself in his late poetry 
continues to judge the question of aesthetics in relation to that of politics. Müller, despite his 
disenchantment with the course of history, never abandons himself to a realm outside the 
historical; nor does he ever, all intertextuality and meta-narrativity notwithstanding, content 
himself with an approach to literature, history and politics that is purely textual, a matter of 
language games and signifiers only. It is in this sense that Müller not only was never a 
postmodernist but that he remains fundamentally part of the legacy – problematic and 
precarious though it may be – of a political modernism.25 By 1989, the “kulturpolitisch 
geforderte Bedeutung der Literatur als Produktivkraft im Gesellschaftsprozess” (Eke, “Frühe 
Biographie” 3) of the 1950s, to be sure, which Müller accepted and engaged with in his 
production plays, was long a matter of the past. So was any kind of manifest Brechtianism 
that would go beyond a basic solidarity with or commitment to the historical figure Brecht. 
But the fundamental tenet of political modernism – the belief in the politically and socially 
transformative potential of artistic production in history as such – for Müller too remains the 
untranscendable horizon against which his poetic praxis needs to be evaluated. 
 It is in this context, accordingly, that one should analyze Müller’s messianism. What 
characterizes this kind of messianism – what is, indeed, its constitutive element – is an 
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extreme inner tension: a position that is, at once, one of abyssal despair and one of hope for 
redemption, one that simultaneously flings the literary act away from the center of history 
and makes it the very medium of historical transformation. “Nur wenn man aus der Zeit 
aussteigt,” Müller says, “kann man auf sie Einfluß nehmen” (Werke 11 673). Derrida too 
points to the paradoxical nature of this temporality when he speaks of an “untimeliness that 
is […] more urgent than ever” (Derrida 109). One can, of course, detect in this paradoxical 
temporality the hallmark of poetic thought itself, in the sense Stathis Gourgouris has used 
the term: “Poetic thought is the greatest enemy of dogmatism” – the dogmatism, in the case 
of Müller, both of the end of history and of any mechanistic notion of progress – “for no 
other reason than its capacity to encapsulate paradox, to occupy a contradictory temporality, 
to exist in an antagonistic simultaneity that gives definite form to two otherwise 
imperceptible positions” (Gourgouris, “Communism and Poetry”). “Kunst ist letztlich nicht 
kontrollierbar. Oder kann sich ständig der Kontrolle entziehen,” Müller argues too: this is at 
the heart of its anti-dogmatic, “fast automatisch [subversiver]” character (Werke 11 637). But 
one must also bear in mind that what I have called here an extreme inner tension was already 
part and parcel of Benjamin’s own messianism, articulated by a heterodox Marxist modernist 
at an earlier moment that was, if not similar, then comparable in its historical structure to 
that of 1989: a moment of defeat, of ends and endings, of a profoundly aporetic sense of the 
future – a moment, as Gourgouris writes about the period after 1989, “of feeling suspended 
in a world satisfied with its mere repetition, content with its inability to imagine itself 
otherwise” (“Communism and Poetry”). Derrida too speaks about “a waiting without 
horizon of expectation” (Derrida 211). And so the recourse to Benjamin is also symptomatic 
of a radical ambivalence at best26, and a fundamental aporia more likely, about the future. It 
is no coincidence at all that Benjamin – though he had also appeared earlier – only becomes 
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central in Müller’s later work27, and as the messianic, not the Brechtian Benjamin. This, 
incidentally, can also be extended to Agamben: to the extreme tentativeness and vagueness 
of his proposal to read Benjamin in a contemporary political context in particular28, and to 
the critique that has been directed at him in general for espousing a strong form of 
philosophical detachment, an extraordinarily a-political and unhistorical variant, 
paradoxically, of political philosophy.29 And, of course, it also underlies the sometimes 
painful rhetorical contortions of Derrida, a conception of a “desert-like messianism (without 
content and without identifiable messiah)” (Derrida 33) that can never more than affirm a 
“certain experience of the emancipatory promise” (74), a “certain emancipatory and messianic 
affirmation” (111), indeed a “certain messianic spirit” (112). Ultimately, as the discussions 
surrounding Derrida’s Specters of Marx demonstrate too, whether one is inclined to read the 
messianic, like Fredric Jameson, as a “political temporality properly conceived” (Jameson, 
“Purloined Letter” 36) or, as Aijaz Ahmad prefers to do, as “an extreme form of anti-
politics” (Ahmad 104), the incapacity – in the domain of poetry as much as in theory – for 
conceiving of anything more affirmative, anything imbued with a more emphatic positivity 
than the messianic30, is a particular and crucial aspect of a (post-)Marxist historical 
imagination at the very historical juncture of the period around 1989. 
 
What then, amid all this, remains of a political aesthetic? Gourgouris, in his reflections on 
the fact that “some of the greatest and most experimental poets of the twentieth-century 
were avowed (albeit maverick) communists,”31 discusses the conjunction of what he calls 
“Communism and Poetry”: 
  We might say that these poets saw the ethical demand of communism’s  
  historical intervention as a poetic task and, conversely, their poetic project as  
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  a chance to hone history’s materiality into a language that metabolizes itself  
  in turn to an actual historical praxis. This chiastic configuration – which is,  
  incidentally, internal, esoteric to the antagonistic relation “communism and  
  poetry” – is what makes such poets political in the strictest sense, which  
  would have to include their intransigent commitment to experimentation  
  with poetic form. Otherwise, if this chiasmus is disengaged, we have either a  
  political poetry that merely extols an ideological certainty […] or a purely  
  self-referential poetry that may indeed unravel all limits of established form  
  but remains unable to theorize the political intersection between literary  
  experimentation and historical materiality (“Communism and Poetry”). 
What manifests itself, I would argue, in Müller’s late poetry is a kind of double pressure on 
this equation, by which the weight of the historical moment threatens to reduce to absurdity 
all “historical intervention” while Müller’s impending death renders impossible the 
continuation of a “poetic project.” This, incidentally, also brings into sharper relief my 
suggestion at the outset of this chapter about what Said calls an “abiding timeliness” – the 
simultaneity, that is, of historical crisis and Müller’s ill health. And so, under this double 
pressure the chiasmus Gourgouris speaks about, the precarious conjunction of communism 
and poetry or, in more general terms, of politics and aesthetics, threatens to collapse. 
 As a result, Müller in his late work increasingly and forcefully gestures towards an 
aesthetics of autonomy. “Das ist die linke Illusion der letzten Jahrzehnte, glaube ich,” he tells 
Kluge in 1990, “der europäischen Intellektuellen oder besonders Literaten, daß es eine 
Interessengemeinschaft von Kunst und Politik geben könnte und sollte” (Werke 11 637). 
“Die Kunst hat eine andere Zeit als die Politik oder die Geschichte” (Werke 12 41). “Lyrik,” 
indeed, “ist Ausstieg aus der Wirklichkeit” (Werke 11 673). Ultimately, however, what 
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Corinna Mieth has called a “Paradigmenwechsel zur autonomen Literatur” in Müller’s work 
(Mieth 211) in my opinion is never fully realized, and Müller abstains from embracing 
completely an aesthetics of autonomy. It is certainly not a notion of l’art pour l’art that one 
can distill out of Müller’s late poetry; nor can we really speak here of an Adornian 
conception of autonomous art by which the autonomy of poetic form remains dialectically 
bound to the utter negativity of a social-historical content. Eventually, Müller’s conception 
of aesthetics remains more immediately linked to the notion of social and historical 
transformation. And so when Müller speaks about “[die] Illusion/[den] Traum der linken 
Intelligenz nicht nur in der DDR, nicht nur in Europa, von einer möglichen Hochzeit von 
Kunst und Politik im Namen der Utopie von einer sozial gerechten Gesellschaft,” he states 
that “[die] Illusion ist verflogen, der Traum ist nicht ausgeträumt” (Werke 12 41). The 
political promise of art is moved into what Müller in a different context has called a 
“Wartestand,” a “ganz messianischer Zustand” (Werke 12 180): poetry, as I have 
demonstrated throughout this chapter, becomes the temporal container for a small residue 
of hope for the future. “Kunst,” then, as the “Museum, in dem die Utopie aufgehoben wird 
für bessere Zeiten” (Werke 12 41f.).32 
 The notion of the museum, I would want to suggest here in closing, points to the 
problematic and highly precarious nature of this kind of waiting for the future. If art is 
indeed the “Museum, in dem die Utopie aufgehoben wird für bessere Zeiten,” are we 
concerned here with a projectile that can travel in time and encapsulates a residue of hope, 
with a display case that enshrines an item of the past, or with a different constellation still by 
which the pastness of the museal and the futurity of better times dialectically converge, as 
Müller seems to suggest, in the Aufhebung of utopia? Different trajectories in time and space 
are at stake here, different chronotopic parameters. But often, in Müller’s late poetry, one 
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can observe a movement of contraction rather than expansion, a hermeticism out of which, 
it is true, a future is hoped to crystallize, but which in reality is curiously indifferent, in any 
tangible kind of sense, towards any more emphatic notion of a future, towards the idea, 
indeed, that 1989 may not only be a moment of ends and endings but also the point of 
crystallization of new world-historical constellations and horizons that are not in sync with 
what the evangelists of the end of history proclaim. Messianic hope, yes; but also very much 
a retreat into the entwined catastrophes of an end of life and a disastrous 20th century. It may 
not be a fair thing to expect from a body of work that consists – in a very fundamental sense 
– of late poetry: But even in 1989, and certainly by the time of Müller’s death, new challenges 
and promises had come to the surface, and there is very little here of what, say, globalization 
may bring, of what new forms of praxis and kinds of collectivities may emerge, and of what 
that would mean for the conjunction of aesthetics and politics. Ultimately, then, some 
twenty years on, one cannot help but wonder if the challenge today perhaps no longer 





1 “Both in art and in our general ideas about the passage of human life there is assumed to be a general abiding 
timeliness. We assume that the essential health of a human life has a great deal to do with its correspondence to 
its time – the fitting together of the two – and is therefore defined by its appropriateness or timeliness” (Said 
3). 
 
2 If one were to dwell on the etymology of the Greek here, one could point out that aposiopoiesis is both apo-
siopoiesis and aposio-poiesis. The prefix από- points to a form of difference or deferral, a movement away from 
something (as in the term “apostasy” or “apology”): Aposiopesis is not silence, then, but the making absent, as 
it were, of something that could be said. As a form of ποίησης, likewise, aposiopoiesis is a silence that was made, 
created, instantiated, brought about, and not originally there. In both instances, what one is dealing with is a 
kind of not-quite-silence, indeed a form of (de-)constructed silence. I owe these remarks to a suggestion by 
Stathis Gourgouris. 
 
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Müller’s poetry in this chapter are from Suhrkamp’s 2014 
complete edition of Müller’s published and previously unpublished poetry, Warten auf der Gegenschräge: 
Gesammelte Gedichte, edited by Kristin Schulz, and abbreviated here as “G.” This edition supplements and 
essentially supplants volume 1 of the complete edition of Müller’s oeuvre, Werke 1: Die Gedichte, first published 
by Suhrkamp in 1998 and edited by Frank Hörnigk, and abbreviated here, whenever used, as “W1.” 
 
4 This number includes both the “Gedichte aus dem Nachlaß” and the “Entwürfe aus dem Nachlaß” in Warten 
auf der Gegenschräge. 
  
5 In fact, in the Werke edition – arranged by the principle of “brutale Chronologie” – it is exclusively in poems of 
the section “1989…” that this kind of dating occurs. In the slightly expanded edition of Müller’s poems in 
Warten auf der Gegenschräge, a few earlier poems appear that bear a date, too. In addition, the purely chronological 
sequence is abandoned there in favor of the rubrics “Gedichtband 1992,” “Veröffentlichungen zu Lebzeiten,” 
“Gedichte aus dem Nachlaß,” and “Entwürfe aus dem Nachlaß.” Within these sections, the chronological 
principle is maintained. 
 
6 There is a certain inconsistency between the Werke edition and the later Warten auf der Gegenschräge. In the 
latter, date lines occasionally appear in different form or disappear altogether. Müller’s involvement in the 
preparations for the first volume however, I would argue, point to the deliberate nature of the decision to 
combine “brutale Chronologie” and a rather precise form of dating in order to reproduce the effect of purely 
chronological stringency. 
 
7 See, for instance, the reproduction of the manuscript version of “B[eschreibung] e[ines] Todes death in 
progress” in Schulz’s edition (449) or Schulz’s transcription of the typographical errors in Müller’s very late 
poem “timon,” written by typewriter in December 1995 (635). 
 
8 In this context, one can also cite Müller’s public performances, often in highly ironic fashion, of his 
progressive silencing late in his life. These include a number of interviews with Alexander Kluge in which 
Müller speaks with a creaking voice – and cigar in his mouth – after a life-threatening surgery that also affected 
his vocal chords, and a fake magazine interview in 1995 with Frank Raddatz, titled “Das Schweigen des 
Müller”: 
  RADDATZ Ich bin jetzt extra von Stuttgart nach Los Angeles gekommen, um ein Gespräch 
  mit Ihnen zu führen. Und Sie schweigen. 
  MÜLLER Ja. 
  RADDATZ Finden Sie es gut zu schweigen? 
  MÜLLER nickt. 
  RADDATZ In Ihrem kürzlich entstandenen Gedicht “Zum Beispiel Ajax” steht etwas von  
  der Erfindung des Schweigens. Arbeiten wir hier an einem neuen Schweigen? Ist es das? 
  MÜLLER schläft ein. 




  RADDATZ Herr Müller. Ich danke Ihnen im Namen von “Theater der Zeit” für dieses  
  Gespräch. (Werke 12 651ff.) 
 
9 Cf. Margarete’s words in Goethe’s Faust: “Nach Golde drängt, / Am Golde hängt / Doch alles. Ach wir 
Armen!” (Goethe 81). 
 
10 “Ab einem Gewissen Punkt,” Müller argued in an interview with Frank Raddatz in 1991, “geht die 
Entwicklung der Ökonomie und des Bewußtseins scherenartig auseinander” (Werke 12 13). 
 
11 “Es gibt im Westen,” Müller says in Gesammelte Irrtümer, “allgemein eine totale Besetzung mit Gegenwart. Das 
ganze ökonomische Potential geht auf Besetzung mit Gegenwart. Das heißt: Auslöschen von Erinnerung und 
Erwartung. Es gibt keine Vergangenheit und Zukunft, nur Gegenwart, man braucht nur über die Straße zu 
gehen, überall Gegenwart” (quoted in Eke, “Zeit/Räume” 145f.). I will comment on the question of experience 
and expectation below, especially in its implications for historical time and for what I have called throughout 
this dissertation modernity’s constitutive promise of an “open future.” 
  
12 The “Leichenberge,” of course, for Müller too would also include those of Communism. 
 
13 See Virilio, Rasender Stillstand. 
 
14 Müller’s rhetoric here, one could argue, displays a certain affinity with the Third International’s identification 
of fascism with finance capitalism. 
 
15 See Koselleck, “‘Erfahrungsraum’ und ‘Erwartungshorizont – zwei historische Kategorien” (Vergangene 
Zukunft 349-375) and the Introduction to this dissertation. 
 
16 The notion of a “Verschwinden des Menschen” is also reference to Foucault’s recurring theme of the 
“disappearance of man.” 
 
17 “The first thing one can reproach him with is that he succumbed to the temptation of catastrophism, of 
perceiving the situation (in 1989) as one of utter despair (recall his statements from those years that he just 
wants to drown himself in alcohol and drugs)” (Zizek, “Out of Joint”). 
 
18 In a brief prose text aus dem Nachlass, most likely written in 1992 or 1993, similarly, Müller writes, without 
mentioning Benjamin: “Der Irrtum von Marx: Revolutionen sind die Lokomotiven der Geschichte. Auf dem 
Hintergrund der Tatsache, daß der technische Fortschritt die Menschheit überholt, d.h. in der Konsequenz 
überflüssig macht, ist der Platz des Revolutionärs heute nicht am Gashebel, sondern an der Bremse” (Werke 8 
602). Talking specifically about the historical context after 1989, in an interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung, too, 
Müller argues that “Revolutionen waren immer der Versuch, die Zeit aufzuhalten und Prozesse zu 
verlangsamen. Dieser letzte Versuch ist nun gescheitert und jetzt kommt die totale Beschleunigung aller 
Probleme. Es eskaliert” (quoted in Eke, “Zeit/Räume” 136f.). 
 
19 “Im Moment ist ja das Schlimme,” Müller tells Kluge in 1992, “daß es nur noch Zeit oder Geschwindigkeit 
oder Verlauf von Zeit gibt, aber keinen Raum mehr. Man muß jetzt Räume schaffen und besetzen gegen diese 
Beschleunigung” (Werke 12 310). It is, I would argue, less a concern with space as such – or with a privileging 
of space over time – that manifests itself here, than an attempt at conceiving of Zeiträume that facilitate 
individual and historical praxis. 
 
20 With a slightly different accentuation, this can also be considered an instance of what Stathis Gourgouris has 
called “the challenge to understand the poetics of self-alteration”: “Especially because in our present time the 
death of communism is final and the distance from any social emancipatory vision abyssal, the challenge to 
understand the poetics of self-alteration – of making oneself into another, of seeing oneself and the world from 
the standpoint of the other, of remaking this world into another – emerges with formidable urgency” 





21 My reading of “Glückloser Engel 2” departs, rather radically, from other readings of this poem, for instance 
by Frank Hörnigk or Janine Ludwig. Hörnigk writes: “Was bleibt, sind Momente von Einsamkeit, von Fremde, 
von Vergänglichkeit. Zwar identifiziert [Müller] immer noch seinen Engel, das Symbol für Befreiung, für 
Emanzipation, aber er ist nicht mehr in der Lage, das Gesicht dieses Engels zu erkennen. So ist er als Autor 
zum Zeit-Zeugen einer zur Geschichte geronnenen Epoche des ausgehenden Jahrhunderts geworden, dessen 
alte Gesichter ihm vertraut sind, die er zu benennen weiß, aber über deren Historizität er sich ebenso im klaren 
ist” (Hörnigk 315). Hörnigk states, apodictically, that “Die Aussicht auf ‘Erlösung’ wird negiert” (316). Ludwig, 
similarly, argues that “Glückloser Engel 2” is a “vorerst endgültige Zurücknahme der Hoffnung auf ein 
Fortschreiten der Geschichte.” The face of the angel “verschwimmt […] bis zur Unkenntlichkeit” (Ludwig 80). 
Ludwig’s contradictory formulation of a “vorerst endültige” revocation of hope, I would argue, points towards 
the very residue of hope – located in an anonymous other – which I emphasize in my own reading. 
 
22 In a public discussion in 1989, Müller – once again provocatively – went as far as saying: “Sie kennen sicher 
den Text von Benjamin über den theologischen Glutkern des Marxismus, der die eigentliche Kraft ist oder war. 
Und wenn der kalt wird, dann hat das Ganze keine Anziehungskraft mehr. Da ist ein durchaus messianischer 
Aspekt im Marxismus […]. Und ich finde überhaupt keinen wirklichen Gegensatz zwischen Christen und 
Marxisten, was die Welt, wie sie verändert werden könnte, angeht. Da gibt es keine Gegensätze mehr, glaube 
ich (Werke 11 872). 
 
23 Derrida, incidentally, in a brief text titled “Out of Joint,” in which he offers his explanation for turning down 
an invitation to speak at Müller’s funeral, writes: “I never met Heiner Müller. Yet – dare I say it, and did he ever 
know it – he is one of my greatest and best friends. I speak here neither of my admiration for him, nor of my 
gratitude, nor of his work. Only of the singular trace that he left in my life and about which I will think until the 
end, an enigma that is larger than me, a signature that history has inscribed, at countertime, into the body of a 
spectral friendship” (quoted in Krapp 206). Derrida was supposed to attend a public discussion about Specters of 
Marx with Müller in Berlin, but the meeting did not happen because Müller was hospitalized. “One evening,” 
Derrida continues, “in Italy, my wife calls me: ‘Heiner Müller is dead, his friends will call you, he has asked 
before dying that you speak at his grave, or for a last word in the last moment.’ After a deliberation that in fact 
could have been endless and will have to remain endless, I decide, without deciding, that I cannot, that I should 
not, that it would be in every way impossible for me […] to speak like that, of him, for him, before him, after 
his death […]. A feeling of treason, the worst, infinite treason. Treason of a dead friend, thus of an infinitely 
vulnerable one. […] And yet something tells me that this treason remains faithful […] because this moment 
remains more unforgettable, more deeply inscribed in my heart, more faithfully turned toward him than if I had 
pronounced some words in public in the big Berlin theater of solemn mourning. […] What remains to be said, 
or to be read, our mutual friends could, if they wished to, find in that public space of remains that one calls 
writing, images, theater” (207). 
 
24 I will not focus here on Derrida’s – somewhat tortured – elaborations on the affinities between 
deconstruction and Marxism in the wake of 1989. It is worth pointing out, however, in the context of my 
discussion of Müller’s late poetry, that Derrida refers to the notions of “deferral, lateness, delay, 
postponement” (Derrida 37) in deconstruction. My concern here is not with deconstruction as such but with a 
certain kind of overlap between Derrida and Müller’s conceptions of messianic temporality and the future after 
1989. Certain parallels and affinities notwithstanding, indeed, it would be going too far, I would argue, to try to 
extract a properly deconstructive program from Müller’s work. For a discussion of the affinities between Müller’s 
work and French poststructuralism in general, see for instance Hans-Thies Lehmann’s article “Raum-Zeit: Das 
Entgleiten der Geschichte in der Dramatik Heiner Müllers und im französischen Poststrukturalismus.” 
 
25 See Karschnia and Lehmann: Müller “wurde […] seit Die Hamletmaschine ein Autor, den man nicht zufällig zu 
einer internationalen Diskussion über Postmoderne eingeladen hat. Doch im Unterschied zu den explizit 
‘Postmodernen’ blieb sein Theater und Schreiben einem aufklärerisch-modernistischen Projekt immer 
verbunden” (Karschnia and Lehmann 10). 
  
26 That socialism, incidentally, appears in Müller’s poetry as both a “[sozialistische] Todgeburt” (90) and a 





27 This also includes a retrospective projection of Müller’s own and his interpreters’ readings of Benjamin after 
1989 onto earlier texts in the author’s oeuvre. 
  
28 “Whatever the case may be,” Agamben writes on the last page of The Time That Remains, “there is no reason 
to doubt that these two fundamental messianic texts of our tradition [the Pauline epistles and Benjamin’s 
“Theses”], separated by almost two thousand years, both written in a situation of radical crisis, form a 
constellation whose time of legibility has finally come today, for reasons that invite further reflection. […] 
Benjamin’s principle […] proposes that every work, every text, contains a historical index which indicates both 
its belonging to a determinate epoch, as well as its only coming forth to full legibility at a determinate historical 
moment.” The following quote by Benjamin – in which, as Agamben writes, “he confided his most extreme 
messianic formulation and which will aptly conclude our seminar” – ends with the lines “‘[…] The image that is 
read – which is to say, the image in the now of its recognizability – bears to the highest degree the imprint of 
the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded.’ (Benjamin 1999a, 463)” (Agamben 145). 
 
29 See, for instance, Marchart’s critique of Agamben’s “Philosophismus” in Die politische Differenz and 
Gourgouris’s article in the volume Paul and the Philosophers (Gourgouris, “Paul’s Greek”). 
 
30 It is worth recalling in this context Rolf Tiedemann’s critique of Benjamin’s messianism too, namely that 
“mit der Rückübersetzung des Materialismus in Theologie beides verlorengeht: der säkularisierte Gehalt sich 
auflöst und die theologische Idee sich verflüchtigt” (quoted in Eckardt 94f.). In a more polemical register, and 
in the specific context of Müller’s work, Richard Herzinger has spoken of a “Sprache ahnungsvoller 
Zukunftserwartung” that “legitimierte einen krypto-oppositionellen Attentismus” (Herzinger 64). 
 
31 In the essay – primarily a discussion of poems by the Greek writers Manolis Anagnostakis and Yannis Ritsos 
– Gourgouris also mentions Mayakovsky, Eluard, Brecht, Hikmet, Neruda, and Pasolini. In a newer essay, 
drawing on “Communism and Poetry,” he explicitly adds Müller to this list (see Gourgouris, “Poetry’s 
Incalculable Account”). 
 
32 Here, indeed, an Adornian dimension shines through, as does in Müller’s notion of his poetry as a 
“Flaschenpost”: “Ich kann nur noch Texte herstellen für Flaschenpost, die ich in eine Flasche stecke, und dann 
werfe ich die Flasche ins Wasser mit der Hoffnung, daß sie irgendwann aufgefischt wird, ob von einem 
Marsmenschen oder Puertoricaner oder was immer. Und der versucht dann aus diesem Text in dieser Flasche 
Informationen zu beziehen, die er vielleicht verwenden kann für sein Leben” (quoted in Buck 152). The notion 
of the “Flaschenpost” however, is not a matter of autonomy but of the temporal trajectory of art in a 
catastrophic present. Müller’s reference to Adorno here, then, does not, I believe, invalidate my argument 
above. In addition, his rhetoric (“irgendwann,” “Marsmenschen oder Puertoricaner oder was immer,” 
“vielleicht”) points to a state of messianic anticipation akin to Derrida’s “waiting without a horizon of 





DEMOCRATIC POETICS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
GLOBALIZATION, GLOBALITY, AND THE  
POLITICS OF PLANETARITY IN THE  
LATER FICTION OF ALEXANDER KLUGE 
_______________________________________ 
 
Apporter le monde au monde! 
- Brothers Lumière 
!
Im Zusammenhang gibt es immer einen Ausweg. 
- Alexander Kluge 
 
 
If one were to read Alexander Kluge’s later fiction with a map of the world by one’s side and 
decided to place a little icon in each location that one of Kluge’s narratives has as its setting, 
the resulting image would be remarkable: Germany, of course, along with Central, Western, 
and Northern Europe would be covered; but so would be southern Europe, the 
Mediterranean, and the Balkans; the Middle East and the Arabic peninsula; the Russian 
Federation, from Saint Petersburg to Siberia, and the former Soviet republics; China, Japan, 
South East Asia, and the Indian subcontinent; North, sub-Saharan and Southern Africa; 
North and Latin America; the Caribbean; Hawaii; Australia and New Zealand. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the field of narration of Kluge’s stories spans the entire globe. 
 What is perhaps more remarkable, however, is the fact that this kind of mapping 
would be a woefully inadequate, an almost laughably diminutive representation of the spatial 
– or more precisely: the chronotopic – parameters of Kluge’s later fiction. For what remains 
un-encompassed in such a map of the world – or, in its three-dimensional variation: the 
globe – is a spectacular expansion not only of space but also of the fourth dimension of 
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time. Kluge’s stories, gathered on thousands of pages across several collections, extend from 
twenty billion years in the past to a science-fictional future, from the smallest of particles 
constituting terrestrial life to the most distant of foreign galaxies. 
 It is this tension – a productive tension – between a global imaginary and one that 
decisively exceeds it that is at the heart of this chapter. In form and content, I will argue 
here, Kluge’s chronotopic maximalism provides the conceptual framework for a negotiation 
of the question of globalization in literature: It allows him to engage with a wide range of 
globalizing processes determining social and political life today; at the same time, it enables 
him to pit an epistemological project, which I will call here a “politics of planetarity,” against 
the exigencies of a contemporary world under the condition of globality. The planet offers a 
critique of the globe. 
 Planetarity, I contend, is at once a figure of contingency and articulation. As such, it 
combines two concepts that are crucial to Kluge’s work in both its political and poetological 
dimensions. The notion of contingency implies an ontological openness or indeterminacy 
that is directed against a thinking of foundations, closures, or the fixity of social, historical or 
formal relations. Articulation, on the other hand, hints at the possibility of connection, 
association, and even collectivity. Contingent articulation, then, in its aesthetic sense, is an 
adequate term to describe the montage of heterogeneous and polysemic elements that 
cannot be reduced to a single or fully determined meaning. In its political valence, the term 
captures a democratic imaginary according to which collective and transformative acts of 
political institution can never be rooted in an ultimate and immutable foundation but must 
be subject to a continuous process of re-negotiation and contestation. As a moment of 
excess, I will argue in the following, planetarity in Kluge’s later fiction brings together the 
aesthetic and the political and arranges them in a chiasmic relationship: while an aesthetics of 
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planetarity gestures towards a democratic politics, a planetary politics finds its sedimentation 
in a democratic poetics. What is at stake, ultimately, is the possibility of a political aesthetic 
for the 21st century, through which the forms and effects of contemporary globalization can 
be re-thought and modified. How, I ask in this chapter, does Kluge conceive of such a 
political aesthetic? And to what extent – if at all – is a project of this kind feasible today?  
 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
In the preface to Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt, Kluge describes the phenomenon of spatial 
compression as a quintessential human experience in the 21st century:  
Aus der Zeit des Stummfilms gibt es eine Szene, bei der die optische 
Wirkung dadurch erzielt wird, daß die Kulissen, also die Horizonte, auf 
Rollen gesetzt, auf die handelnden Personen zufahren und den Raum 
verengen. Der Zuschauer spürt die Wirkung, kann aber den Grund dafür 
nicht erkennen; er empfindet das als unheimlich. In unserem Jahrhundert 
wird dieser Effekt zu einer allgemeinen MENSCHLICHEN ERFAHRUNG. 
(LT 7)1 
The notion of compression is, of course, at the core of a number of conceptualizations of 
the nature of globalization, from David Harvey’s influential “time-space compression” 2 in 
postmodernity through James Mittelman’s observation that globalization “compresses the 
time and space aspects of social relations” to Roland Robertson’s assertion that globalization 
“as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of 
consciousness of the world as a whole.”3 What I am interested in here is the fact that the 
nominally expansive process of globalization is identified in these definitions with a logic of 
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contraction, with – as Kluge suggests in his preface – a shrinking of the horizons (Horzionte) 
of human experience, which is perceived as frightening or uncanny (unheimlich). The world, 
indeed, is reduced to the globe. 
 It is in the eighth chapter of Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt, titled “Was heißt Macht? / 
Wem kann man trauen?” that Kluge develops this problematic most systematically. The 
chapter is emphatically about the “Globus” (541), and not about nations on the one hand or 
the world or planet on the other. Throughout, Kluge speaks of “Globalisierung” (541), “das 
globale System” (535), and a “globale Dimension” (610). He refers to “Karten des Globus” 
(580), humanity “als Teil des Globus” (572), and a “globale Verteidigungsmaschine” (533). 
Most importantly, perhaps, he designates the “Globus als Herrschaftsraum” (570). This 
rhetoric of globality goes hand in hand, thereby, with what Harro Müller has called a 
“Globalisierung des Erzählfeldes” (Gegengifte 112) in Kluge’s later fiction. Unlike in his first 
collection of stories, Lebensläufe, and in much of his earlier output, Kluge is no longer 
concerned with a predominantly German field of narration. Germany, in fact, as both setting 
and historical agent, is largely absent from “Was heißt Macht? / Wem kann man trauen?” 
Instead, the stories in this chapter are criss-crossing the entire globe. 
 Globality, then, is also a formal property of Kluge’s work. The rapid succession, on 
just over 100 pages, of some fifty short narratives – set across the globe and arranged with 
no apparent order or hierarchy – even typographically translates the experience of spatial 
compression into literary form. In his acceptance speech for the Georg Büchner Prize in 
2003, Kluge argued that, 
Meines Erachtens sehen wir uns heute einer Veränderung in der Geometrie 
des Erzählraums gegenüber. […] 
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Autoren können mit dieser quasi objektiven Geometrie der Erfahrungsräume 
nicht nach subjektiver Willkür umgehen, nach Geschmack oder 
Kunstverstand. Sie reagieren vielmehr als professionelle Seismographen mit 
Messungen. (FKDB 76) 
More than a mere representation, the formal arrangement of the stories in the eighth chapter 
of Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt can thus be conceived of as a sedimentation of processes of 
globalization, which not simply necessitate but actually produce new forms of narration. 
 
If globalization can be understood “as the widening, deepening and speeding up of 
worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to 
the criminal, the financial to the spiritual” (Held et al. 2), then Kluge’s tight network of 
narratives in “Was heißt Macht? / Wem kann man trauen?” provides a sort of textbook 
example for the forms and effects of contemporary globalization. I am particularly interested 
in the way Kluge engages not so much with the process of globalization as such, but with a 
particular configuration of globalizing processes into a coherent social-political and 
ideological formation that might best be described as the contemporary condition of 
neoliberal globality.4 Kluge’s concern, I would argue, is above all with new forms of 
sovereignty and power that pose an extraordinary challenge to the notions of individual as 
well as collective agency and historical contingency. What is at stake here is once again the 
constitutive promise of modernity, according to which history can be made and an open 
future be shaped through transformative human praxis. “Der Zuschauer spürt die Wirkung, 
kann aber den Grund dafür nicht erkennen” (LT 7): it is the increasing autonomization of a 
systemic logic that is at the heart of the unheimlich effect of contemporary globalization that 
Kluge hints at in the preface of Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt. 
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 Kluge’s disavowal of a national or even simply international perspective points to the 
frequent “‘unbundling’ of the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality and state 
power” in contemporary globalization (Held et al. 8) and leads him to engage with trans- or 
supranational processes and institutions instead.5 “Die Kausalketten in der globalisierten 
Welt,” he writes in Das Bohren harter Bretter, “bilden ein weitmaschiges Netz” (BB 13). Such 
networks are located on all levels of political, military, economic and social interaction: The 
EU, the UN and NATO are frequently mentioned throughout Kluge’s stories of 
globalization, in and beyond the eighth chapter of Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt. “[Die] 
Kontakte zur Nato sichern [die] Stellung im eigenen Land, wie es politische Konstellationen 
im Land selbst nicht vermögen” (LT 517). “In diesen Jahren transformiert sich die Nato. Ein 
Netzwerk weit entfernt vom Raster der frühen Jahre, in denen es um die Überwachung des 
recht übersichtlichen Nordatlantiks ging” (TT 207). Kluge speaks of “Freihandel” (LT 560), 
“Großbanken” (TT 136), a “Bankenkonsortium” (139), “die Leitung eines globalen 
Konzerns” (137), the “Evolution kapitalistischer Netzwerke” (137f.), “multinational 
befestigte Unternehmen” (527) and “Unternehmen […], die in globalen Strukturen denken” 
(BB 82). “Und heute verlieren [die Territorialstaaten] diese Autorität, die sie einst hatten. 
[…]. [Im] Umkreis der transnationalen Konzerne [bildete sich] eine neue Form der Macht” 
(61). The section “Land der Verheißung / Festung Europa” in the ninth chapter of Die 
Lücke, die der Teufel läßt in its entirety deals with the complex interplay of global inequality, the 
movement of people and its social repercussions, new regimes of security and border 
policing, and the human tragedies attendant to such processes. “In einem Schlauchboot an 
der Küste westlich von Alicante wurde ein Leichnam gefunden, ums Leben gekommen bei 
dem Versuch, die europäische Küste zu erreichen” (LT 842). “Woche für Woche werden 
aufgedunsene Körper an die Badestrände bei Tarifa gespült” (843). “Massenanlandungen 
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illegaler Einwanderer finden in Süditalien, über die Meerenge von Gibraltar und im Bereich 
des griechischen Inselarchipels statt. Das sind die ‘clandestini’. Die Meerenge von Gibraltar 
gilt als größtes Massengrab Europas” (852). “Ceuta und Melilla sind eingezäunt wie Berlin 
zur Zeit der Mauer” (844). “Ein Strom illegaler Einwanderer” (844) is met with force at the 
“vorgeschobenen Außengrenzen Europas” (845), where a “[europäisches] Grenz- und 
Polizeikorps” protects “den Schutzwall um [Europas] Außengrenzen” (847). These, Kluge 
suggests, are the rather drastic limitations to mobility in a globalizing world. Capitalizing on 
the plight of others, consequently – through rings of prostitution (854, 856) or human 
trafficking (847, 852, 854) – becomes a highly lucrative business. Time and again, finally, 
Kluge’s narratives suggest a globalization of violence through altogether more sinister forms 
of global networking: These include, of course, “Terroristen” (LT 602, 850), 
“Selbstmordattentäter” (841), a “Vernetzung der Terrorwerke” (600) and “die Mafia” (609); 
but also the global business of arms trade (622, 904), “[private] Sicherheitsdienste […] im 
Irak und in Afghanistan” (BB 69) and the more conspicuous practices of a “[weltweites] 
Netz der Homeland-Verteidigung” (LT 880) in the “asymmetrischen Kampf gegen den 
Terror” (TT 553): “Eine Gruppe von Verhandlungsführern des CIA hat das Verhör eines 
vermuteten Mitglieds von Al-Qaida aufgegeben, das Subjekt an einen befreundeten 
Geheimdienst überstellt, dem nach der Gesetzgebung seines Landes Folter zugestanden ist” 
(LT 870). Frequently, indeed, in Kluge’s stories this “‘unbundling’ of the relationship 
between sovereignty, territoriality and state power” (Held et al. 8) leads to a complex 
enmeshment of political, economic, military and criminal forms of power. “In kräftigen 
Farben zeigten Kästchen und Strichverbindungen die Zusammenhänge zwischen Banken in 
Somalia, den Al-Qaida-Spuren (soweit lesbar) und den Abu-Sayyaf-Kämpfern, die man 
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entweder als regionale Aufständische, als muslimische Extremisten oder als Räuber deuten 
konnte” (LT 600). 
  Nie wird [die Mafia] darauf vertrauen, daß der Weg solcher Gelder auf Dauer 
  unerklärbar bleibt, noch stärker aber schlägt zu Buche, daß die Bush-  
  Administration und der Premierminister Italiens im Weltzusammenhang  
  einen Wert an sich darstellen, den selbstbewußte Kräfte, wie die von Neapel  
  und Sizilien, im Diskurs mit ihren Kollegen an der Ostküste der USA  
  selbstverständlich ins Auge fassen. Es sind moderne und es sind   
  unternehmerische Kräfte. (609) 
 It is what Andreas Huyssen has called “the cumulative impact” (Twilight Memories 
147) of Kluge’s form of narration that is at work in these “Kürzestgeschichten” (see 
Steinaecker 32). There is a frantic quality to Kluge’s storytelling – at once radically expansive 
and condensing, fundamentally heterogeneous and articulatory – that powerfully re-produces 
the effect of the “extensity, intensity, velocity and impact” (Held et al. 16) of globalizing 
processes in the contemporary world. “Aus vielen solchen Geschichten lässt sich 
GLOBALISIERUNG beschreiben,” Kluge argues in the Büchner Prize speech, “kaum aus 
einer einzelnen” (FKDB 79). What we need, he adds in the Frankfurter Poetikvorlesungen, 
“wenn wir mit den Stoffmassen des 21. Jahrhunderts umgehen wollen,” is a “konstellative 
Erzählweise,” “nicht [eine lineare]” (TE, June 19). When, within the space of a page or even 
a single paragraph, Kluge moves between a variety of locations and levels of human 
interaction on the globe – all the while creating connections, analogies and continuities 
between individual stories – this social and historical content becomes effectively 




I have, however, suggested above that I am particularly interested in those instances in 
Kluge’s work in which globalization manifests itself as a paradoxical kind of shrinking. It is 
indeed this notion of the globe as a reduction, I would argue, that is at the heart of Kluge’s 
critique of the condition of globality in its contemporary forms and effects. At the core of 
this critique is Kluge’s insistence on the pervasive impact of processes of computerization, 
digitalization, and technologization. These processes, in turn, are linked to a concomitant 
trajectory of increasing systemic autonomization that radically puts into question the 
concepts of human agency as well as of collective and transformative political praxis. 
 References to computers and digital technology are ubiquitous in Kluge’s stories. 
People and institutions are “[über] Internet […] weltweit […] verknüpft” (CG I 124). “Alles 
blieb eine virtuelle Sache der Computerauswertung” (LT 529). Significantly, thereby, it is a 
kind of virtual mapping of the globe for explicitly military purposes that Kluge often puts 
particular emphasis on: “Nato-Simulationen in Form von COMPUTER-MANÖVERN” are 
designed to assess “die Sicherheitslage des Erdballs UNTER BESONDERER 
BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES ATLANTIKS” (527). Computers produce a “genaues Bild 
einer gedachten Erdgestalt” (CG I 884); “im Computer eingespeicherte” data then facilitate 
the use of “Kampfgeschosse, die dazu bestimmt waren, […] über den Erdball hinzuziehen 
und ‘angriffslustige Schurkenstaaten’ zu bestrafen” (884). The “Computerkapazität des 
Pentagon” is a crucial part of the “globale Verteidigungsmaschine” (LT 533) I have already 
mentioned above: “Computer […] errechneten die MÖGLICHKEIT” (535) of a variety of 
geostrategic and military scenarios by processing “Realdaten im Weltmaßstab” (535). 
Elsewhere, Kluge speaks of the fact that the “4. US-Infanterie-Division (die ‘Digitalisierte’) 
war die schnellste und […] die elektronisch am besten ausgerüstete Kampfeinheit der USA” 
(TT 77). And in one of the many military exercises described in his stories – a “schöne, 
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multinationale und raumübergreifende Übung,” conducted “auf […] elektronischen 
Geräten” – an international group of NATO soldiers simulates a combat mission “an der 
digitalen Front vor Istanbul” (339):  
  Brigadier Andreas Bölsterli […] hob in der Abschlußbesprechung hervor,  
  ‘daß die Schlachten der computerisierten Zukunft nicht für Menschenmaß  
  gemacht seien, d.h. keine Rücksicht nähmen auf menschliche Leiber, die  
  irgendwann schlafen müssen’. Wachheit sei die Devise. Die Körper müßten  
  sich letztlich an die Geräte anpassen, weil die Geräte (und auch ein vernetztes 
  Schlachtfeld des 21. Jahrhunderts sei zunächst nichts anderes als ein Gerät)  
  sich an die menschliche Schwäche nicht anpassen würden. (339f.) 
 This passage is highly significant: Computerization and digital technology, Bölsterli’s 
remarks suggest, not only make possible a digital mapping of the globe on an unprecedented 
scale but also bring about entirely new forms of temporality.6 Kluge’s story thus points to a 
radical re-structuring of the temporal and spatial parameters of human life under the 
condition of globality. This re-structuring, in turn, produces measures of time and space that 
are fundamentally “nicht für Menschenmaß gemacht” and thus effectively liquidate what 
Reinhart Koselleck had called the Verfügbarkeit, or accessibility, of history as such.7 This de-
humanization, and the substitution of the constitutively modern promise of history’s 
Verfügbarkeit by systemic autonomization, extends far beyond the sphere of the military. It is 
presented, indeed, in Kluge’s stories as one of the principal characteristics of the condition 
of globality. “Leben wir Tür an Tür mit einem ‘modernen Raubtier’, das kein Mensch ist” 
(TT 95)? “Lassen sich die Informationssysteme […] überhaupt kontrollieren oder 
beherrschen? […] – Nichts vermag die Welt zu regieren. Sie regiert sich selbst” (100f.). In his 
Frankfurter Poetikvorlesungen, Kluge speaks of an “Ausbruch der Mathematik aus dem 
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akademischen Gefängnis” and its subsequent accession to “Macht im Internet und der 
digitalen Welt,” of a “Mathematik, die die Menschheit zu überholen beginnt” and the 
production of “staunenswerte Maschinen” (TE, June 19). “Wir sind heute Zeugen davon,” 
he argues in the Büchner Prize speech, 
  wie das Gewicht tödlicher Abstraktionen, wie objektive Verhältnisse sich auf  
  dem Planeten bandenmäßig zusammenrotten, von Einzelmenschen fast nicht 
  mehr beobachtbar, auf keinen Fall anwendbar. […] 
  Das ist eine Inflationierung der Äußerlichkeit. Das Objektive rüstet auf.  
  (FKDB 82)  
 What is at stake here, ultimately, and threatened, is the condition of possibility for 
transformative human praxis in the contemporary world. Human subjects “nehmen […] an 
der Globalisierung kaum teil, sie erfahren nur ihre Folgen” (FKDB 79). The sphere of 
politics, thereby, for Kluge is itself one of the traditional – and now largely obsolete – realms 
of society in which autonomous human agency could realize itself. “DIE WIRKLICHKEIT 
[WANDERT] AUS DEM SYSTEM DER POLITIK [AUS]” (BB 324). Where Kluge does 
not posit this process as one of complete de-humanization and automatization – a system 
running on auto-pilot, a “RIESENMASCHINE GESELLSCHAFT, die das Schicksal wie 
ein Monster zuteilte” (TT 457) – he frequently emphasizes the sovereign or largely 
autonomous functioning of an ever more powerful economic system. In a story significantly 
titled “Skizze für einen Nachruf auf den Nationalstaat,” Kluge – referencing Jürgen 
Habermas – states that “[Märkte] besitzen FAKTISCHE SANKTIONSGEWALT. Der 
Absturz der Kurse sanktioniert schärfer, als ein Territorialstaat es vermag” (BB 265). 
“Internet und die Börse akkumulieren Informationen rascher als jede politische Institution. 
Es muß aber doch das, was geschieht,” he summarizes the philosopher’s position, “durch 
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Personen vermittelt sein, die nicht wie an der Börse Anhängsel des Geschehens sind” (266). 
For Habermas – one of the most prominent champions of the project of modernity – this is, 
crucially, a “Frage der Souveränität” (266). Wenn Kluge speaks of 
“SANKTIONSGEWALT” (265) or the “Ohnmacht der Politik gegenüber wie 
Territorialstaaten auftretenden Konzernen und Börsen” (324), he also hints at the systemic 
violence intrinsic to this dramatic shift of paradigm. A “Soziologe und Systemforscher in 
China” (TT 17) in a story of that title diagnoses a “Verzerrung der Gesichter”: “Das Gesicht 
‘hängt’, weil es nicht von seinem Ausdruck abhängt, daß die Gesellschaft funktioniert. Sie 
bewegt sich in Shanghai auf Grund eines VORRANGS DES OBJEKTIVEN” (19). In the 
story “Ein Schadensfall im Tschad,” which revolves around the issues of oil production, 
debts, and credits, the members of an anonymous “Organisation” are labeled a 
“Schlägertruppe der Gläubigerbanken” (134). “[Wir sahen], daß zwar die Zukunft des 
Tschad zerstörbar wäre,” a bank executive says, “nicht aber die unseres Hauses” (136). 
 
“The globe is on our computers,” Gayatri Spivak famously argued in her Imperatives to Re-
Imagine the Planet: 
  Globalization is achieved by the imposition of the same system of exchange  
  everywhere. It is not too fanciful to say that, in the gridwork of electronic  
  capital, we achieve something that resembles that abstract ball covered in  
  latitudes and longitudes, cut by virtual lines – once the equator and the  
  tropics, now drawn increasingly by other requirements – of Geographical  
  Information Systems. The globe is on our computers. No one lives there;  
  and we think that we can aim to control globality. (Spivak, Imperatives 44) 
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It is precisely this exact circumscription of the globe that is at the heart of what I have 
described above as a process of contraction, or as a reduction of the world to the globe. In 
Chronik der Gefühle, Kluge too not only speaks of the production of “ein genaues Bild einer 
gedachten Erdgestalt” but also mentions the figure of “das sog. Geoid”: “Geoid = 
computerisiertes Abbild der Erde” (CG I 884). “Umrunden nicht die Kapitalien der 
Pensionskassen und Großinvestoren den Erdball?” (TT 16), it is suggested in Tür an Tür mit 
einem anderen Leben. And in one of the stories in the chapter “Das moderne Raubtier,” 
someone argues that “[die Großbanken] haben alle übrigen Märkte in der Welt auf eine 
bestimmte Weise eingerichtet. Wenn sie jetzt einige Landschaften der Welt auslassen, so 
passen diese nicht mehr in die Einrichtung der Welt” (136).  
 What both Spivak’s notion of the globe “on our computers” and the various 
manifestations of globality in Kluge’s stories hint at, then, is precisely a specific kind of 
“Einrichtung der Welt”: a dramatic systemic de-limitation of the world that imposes a 
unified framework on the entire globe as one. Though Kluge, as I will argue in this chapter, 
radically opposes this kind of figuration of the globe, he clearly interrogates what Urs Stäheli 
has called a “Faszination durch die Undekonstruierbarkeit und die Singularität des Globalen” 
(quoted in Bergermann 20) – the notion, as Ulrike Bergermann writes in an essay “Vom 
Denken und Abbilden des ganzen Globus,” of “‘das Globale’ als [ein] Letzthorizont […], 
der nicht weiter beobachtbar sei und über kein Außen zu verfügen scheine” (Bergermann 
20). As a regime of absolute spatialization, this formation of globality, to begin with, draws a 
systemic horizon that cannot be transcended. At the same time, it liquidates any sense of 
differentiated temporalities and along with it, ultimately, the notion of history itself. 8 
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 Perhaps the most prominent example of this kind of spatiotemporal imaginary of 
globalization can be found in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s concept of Empire: “The 
concept of Empire,” Hardt and Negri argue,  
  is characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries: Empire’s rule has no  
  limits. First and foremost, then, the concept of Empire posits a regime that  
  effectively encompasses the spatial totality […]. No territorial boundaries   
  limit its reign. Second, the concept of Empire presents itself not as a   
  historical regime […], but rather as an order that effectively suspends history  
  and thereby fixes the entire state of affairs for eternity. […] In other words,  
  Empire presents its rule not as a transitory moment in the movement of  
  history, but as a regime with no temporal boundaries and in this sense  
  outside of history or at the end of history. (Empire xivf., my emphases) 
I do not argue here – and this is an important distinction – that Kluge subscribes to such 
conceptualizations of the nature of globalization.9 His fiction, however, clearly engages with 
them and identifies the historical, political and social effects of their increasing discursive 
potency as a threat that needs to be confronted – on a political as much as on a poetic level. 
 
I have suggested above that Kluge’s globalization narratives are concerned with a dramatic 
narrowing of the conditions of possibility for transformative political praxis. What they 
negotiate, ultimately, is a profound crisis in the historical imagination of alternative futures 
for a globalized modernity. The notion of an alleged “end of history” – in its properly 
Fukuyaman inflection – is instructive in this context: It is in Fukuyama’s reading of 
Alexandre Kojève’s Hegelian concept of a “universal and homogeneous state” that one finds 
one of the clearest co-articulations of the discourses of the end of history on the one hand 
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and the successive globalization of liberal democracy and a capitalist economy on the other;10 
and it is precisely the nearly unchallenged hegemony of such a neoliberal figuration of 
globalization11 that is at the core of the mantra of much contemporary political discourse: 
that “there is no alternative.”12 For Fukuyama, in the universal homogeneous state “all prior 
contradictions are resolved” and there is “no struggle or conflict over ‘large’ issues” (“End 
of History?” 5). “Within that framework, of course, many things could be improved,” 
Fukuyama argues (End of History 46, my emphasis),  – but there is no outside of that 
framework, no transcendable horizon.13 
 It is precisely this particular figuration, or ideological fixation, of the condition of 
globality as a “universal and homogeneous state,” as an untranscendable horizon, that is 
most pertinent to my discussion of Kluge’s work too. What Kluge seeks to challenge in his 
fiction is a cancelling-out of historicity, a neutralization of the quintessentially political 
aspiration to transform. His work, in this sense, can also be seen in the context of recent 
discussions in the fields of political theory and political philosophy about a “post-
democratic” or “post-political” condition.14 Technocrats and lobbyists, indicatively – 
something like the poster boys of post-politics – are ubiquitous figures in Kluge’s 
globalization narratives. In one story from the eighth chapter of Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt, 
set at the Munich Security Conference, an “Arbeitszeitmesser” describes the activities of the 
conference participants in the following terms: “Es ist eine konkrete Intelligenzarbeit, die 
hier stattfindet, die sich auf Anschluß, Vernetzung, Konsens spezialisiert hat und den 
traditionellen Prozeß der Kritik (Unterscheidungsvermögen, Selbstvergewisserung, 
Kontrolle) an keinem Punkt der Veranstaltung vorsieht” (LT 520). The result of the 
“Unterscheidung: wieviel Intelligenz wird als Dienstleistung und Moderation 
(Verkaufsgespräch, Lobby, Begrüßung, Verteidigung einer Rangordung) verausgabt, und 
 
! 187 
wieviel besteht aus Kritik” (516) is, accordingly, very clear. “Mein Ergebnis,” the 
Arbeitszeitmesser states: “92% aufgewendet als Dienstleistung und Moderation!” (516). In 
another story, also set at the Munich Security Conference, the proportions are even worse: 
“Arbeitszeitmesser Becker zählte diesen Dialog zu dem Anteil von 0,8 Prozent KRITIK 
gegenüber dem Anteil von 99,2 Prozent der INTELLIGENZ ALS DIENSTLEISTUNG” 
(619). What one witnesses here is the consensual liquidation of all politics proper: an 
unquestioning acceptance of the terms of debate set by the status quo and a complete 
disavowal of any ambition to change the parameters of what is, politically speaking, possible. 
“Nicht einmal in den Pausen oder auf den Pissoirs ein Funken von kreativer Suche nach 
Auswegen. Eine Lähmung hatte alle Verhandler erfaßt” (TT 139). 
 
BEYOND THE GLOBE: THE POSSIBLE, THE IMPOSSIBLE, AND THE PLANET 
 
Kluge’s project then, I want to suggest here, is fundamentally about an expansion of the 
category of the possible under the condition of globality. How is one to conceive of a form 
of praxis that transcends the horizon of a “universal and homogenous state,” of an “abstract 
ball” that has turned into the emblem of a self-regulating and dehumanized systemic logic? 
How can one counter this paradoxical shrinking of a world that has become 
incommensurate with human – individual and collective – self-determination? How indeed, 
in Slavoj Zizek’s poignant formulation, “are we to reinvent the political space in today’s conditions of 
globalization” (Zizek, Ticklish Subject 266)? 
 Kluge, to begin with, is unequivocal, in both his theoretical and his literary work, in 
his rejection of the notion that politics is a mere art of the possible. Already in Maßverhältnisse 
des Politischen, co-authored with Oskar Negt and published in the early 1990s, the guiding 
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question “Was ist am politischen Handeln politisch?” (MP 15) leads Kluge to a critical assessment 
of “Politik als Kunst des Möglichen” (15), of politicians as “Künstler des Möglichen” (17), and 
of the closely related concept of “Realpolitik” (17). For Kluge, thereby, a restrictive 
conception of what constitutes the possible and what is real – a “Betonwelt der Realität” (15) – 
always runs counter to the constitutively modern imperative of human self-determination. 
  Dort, wo sich Gemeinwesen andeutet, wo die Menschen anfangen, sich  
  selber nach ihren Lebensinteressen zu organisieren, ist diese Realpolitik  
  nämlich damit beschäftigt, in solche Prozesse zu intervenieren, sie   
  abzubrechen, was heißt: bessere Möglichlichkeiten der Organisation des  
  Gemeinwesens zu verhindern. Realpolitik hat gegenüber Interessen, die am  
  Gemeinwesen orientiert waren und sich selber als politisch verstanden, stets  
  den abwertenden Gesichtspunkt des bloß Utopischen geltend gemacht und  
  so zur Mystifizierung der Realitätsmacht des Gegebenen beigetragen. (17) 
This critique of realpolitik, I would argue, combined with an attempt at the reconfiguration of 
a properly political space, places Kluge squarely into the theoretical environment of a 
broader contemporary Left that seeks to redefine the conditions of possibility for 
transformative praxis in the age of globalization. This includes, of course, the work of 
Habermas, with whom Kluge feels a self-professed kinship15, or of Ulrich Beck, who 
according to Thomas Bedorf “reserviert den Begriff des Politischen […] für die reflexiven, d. 
h. regelverändernden Neuerungen politischer Ordungen” (Bedorf 19). I would however 
want – somewhat counter-intuitively perhaps – to move Kluge more closely in the vicinity of 
thinkers for whom the re-appropriation of the political impulse proper is predicated on a 
strongly anti-consensual model of the political.16 This line of thought – sometimes described 
as a “post-foundational” political philosophy17 and often identified with the concept of 
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“radical democracy” – comprises a heterogeneous group of thinkers that includes a number 
of more militantly anti-liberal figures like Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek but also – and more 
pertinent to Kluge – theorists such as Jacques Rancière, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, 
and Claude Lefort. It is interesting, thereby – on a still rather general level – to what extent 
Kluge’s characterizations of the limits of politics coincide with the formulations of many of 
his more exclusively theoretical interlocutors. While Kluge and Negt, for instance, define 
politics as “das, was Berufspolitiker machen” (MP 42) and point to a transformation of “das 
emphatisch Politische in einen Verwaltungszweig” (44), Rancière deplores the role of the 
“administrators of the possible” (Disagreement 127) in the consensus system, or, as Laclau and 
Mouffe write, amid a “sacralization of consensus” (Laclau and Mouffe xv). Zizek, in turn, 
juxtaposes the “political act (intervention) proper” (Ticklish Subject 237) with the mere 
“administration of social matters” (236). The “administrativ-industrielle Wirklichkeitsblock” 
(MP 288) of Kluge and Negt is echoed in Rancière’s “system of belief peculiar to the 
consensus system: realism” (Disagreement 132). “Realism,” Rancière argues, “is the absorption 
of all reality […] in the category of the only thing possible” (132). Laclau and Mouffe call 
this the constant rehearsal of “the ‘no alternative dogma’” (Laclau and Mouffe xvi). And 
where Rancière evokes “the ‘almost nothing’ of a possible” (Disagreement 113) and the 
“monotonous reiteration of the impossibility of the impossible” (133), Zizek significantly 
postulates an “art of the impossible” that changes “the very parameters of what is considered 
‘possible’” (Ticklish Subject 237). One of Kluge’s stories – including a subsection titled 
“Prolegomena zur Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen” (LT 619) – neatly reiterates this sentiment: 
“Wenn es hart auf hart kommt, braucht Politik das Unmögliche” (613).18 
 What is at stake here is a transcendental inquiry about the conditions of possibility 
for a transformative politics in the age of globalization. It is precisely in this context, I want 
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to argue, that one must analyze Kluge’s supplementation of a global imaginary – in the forms 
I have outlined above – with a thinking of the planet. Planetarity in Kluge’s later fiction, I 
contend, is a poetic strategy for a performative reconfiguration of a given framework: 
humanity’s epistemological estrangement, in the properly Brechtian sense of the term, from 
the ontology of globality. “Mit Welt bezeichnen Sie unsere kleine Erde?” (TT 32), Kluge 
writes. The earth and its inhabitants are to be wrested away from the exigencies of global 
thought in order to be re-imagined as planetary. “In this era of breakneck globalization,” as 
Spivak writes, “I propose the planet to overwrite the globe” (Spivak 44). 
 This notion of “overwriting” the globe is crucial. Wolfgang Reichmann has correctly 
identified a “kontinuierliche Ausdehnung der räumlichen und zeitlichen Perspektiven in 
Kluges Erzählkosmos seit der Jahrtausendwende” (Reichmann 110). This formulation neatly 
captures a trajectory of Kluge’s work that leads from the early Lebensläufe (1962) – set 
predominantly in the Federal Republic of the immediate post-war era – to the “[Zeiträume], 
die länger dauern als ein Lebenslauf” (CG II 923) in Chronik der Gefühle (2000) and after.19 It 
does not, however, do justice to the importance of the very term of Zeitraum – to the 
intricate connection, that is, and the inextricable formal articulation of spatial and temporal 
parameters in Kluge’s stories. The concept of a transformation of chronotopes – which I 
have proposed in the introduction to this dissertation – might accordingly serve better here. 
What the notion of a chronotope encompasses, above all, is the fact that Reichmann’s 
“Ausdehnung der räumlichen und zeitlichen Perspektiven” manifests itself in profoundly 
different ways in Kluge’s fiction, that how precisely time and space are articulated in specific 
instances is linked to different meanings and valences of such an expansion. And so the 
chronotopic maximalism of Kluge’s frame of narration can take the form both of a precise 
circumscription of the entire globe as one – what I have called above a paradoxical shrinking 
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or the reduction of the world to the globe – and of the rather more radical expansiveness, as 
I will show in the following, of a planetary re-imagining. As a total effect of Kluge’s narrative 
universe, I argue, this maximalism functions both as a formal sedimentation of and as a 
counter-hegemonic practice against the social-historical formation that comes by the label of 
neoliberal globality. This also explains the significance of Spivak’s proposition: To say that 
the planet ought to “overwrite the globe” shows that globe and planet cannot be strictly 
separated, that there is no simple dualism between the two, that globality and planetarity 
ultimately both refer back to and negotiate the very same question of how we want to 
imagine – and shape – the process of globalization.20 
 
The word planet is etymologically linked to the Ancient Greek noun plané – a wandering, or 
roaming – and it is indeed in this original sense of the word too that Kluge’s narratives could 
be described as planetary. Imbued with an exuberant spatio-temporality, they freely traverse 
the entire universe – and beyond – in time and space, from its cosmological origins to a 
remote future, and from the tiniest of particles to the most distant of foreign galaxies. 
Though this kind of planetarity can also be found in the more recent parts of Chronik der 
Gefühle, it is at its most pronounced in Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt and in Tür an Tür mit einem 
anderen Leben. Similar to what I have called Kluge’s globalization narratives in “Was heißt 
Macht? / Wem kann man trauen?” planetary stories often appear in more concentrated form 
in specific chapters. These include, for instance, “Geschichten vom Weltall / Primäre 
Unruhe / Wohin fliehen?” – the fifth chapter of Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt – or the last 
chapter of Tür an Tür mit einem anderen Leben, titled “Inseln auf Leben und Tod.” Significantly, 
planetary and global narratives are frequently placed in immediate proximity of each other by 
Kluge, as for instance when the “globality” sub-section “Land der Verheißung / Festung 
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Europa” is followed directly by the planetary “Die blaue Gefahr” in the last chapter of Die 
Lücke, die der Teufel läßt, “Wach sind nur die Geister;” or indeed when planetarity and 
globality both appear in the same chapter, as in “Wir Glückskinder der Ersten 
Globalisierung” or “Das moderne Raubtier” in Tür and Tür mit einem anderen Leben. 
 There are too many instances of planetarity in these stories to list them all 
individually here, but it is precisely this density – and Kluge’s joyful embrace of the spatial 
and temporal extremes of a planetary imaginary – that is at the heart of a kind of chronotopic 
extravaganza that animates large parts of Kluge’s later fiction. In Chronik der Gefühle, an 
“Äonen-Chronik des Mönchs Andrej Bitow” begins “20 Milliarden Jahre v. Chr.” (CG II 
952).21 In Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt, the reader is projected “hinaus in eine Ferne von 80000 
Lichtjahren vom galaktischen Zentrum” (LT 332). Kluge’s chronotopes span periods of “67 
Millionen Jahre” (LT 345), the “ersten 600 Milionen [Jahre] der Existenz unseres Planeten” 
(362), “kaum mehr als 10 Millionen [Jahre],” “1,8 Milliarden Jahre” (362), continents “vor 
4,3 Milliarden Jahren,” molecules with an “Alter von 4,1 Milliarden Jahren” (885), 
“Geobiologie ab 500 Millionen Jahren v. Chr.” (TT 29), “630 Millionen Jahre,” “zwei 
Milliarden Jahre” (347), “11 Milliarden Jahre,” “14 Milliarden Jahre” (CG II 952), indeed: 
“Jahrmilliarden” (TT 347) and a “BALLETT DER ÄONEN” (CG II 1007); they extend 
into “ein Gebiet außerhalb des Menschengeschlechts” (LT 905), to a “Perlenkette immer 
entfernterer Galaxien” (CG I 867), to the “[zweiter] Stern des Sternenbilds Lyrae” (LT 329), 
the “Stern Gliese 229, achtzehn Lichtjahre entfernt im Sternenbild Hase” (330) and its 
“Begleitstern vom Typ ‘brauner Zwerg,’ Gliese 229B” – “Die Entfernung zwischen den 
beiden Sternen: 6,5 Milliarden Kilometer” (330). The reader of Kluge’s stories is transported 
to the “Bauch unserer Milchstraße […] [etwa] 5 000 Lichtjahre vom galaktischen Zentrum 
entfernt” (332), into a distance of “490 Lichtjahren” (333), to the “Zentrum des 
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Rosettennebels […] im Westen des Universums” (335), the “Stern HD 47129 im Sternenbild 
Einhorn” (336), the “Zentralregion einer Spiralgalaxie” (340), the “Galaxienhaufen Abell 
2218 im 2 Milliarden Lichtjahre entfernten Sternebild Drache” (361) and the “Gegend der 
Oortschen Wolke […], weitab von der Sonne und den äußersten Planeten (TT 378); he 
follows a “Sternenwind” (LT 319), a “TANZ DER GESTIRNE” (333), a “Jet, der eine 
Länge von sechzehn Lichtjahren aufwies” (334), “expandierende Schockwellen im 
interstellaren Medium” (340), an “interstellare Wolke […] mit 6000 Lichtjahren 
Durchmesser” (352), a “ZEITSTROM VON MILLIONEN JAHREN” (TT 9), the “Gewalt 
rasanter Galaxien” (347) and the “Kreisbewegung der Spiralarme um das Zentrum der 
Milchstraße” (350) until, ultimately, he reaches Teilhard de Chardin’s Omega Point, the “Ort 
oder die Zeit, zu dem sich das Universum letztlich ausdehnt” (LT 352), or even a “[zweites] 
Universum” (TT 31). The scale and material dimensions of all this are truly stupendous: 
Kluge speaks of a “gewaltigen Materienstrom” (LT 330), of a “galaktische Hauptscheibe, 
rund 2 000 Lichtjahre dick, welche die Mehrzahl der Sterne der Galaxis enthält und sich über 
die Umlaufbahn der Sonne hinaus erstreckt” (332); of “etwa den fünfhundertfachen 
Sonnendurchmesser” (333), a weight of “55 Sonnenmassen” (336), “[zwanzig] Millionen 
Sonnenmassen” (352) or “50 Billionen Sonnenmassen” (361), of “[eine] Milliarde Kilometer 
Durchmesser” (356) and a “[schwarzes] Loch von 3000 Millionen Sonnenmassen” (TT 353).  
 Though mostly preoccupied with the inconceivably large, Kluge is also attuned to 
the infinitesimally small, as when he writes about “Planetenbewohner (bis zu den Mikroben 
hin)” (CG I 485), about “Elementarteilchen” (LT 105), “eine Periode von 
5,757451831072007 Millisekunden” (338), “die 22. Aminosäure” and the “archae-bacterium” 
(364), about “die Welt der Nanosphären” (TT 34) or “Planckzeit”22 (TT 32). In one story, he 
juxtaposes a timeframe of “3,4 Milliarden Jahre” (LT 346) with the size of “zwei Zellkerne 
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der Wimperntierchen” (347); in another, he describes the work of a scientist who “entwarf 
[…] Gleichungen, die das UNENDLICH KLEINE und ZEITLICH KURZE mit dem 
KOSMISCH GROSSEN […] in Verbindung brachten” (TT 34). And often, importantly, he 
moves beyond any kind of intelligible measure, to “Wesenheiten, die die Welt nicht kennt” 
(CG II 1007), to a “Materie, die auf der Erde unbekannt ist […], die auch im Kosmos bisher 
nicht festgestellt wurde” (TT 377), to a “Denken, das von anderen Sternen stammt” (CG I 
415), emanating from an “ALTERNATIVE INTELLIGENZ” (LT 366), from “Besucher 
von einem fremden Stern” (863) or the ubiquitous “Außerirdischen” (see, for instance, CG I 
485; LT 366; TT 30; 114). 
 The notion of a “Denken, das von anderen Sternen stammt” and the presence of 
extraterrestrials are key aspects of planetarity: they function, I would argue, as disturbants, as 
figures of difference from an established order of perception. They are, indeed, signifiers of 
what I have called above humanity’s epistemological estrangement from the globe.23 To 
“overwrite” the globe with the planet, then, means to disrupt – through a properly Brechtian 
Verfremdungseffekt – the naturalization of the chronotopic measures of globality and thus to 
hint at the profoundly contingent nature of their emergence. Kluge time and again produces 
this effect through what one could call a layering of global and planetary dimensions: a 
montage of the radically incommensurate temporal and spatial parameters of the globe and 
planet. This effect can be observed on different levels in Kluge’s fiction, from the formal co-
arrangement of larger blocs or sections of global and planetary narratives to little turns of 
phrase like “jetzt, d.h. vor 260 Millionen Jahren” (TT 540) or “[nur] wenige Millionen Jahre 
später, also geologisch ‘bald darauf’ oder ‘plötzlich’” (30). In the caption to an image of the 
Indian subcontinent, Kluge writes, 
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  Von Süd nach Nord drückt seit 200 000 Jahren, also als geologisch junges Ereignis, 
  der Carlsberg-Rücken, im Meer verborgen, auf den Murray-Rücken, und  
  dieser Druck schiebt Hindukusch, Pamir und Karakorum in die Höhe.  
  Dagegen […] drücken moslemische Reiche seit knapp 500 Jahren, eine historisch 
  alte Formation, auf den Westen Indiens. (CG I 467, my emphases) 
Entities like “Indischer Staat” and “Pakistanischer Staat” – both in inverted commas in the 
text – in light of this planetary re-scaling appear as “Phantasiegebilde” (469).  
 Perhaps the clearest example of this kind of estrangement effect can be found in a 
story from the section “Geschichten vom Weltall / Primäre Unruhe / Wohin fliehen?” in 
Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt. The story, appropriately titled “Das neue Denken der Bush-
Administration und die Geophysik,” deals with the work of “23 Extrempolitikern, die in der 
Bush-Administration als Jugendgruppe den Ton angaben” on the one hand and a “Crew von 
Geophysikern” (LT 374) on the other. As such, it constantly oscillates between the political 
management of America’s role as a global superpower and planetary, or indeed cosmological, 
concerns. “Die jungen Theoretiker im Weißen Haus,” Kluge writes,  
  faszinierte an der Arbeit ihrer geophysikalischen Kollegen die ZEITSKALA,  
  in der Prozesse von 900 000 Jahren oder 40 Millionen Jahren als   
  JETZTZEIT galten, während doch eine Entscheidung über Krieg und  
  Frieden im Morgenland, schon wegen der Wetterrücksichten, nur Wochen  
  oder Monate für den Entscheidungsprozeß übrigläßt (374).  
The young politicians – a “Nachwuchs […], der die Architektur des Globus neu ins Auge 
faßt” – are concerned with the constitution of the “politische Weltkarte” under American 
premises. But what they experience is, “daß die Erdgeschichte die Tagespolitik kritisiert”: 
“Geophysik und aktuelle Politik, in der Zeitskala, das weiß jeder, können niemals 
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aufeinanderpassen” (376). This radical incommensurability, however, proves highly 
instructive: it is precisely the disruptive logic of the planetary, Kluge’s story ultimately 
suggests, that may lead to the recognition of potentially new historical perspectives, to 
insight into alternatives avenues of political praxis: “Unter dem Eindruck der 
KOLOSSALGESCHICHTE DES AMAZONAS,” for instance, “hätte es sein können […], 
daß sich Positionen zwischen US-Politik und Gesprächspartnern aus dem Nahen Osten 
verschoben hätten. Nichts,” the story concludes, “ist instruktiver als ein Durcheinander der 
Zeitskalen” (379). 
 This sentence – it also appears in identical form as a kind of motto in the preface to 
“Geschichten vom Weltall / Primäre Unruhe / Wohin fliehen?” (LT 319) – hints at why I 
have insisted on the chronotopic nature of a planetary re-imagining here. Not only, that is, 
does the planetary far exceed the global in space; it also produces measures of time that very 
much lie outside the uniformity of an all-encompassing “Weltzeit” (CG I 483).24 And it is 
indeed in a widely expanded concept of temporality that Kluge above all seems to locate the 
possibility of alternative ways of perception and different avenues of praxis. To keep time in 
place, as I have suggested in the title of this dissertation, for Kluge means to insist on the 
diversity and multiplicity of a variety of different times – against the uniformity of the time of 
globality, whether that manifests itself as an impossibly breite Gegenwart, as 
Gegenwartsschrumpfung, as an instantaneity without history or as a wholesale liquidation of 
temporality as such. “Wegnahme der Zeit […] erzeugt Lähmung” (PR 50), Kluge argued in a 
speech on the occasion of the Ricarda-Huch-Preis in 1996. “Zeitreserve,” he writes in 
Maßverhältnisse des Politischen, “ist das wichtigste Maßverhältnis des Politischen” (MP 22).  
 What is crucial about Kluge’s planetary time is not simply that its measures are 
longer than those of global time but that it is infinitely more variegated than the uniform 
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time in which, as Joseph Vogl says, “der Globus eingewickelt ist” (Kluge and Vogl 268). 
Kluge speaks of “‘Luxurierende Kausalität’ […] [in] Ausdehnung von 4000 Jahren” (TT 
247), of a “Zeitfaden von tausend Jahren” (305), and he warns that “[nichts] ist gefährlicher 
als zerrissener Zusammenhang” (305) amid such long measures of time. Throughout his 
work, he identifies time with possibility and potentiality, while a lack of time – recalling 
Koselleck’s dictum that Krise ist Zeitnot25 – is equivalent to the shrinking of options and the 
paralysis of action.26 “Das Problem ist, daß politische Brems- und Umlenkungswege 
extremen Aufwand an Zeit brauchen,” Kluge argues in his “Totenrede für Peter Glotz” (BB 
269). The “Zeitvorteil der PLANETARISCHEN GESCHICHTE” (CG I 478), in this sense, 
is also a counter-measure against the radical acceleration of late modernity which I have 
discussed in the introduction to this dissertation.27 But Kluge also speaks of “drei Sorten von 
Zeit” (LT 325), of an “Eigenzeit der Inselbewohner” (CG I 971), of the fact that “[wir] leben 
‘eingerollt’ im AUGENBLICK und zugleich im ZEITSTROM VON MILLIONEN 
JAHREN. Im selben Körper und Geist koexistieren kurze und lange Zeiten” (TT 9). And, 
crucially, there are once again the indomitable extraterrestrials: In a story titled “Weltzeit,” it 
is, significantly, “Operationen an Außerirdischen,” on “fremden Wesen im neutralen Milieu 
des Outerspace” that unveil the immensity of the nature of time. “Wir fanden,” a Russian 
neuroscientist explains, 
  eine der unseren völlig verschiedene Zeitstruktur, niedergelegt in den  
  Körpern. Das meiste ist unübersetzbar. Wir Planetenbewohner (bis zu den  
  Mikroben hin) kennen acht elementare Zeiten, von denen sieben Leben  
  gestatten. Aus diesen elementaren Zeiten können auf Erden sechs Milliarden  
  Zeitarten entstehen, von Moment bis Äon. […] Ganz anders die Körper der  
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  Außerirdischen. Sie besaßen 23 elementare Zeitstrukturen, eine Primzahl.  
  (CG I 485) 
It is following this statement – and here once again the nexus of planetarity and possibility 
becomes very obvious – that the scientist speculates about “die Chance, […] IN EINE 
NEUE ZEIT ZU SPRINGEN,” about the “Moment einer günstigen Zeitversetzung” and a 
“Geschichtssprung in eine andere Zeit” (485). 
 
All this, of course, is highly extravagant. But one should not assess the planetary through the 
prism of a misleading literalism. For Kluge, I contend, the planet does not represent a 
realistic prescription for a concrete alternative to the globe but a transcendental imperative: it 
is the figure for a sustained exercise in thinking differently.28 “Planetarity,” as Susan Stanford 
Friedman has suggested too, “is an epistemology, not an ontology” (Friedman 494).29 In the 
preface to the volume Das Planetarische: Kultur – Technik – Medien im postglobalen Zeitalter, the 
editors write, significantly, that “Figuren des Planetarischen erweisen sich immer auch als 
Möglichkeiten der Kritik, die das weltumspannende Netz aus Kultur, Technik und Medien 
reflektieren und in Frage stellen” (Bergermann et al. 15). “[Mit] dem Planetarischen [stehen] 
die Grenzen der Globalisierung und die unbeschränkte Verfügbarkeit des Globus immer 
schon in Frage” (9). And indeed: Kluge’s planetary thinking measures the historical terrain in 
its chronotopic parameters in a way that radically departs from viewing the “abstract ball” of 
the globe, and thus casts an estranging glance on the model of history instantiated by what I 
have described above as neoliberal globality. As a result, planetarity in Kluge’s work emerges 
as the name for a chronotopic regime that transcends the fully immanent logic of the 
“System Globus” (LT 376). It encapsulates, that is, a multiplicity of spaces and times that 
cannot be reduced to the one time and the one space of globality. In its cumulative impact, 
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importantly, the planetary still functions as an articulated whole, but its spatiotemporal 
matrix is immeasurably wider and internally more differentiated than that of the globe. 
 This, precisely, also manifests itself in Kluge’s form of storytelling. In their entirety, 
gathered across several thousand pages, Kluge’s expansive micro-narratives constitute an 
exuberant narrative space – an “Erzählraum,” crucially, that also “besteht aus 
Zeitperspektiven,” as Kluge argues in the Frankfurter Poetikvorlesungen (TE, June 5). It is 
through this spatial and temporal exuberance that Kluge formally “overwrites the globe,” 
and it is in the spatial and temporal exuberance of Kluge’s narration that the readers are 
invited to seek, imaginatively, the gap of Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt, the door to the other life 
of Tür an Tür mit einem anderen Leben. What is at stake here is an exercise in what is perhaps 
the key category of Kluge’s conceptual apparatus: the faculty of Unterscheidungsvermögen.30 This 
capacity to differentiate is at the heart of any effort at identifying different orders of 
perception, new avenues of praxis, and therefore alternative histories: what Kluge, in short, 
calls Auswege.31 
 
(ANTI-)REALISM, CONTINGENCY, ARTICULATION: A DEMOCRATIC POETICS 
 
I have hinted before at a sort of conceptual extravaganza that animates Kluge’s planetary 
narratives. Planetarity indeed is a deeply ambitious, a highly un-realistic – one might even say: 
a positively impossible – endeavor, an “experience of the impossible,” as Spivak calls it 
(Spivak 56). But this, once again, is precisely the point: “Diesen Entmutigungen sollen wir 
Unglauben entgegensetzen” (TT 54). Planetarity is about altering the framework of 
possibility. As such, it depends on a profound imaginative investment, on a fundamental 
belief that historical realities ultimately, as Kluge writes in Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt, emerge 
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“aus den Vorstellungen […]. Aus WORTEN UND BESCHREIBUNGEN. Eine härtere 
Substanz als Beton. UNBEIRRBARE EINBILDUNG” (LT 526). 
 The belief that reality is a “geschichtliche Fiktion,” indeed a “reißerische Erfindung” 
(GS 215), has been a central tenet of Kluge’s thought since at least the 1970s. “Die schärfste 
Ideologie: daß die Realität sich auf ihren realistischen Charakter beruft” (215), Kluge argues 
in Gelegenheitsarbeit einer Sklavin, subtitled, importantly, Zur realistischen Methode. In his 
Frankfurter Poetikvorlesungen, held some forty years later, Kluge likewise speaks of a reality that 
“bläht sich auf als etwas Wirkliches,” of a “Wirklichkeit” that is “wirklich, aber zugleich eine 
grobe Erfindung” (TE, June 5). 
 Reality, then, for Kluge is not something stable, something that is rooted in a firm 
ground or ultimate foundation, but an imaginative construct planted onto a contingent 
terrain: something, indeed, that has its roots in a properly aesthetic configuration of the world. 
It is in this context, precisely, that the profound affinities between Kluge’s thought and that 
of a thinker like Rancière once again come to the fore. For Rancière, the political 
constitution of the world emerges out of a certain “aesthetics of politics”:  
  There is thus an ‘aesthetics’ at the core of politics […]. It is a delimitation of  
  spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that  
  simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of  
  experience. Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it,  
  around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties 
  of spaces and the possibilities of time. (Politics of Aesthetics 13, my emphases) 
Such an aesthetics of politics finds its sedimentation, according to Rancière, in a specific 
partage du sensible, or “distribution of the sensible”: 
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  A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time  
  something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment  
  of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of  
  activity that determines the very manner in which something in common lends  
  itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this  
  distribution. (12, my emphases) 
This, Rancière argues, is how politics and aesthetics become mutually imbricated. “Politics 
and art,” he writes – echoing Kluge’s notions of a “geschichtliche Fiktion,” a “Real-
Erfindung” (GS 215) and history’s “Real-Roman” (222) – “construct ‘fictions’, that is to say 
material rearrangements of signs and images, relationships between what is seen and what is 
said, between what is done and what can be done” (39).  
  It is here that we encounter the other question […], which concerns the  
  relationship between literarity and historicity. Political statements and literary  
  locutions produce effects in reality. […] They thereby take hold of unspecified  
  groups of people, they widen gaps, open up space for deviations, modify the speeds,  
  the trajectories, and the ways in which groups of people adhere to a condition, react to  
  situations, recognize their images. They reconfigure the map of the sensible  
  […]. (39, my emphases) 
An aesthetics of politics, then, can be countered by a politics of aesthetics.32 “Entweder erzählt die 
gesellschaftliche Geschichte ihren Real-Roman, ohne Rücksicht auf die Menschen,” Kluge 
writes, “oder aber Menschen erzählen ihre Gegengeschichte” (GS 222). “The politics of 
work of art plays itself out,” Rancière contends, “in the reconfiguration of worlds of 
experience based on which […] consensus and political dissensus are defined. It plays itself 
out in the way in which modes of narration or new forms of visibility established by artistic 
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practices enter into politics’ own field of aesthetic possibilities” (65). Kluge and Negt, 
strikingly, in almost identical terminology, point to a “vom Herrschaftssystem aufgeteilte 
soziale Raum, in dem vorgeschrieben ist, wo und wie sich Menschen zu bewegen haben und 
wann Tätigkeit dort verboten ist,” juxtaposing this with “Formen der wirklichen 
Besitzergreifung, der Umstrukturierung der Wahrnehmungen und des sinnlichen Betastens 
eines sozialen Raumes, der den Alltagserfahrungen der Menschen enteignet war” (MP 82). 
Like Rancière, they postulate an “Umstrukturierung des sozialen Raumes und der 
gesellschaftlichen Zeit” (84). “Erst wenn die Wahrnehmungen nicht mehr eingeengt sind 
[…], entsteht Spielraum” (86), “a shift,” in Rancière’s words, “in the playing field” 
(Disagreement 39). The substance of a political aesthetic, for Rancière as much as for Kluge, 
consists in a dis-sensual activity that disrupts a given order of perception. They speak of 
creating a “system of heterologies” (Politics of Aesthetics 64), a “Zwischenwelt des Streites und 
des Kampfes, der Enteignung und der Wiederaneignung” (MP 58) that breaks with the 
existing distribution of the sensible and, as Rancière writes, “establishes other networks of 
the sensible, which can possibly corroborate the action undertaken by political subjects to 
reconfigure what are given to be facts” (64). 
 Rancière’s dissensual acts of reconfiguration – a fundamentally imaginative and 
aesthetic procedure – are also at the core of Kluge’s own notions of an “antagonistischer 
Realismusbegriff” (TE, June 5 and 12; GS 187), an “Anti-Realismus des Gefühls” (TE, June 
5; FKDB 83; PR 22), an “antirealistische Haltung” (FKDB 9) or “Antirealismus des Motivs” 
(FKDB 9; GS 217). “Das Motiv für Realismus,” Kluge argues, “ist nie Bestätigung der 
Wirklichkeit, sondern Protest” (GS 216). Postulating a “Haltung gegen das, was an Unglück in 
den realen Verhältnissen ist,” a “Leugnung des reinen Realitätsprinzips” (FKDB 9), a 
“skeptischer Widerwille” (MP 15) and an “Unglauben gegenüber geschlossenen 
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Systemwelten” (PR 22), he maintains that there is an “Anti-Realismus des Gefühls, mit dem 
wir Menschen ausgestattet sind, das sich gegen die Wahrnehmung eines Verhängnisses 
zunächst wehrt” (PR 67).  
 It is, crucially, “[die] Phantasie” that functions as a “Fluchtwesen” (PR 67) in this 
context. Kluge insists on the key role of “Ausdrucksvermögen” (MP 32) and constantly 
emphasizes “diese wichtigste Kraft, das gesellschaftliche Vorstellungsvermögen” (GS 195) or 
– in its individual manifestation – the “Großmacht Subjektivität” (TE, June 12).33 One can, 
he says in the Frankfurter Poetikvorlesungen, a “Wirklichkeit, die es nicht gut mit einem meint 
[…] ein kleines bisschen illusionistisch abändern” (TE, June 5). “Diese starke 
Leugnungskraft im Menschen bewirkt auch das, was man einen Realitätsriß nennt” (FKDB 
83). “Die Welt,” he contends, “erscheint aussichtsreich. Und selbst für den Fall, in dem dies 
eine Illusion darstellt, ist es eine Illusion, die Aktivität in die Lebensläufe hineinbringt” (PR 
62). There is, accordingly, an immediate link between imagining and doing, between poiesis 
and praxis: “Poetik kommt von machen” (TE, June 26), and even “Alltagssprache” is 
“schöpferisch” (TE, June 12). In a story in Das Bohren harter Bretter, aptly titled “Politik der 
Wörter,” Kluge refers to words as “Lebewesen” and accords them – via a nod to Joyce’s 
Finnegan’s Wake – an elemental and insurrectional force: “Eines Tages im 20. Jahrhundert 
schritten [die Wörter] zur Revolte. In Finnegans Wake wurde eines dieser widerborstigen, 
aufständischen Wesen die Bezeichnung für die elementarsten Kräfte der Natur, die 
QUARKS” (BB 297). 
 This politics of the imagination does not only find expression throughout Kluge’s 
theoretical work. It also animates a large number of Kluge’s stories. One could argue, indeed, 
that what unites the hugely heterogeneous cast of characters in Kluge’s fiction is a quest to 
articulate and bring about, imaginatively, what one such character in Chronik der Gefühle calls 
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a “GEGEN-REALITÄT” (CG I 878). Here too, one reads about an “Ungläubigkeit 
gegenüber dem verbreiteten Unglauben ans Glück” (401), about “Glückserzwingung” and 
the search for “die Lücke in den Tatsachenhaufen” (400). In an epigraph, Kluge quotes 
Montaigne’s “Über die Macht der Phantasie” (506); the Russian neuroscientist who examines 
extraterrestrials speaks about “die Macht des dichterischen Wortes” (484); and at an 
international conference titled “Agenda 2040,” someone posits that “[aus] Ausdrücken 
werden Realitäten geboren” (TT 62). At the Munich Security Conference, a participant says 
that “[die] Menschheit arbeitet permanent an der Herstellung eines Wirklichkeitsbildes” (LT 
618). “Es geht um die Gegenrede zu einer ganz falschen Welt” (557).34 “Was möglich und 
was unmöglich ist,” thereby, “bestimmt die FORTGESETZTE POLITISCHE REDE” (TT 
281). “Wo die Realität unbrauchbar ist, muß man sich eine andere wählen” (221).35 “Was 
sollte daran unmöglich sein? – Daß niemand daran glaubt” (291). 
 
I want to return here briefly to the question of planetarity because I believe that my 
discussion of Ranciere and Kluge’s concepts of (anti-)realism will have brought into sharper 
relief what I mean when I speak of a “politics of planetarity” in Kluge’s later fiction. It is 
precisely in a heterological relationship that planet and globe stand in Kluge’s stories: the 
political aesthetics of planetarity disrupts and reconfigures the very distribution of the 
sensible that underlies the condition of globality. The planet then, once again, is not an 
“other” or alternative place, nor even a utopia, but a radical epistemological, aesthetic and 
political approach to, and critique of, a given world order: hence Spivak’s formulation of her 
proposal for the planet to “overwrite the globe,” for a position that has [a] particular (non)-
relationship to the global” (Spivak 44, my emphasis). Kluge, in his Adorno Prize speech from 
2009, speaks of a “Verdopplung der Realität” that brings with it both “die Einfühlung und 
 
! 205 
die Auswege” (PR 70). Rancière, in his “Ten Theses on Politics,” calls this a “manifestation 
of dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one” (Dissensus 37). The planetary indeed 
transforms what Rancière calls “the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Politics 
of Aesthetics 13), it “[widens] gaps, [opens] up space for deviations, [modifies] the speeds, the 
trajectories, and the ways in which groups of people adhere to a condition” (39); it aims – in 
Kluge’s words now – at an “Umstrukturierung des sozialen Raumes und der 
gesellschaftlichen Zeit” (MP 84) and thus brings into being, aesthetically, a new kind of 
“Spielraum” or “playing field.” It is on this chronotopically restructured – and, as I argue, 
infinitely more differentiated – playing field that one – writer and reader – can seek Auswege 
by exercising Unterscheidungsvermögen. “Tausend Unterschiede machen ist feinfühliger, als nur 
drei Unterschiede machen” (TT 552). Harro Müller has called this a “Schaffung von 
massenhaftem Unterscheidungsvermögen für glückliche Zusammenhangsherstellung, für das 
Finden von Auswegen” (Gegengifte 113). “[Im] Zusammenhang,” as Kluge has it, “gibt es 
immer einen Ausweg” (FKDB 13). Unterscheidungsvermögen, then, is a kind of historical 
sensorium, a capacity to bring into constellation different times and different spaces, what is 
continuous and what is discontinuous, what is identical and what is different, what is 
necessary and what is contingent in the historical process. Unterscheidungsvermögen produces 
what Kluge calls a “Geschichtsverhältnis” (FKDB 19), and thus allows one to try to identify 
the very gaps and openings – the Lücke – in the perceptual fabric of the world through 
which one can proceed to “alternative Handlungschancen” (LT 514), “unerwartete 
Auswege” (626) and “MÖGLICHKEITEN” (535). The planetary, in this sense, denotes the 
maximum point of extension of this kind of epistemological Spielraum: the radical counter-
model, that is, to the reduction of the world to the globe. 
 I insist here once again on the nature of planetarity as an epistemological project, or 
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as an inquiry into the conditions of possibility for transformative praxis, rather than as a concrete 
alternative to the globe. The planet is not a policy prescription. This is important for two 
reasons: Firstly – and I will expand on this below – a non-ontological conception of 
planetarity minimizes the threat of planetarity’s devolving into a kind of cosmological 
apoliticism. Secondly, as I will argue in the following, it is precisely this fundamental 
indeterminacy at the heart of Kluge’s narrative universe that makes his political aesthetic of 
planetarity a democratic political aesthetic for the age of globalization. This, incidentally, is also 
why I have refrained throughout this chapter from focusing on specific stories of Kluge’s in 
much detail. There is a tendency in Kluge scholarship to choose one or two among the 
thousands of narratives across a number of publications and to extrapolate from them a 
decisive meaning that is then posited as representative of Kluge’s project as a whole. It is, 
however, important to keep in play the indeterminacy, undecidability and contingency of 
Kluge’s forms of narration. 
 
I want to return, then, to the notion of contingent articulation that I have mentioned at the very 
beginning of this chapter. If, as Kluge says, reality emerges “aus den Vorstellungen” (LT 
526), or if, as Rancière argues, the constitution of the world is based on an “‘aesthetics’ at the 
core of politics” (Politics of Aesthetics 13), then any social order – even the most hegemonic – 
has its roots in an imaginative, or discursive, act of institution and therefore must at its 
innermost core be radically contingent. To speak of “Antirealismus,” accordingly, is both to 
acknowledge the non-fixity of the real and to point to the potential for instituting – or 
indeed: articulating – a new reality of its own. Any such act of articulation, however, must of 
course in turn be aware of its very own contingency.  
 It is precisely this logic of contingent articulation that is at the heart of the theory of a 
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“radical democratic politics” most closely associated with thinkers such as Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, and Claude Lefort.36 Perhaps the clearest exposition of this kind of thinking 
can still be found in Laclau and Mouffe’s original contribution to the debate about a “radical 
democracy,” Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. “Our 
approach,” they write, “is grounded in privileging the moment of political articulation, and the 
central category of political analysis is, in our view, hegemony” (Hegemony x).37 
  [One] can see hegemony as a theory of the decision taken in an undecidable  
  terrain. Deeper levels of contingency require hegemonic – that is, contingent  
  – articulations, which is another way of saying […] an act of political   
  institution that finds its source and motivation nowhere but in itself. 
  […] If social objectivity, through its internal laws, determined whatever  
  structural arrangement exists […], there would be no room for contingent  
  hegemonic rearticulations – nor, indeed, for politics as an autonomous  
  activity. […] [To] say contingent articulation is to enounce a central dimension of 
  ‘politics.’ (xif.) 
The logic of hegemony, then, is “a logic of articulation and contingency” (85). It is as a 
sedimentation of particular articulatory practices that a specific hegemonic order manifests 
itself. Stable as it may seem, however, a hegemonic order is itself only contingent and can 
therefore be undone, or rather: dis-articulated. “Indeed,” Laclau and Mouffe argue, and this 
takes me to the core of Kluge’s project too, 
  scrutinizing the so-called ‘globalized world’ through the category of   
  hegemony […] can help us to understand that the present conjuncture, far  
  from being the only natural or possible societal order, is the expression of a  
  certain configuration of power relations. It is the result of hegemonic moves  
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  on the part of specific social forces […]. This hegemony can be challenged.  
  (xvi) 
Like Kluge, Laclau and Mouffe denounce the “no alternative dogma” of contemporary 
political discourse, the “usual justification [of which] […] is globalization.” “This argument 
takes for granted the ideological terrain which has been created as a result of years of neo-
liberal hegemony, and transforms what is a conjectural state of affairs into a historical 
necessity” (xvi). One must oppose “the sacralization of consensus” (xv), the notion that any 
“deviation from neo-liberal orthodoxy” is impossible, that a world under the condition of 
neoliberal globality is “a fate to which we all have to submit” (xvi). “This is why we stress 
that it is vital for democratic politics to acknowledge that any form of consensus is the result 
of a hegemonic articulation, and that it always has an ‘outside’ that impedes its full 
realization” (xviii). 
 Laclau and Mouffe’s, then, is itself a cri de coeur against the “Betonwelt der Realität” 
(MP 15) of neoliberal globality. Here, too, we find a kind of Antirealismus des Motivs. And 
indeed, what Kluge calls “Vorstellungen […]. [WORTE] UND BESCHREIBUNGEN” (LT 
526) has its precise equivalent in Laclau and Mouffe’s emphasis on the key role of contingent 
forms of discourse. “This is the point,” they argue, “at which, for our analysis, a notion of 
the social conceived as a discursive space – that is, making possible relations of representation 
strictly unthinkable within a physicalist or naturalistic paradigm – becomes of paramount 
importance” (x). Echoing Kluge’s notion of a “härtere Substanz als Beton” (LT 526), Laclau 
and Mouffe foreground “the material character of every discursive structure” (108).38 
 “Every social practice,” for them, “is […] articulatory” (112). What is crucial, 
however, in this context is Laclau and Mouffe’s assertion that articulation is “a discursive 
practice which does not have a plane of constitution prior to, or outside, the dispersion of 
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the articulated elements” (109). Articulation “is a practice, and not the name of a given 
relational complex” (93). The conditions of emergence of articulatory practices, that is, are 
radically contingent; there is no ultimate foundation upon which an articulated whole is built. 
This takes Laclau and Mouffe to the heart of their argument about a radical democratic 
imaginary: What defines the democratic paradigm is both its lack of an ultimate foundation 
and the impossibility of its final closure. It cannot be “fixed in any transcendental signified” 
(137). There is a radical contingency, then, a “radical indeterminacy which democracy opens 
up” (188), and it is through this “heterogeneity,” through this “range of possibilities which 
are opened in the terrain of democracy” – “a true polysemia” (168) – that a “logic of 
contingency” (3) becomes wed to possibility, to alternatives or – in Kluge’s diction – to 
Auswege. “Politisch an Kontingenz,” as Oliver Marchart writes, “ist genau die Erfahrung, dass 
die Dinge auch anders liegen können, dass Gesellschaft auch anders geordnet sein kann” 
(Marchart 80). 
 Here, then, is the democratic imperative: “This moment of tension, of openness, 
which gives the social its essentially incomplete and precarious character, is what every 
project for radical democracy should set out to institutionalize” (190). Radical democracy is 
“a form of politics which is founded not upon dogmatic postulation of any ‘essence of the 
social’, but, on the contrary, on affirmation of the contingency and ambiguity of every 
‘essence’, and on the constitutive character of social division and antagonism […] – in other 
words, the field of the political as the space for a game which is never ‘zero-sum’” (193). It is 
through a process of unceasing contestation, through acts of articulation that are “constantly 
re-created and renegotiated” (188), through a “continuous redefinition of […] social and 
political spaces” (144) – in short: through contingent articulation – that a democratic ethos 
actualizes itself. It is in the productive excess of the contingent that the possibility of an 
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alternative order resides: 
  It is not the poverty of signifieds but, on the contrary, polysemy that   
  disarticulates a discursive structure. […] Society never manages to be   
  identical to itself, as every nodal point is constituted within an intertextuality  
  that overflows it. The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of  
  nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds 
  from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every  
  discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity. 
  Every social practice is therefore – in one of its dimensions – articulatory.  
  […] The social is articulation […]. (113f.) 
 
It is as a sedimentation of this kind of democratic paradigm that I propose to read the 
formal structure of Kluge’s fiction. The form of narration and the structural arrangement of 
Kluge’s stories, I would like to suggest here, produce a narrative domain in which meaning is 
neither prescribed in advance nor ever established in conclusive fashion: there is neither an 
ultimate foundation nor final closure. It is a free and open terrain that Kluge instantiates, a 
level playing field on which – in the terms of Claude Lefort – the locus of power and 
authority is an “empty space.”39 It is true, of course, as Thomas von Steinaecker has written, 
that  
  auch wenn man in den Texten vergeblich nach einer klassischen Haupt- oder 
  überhaupt einer Identifikationsfigur sucht, so findet man diese am ehesten  
  noch im hier sichtbar werdenden auktorialen Erzähler, der nicht nur   
  zwischen weit entfernten Räumen und Zeiten hin und her eilt und   
  Verbindungen herstellt, sondern in Fuß- und Endnoten auch auf andere  
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  Werke des Autors verweist (Steinaecker 35). 
And yet – Steinaecker too seems to concede this point – this form of narration does not 
steer the reader to anything like an ultimate or overall meaning, it does not leave one with a 
point made, with something to carry home.40 Instead, there is a motley crew of characters – 
from Enlightenment philosphers to ordinary citizens, from ancient emperors to modern 
tyrants, from American neocons to extraterrestrials – all of them vying for attention, trying 
through all kinds of activity to produce some form of social order, some form, often, even 
of hegemony41, forming alliances, associating and dis-associating themselves, antagonizing 
each other. It is an exuberant carnival of opinions, something like a beautiful cacophony of 
voices that one observes here: an untamable discursive excess.42 This is precisely why one 
must keep in view the cumulative effect of Kluge’s storytelling, rather than “interpreting” 
one or a number of specific stories: it is not the reader’s task to extract a particularized 
meaning from any individual narrative but to inscribe oneself and to participate, through 
one’s own critical praxis, in the frantic and dissensual activity that can be witnessed there.43 
To make once again the link between political theory and aesthetics: If, as Marchart writes 
about Lefort, the “Leere des Ortes der Macht muss institutionell anerkannt werden” and if 
“[das] demokratische Dispositiv muss ein institutionelles framework entwickeln, das 
Akzeptanz bezüglich der Grundlosigkeit des Sozialen garantiert” (Marchart 147), then 
Kluge’s narrative universe is the poetic enactment of such a framework without ultimate 
foundation.  
  Wenn Abwesenheit als solche sich nicht institutionieren lässt, muss ihre  
  diskursive Aktualisierung auf etwas anderes zielen: […] die Anerkennung der  
  Unmöglichkeit, Gesellschaft ein für alle Mal zu gründen. Es muss ein  
  symbolisches Rahmenwerk zu Verfügung gestellt werden, welches erlaubt,  
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  Befragung, Debatte und Konflikt als Instanzen zu akzeptieren, die   
  Demokratie zuallererst generieren. (Marchart 150) 
“Befragung, Debatte und Konflikt,” of course, are also key aspects of Kluge’s Antirealismus. 
And so, he argues in the Frankfurter Poetikvorlesungen, one must “den Antagonismus nicht 
kleben und kitten beim Erzählen” (TE, June 5). This also explains the radical heterogeneity 
of opinions in the dissensual struggle for political and social power with which so many of 
Kluge’s stories are concerned, the fact indeed that Kluge also stages characters who are far 
removed from his own system of beliefs: Nazi officers, ancient tyrants, Heidegger. Laclau 
and Mouffe speak of “a vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their articulation 
to opposite camps” (136). Articulation, they argue, “should take place through a 
confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices […] in a field criss-crossed by 
antagonisms” (135). “Und wenn,” Marchart adds in his reading of Lefort,  
  die Instituierung/Fundierung von Gesellschaft auf der symbolischen Ebene  
  vonstatten geht, dann wird sie notwendigerweise inszeniert werden müssen:  
  Das genau meint Lefort, wenn er von mise-en-scène spricht. Gesellschaft mag  
  in unterschiedlicher Weise auf die Bühne gebracht werden: […] Im Fall der  
  Demokratie wird, so könnte man sagen, ein Spiel mit offenem Ausgang auf  
  einer leeren Bühne inszeniert, und doch wurde das Theater der Macht noch  
  keineswegs geschlossen. (131) 
Kluge’s question about “die Zukunft des Dramatischen” in a story from Chronik der Gefühle – 
“Hat das neue Jahrhundert neue Dramaturgien?” (CG I 183) – hints at precisely this 
dynamic. 
 
I want to dwell here briefly on the more strictly formal aspects of what I have suggested to 
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call Kluge’s democratic poetics. If it is indeed the notion of contingent articulation that both 
an “aesthetics of politics” and a “politics of aesthetics” are predicated on, then the carrier of 
this procedure of contingent articulation in Kluge’s fiction is, of course, his particular use of 
montage. In his speech on the award of the Heinrich Böll Prize in 1993, Kluge said that, 
  Die Form der Montage gehört zum Bestand der Moderne. […] Der Sinn der  
  Anwendung der Montageform kann verschieden sein. […] [Ich habe] zum  
  Beispiel die Anfangsgründe der Montage an Sergei Eisensteins Arbeiten  
  erlernt. Eisenstein verwendet die Montage, um große rhetorische   
  Zusammenhänge herzustellen. Die Montage vertieft die Überredungskunst.  
  Das ist offensichtlich das Gegenteil von dem, was mich als Autor   
  lebenslänglich interessiert hat. Ich vertrete (gelegentlich auf Kosten der  
  leichteren Verständlichkeit) einen strikt anti-rhetorischen, nicht-  
  überredenden Standpunkt. Die einzelnen Phänomene, die sich beobachten  
  und beschreiben lassen, sollen gerade ihr Eigenleben behalten. Sie sind  
  primär und von sich aus nicht Instrument eines übergeordneten   
  Sinnzusammenhangs. (PR 25) 
I have spoken above of the complex and highly differentiated spatiotemporal matrix of 
Kluge’s stories as a whole, of their profoundly non-hierarchical arrangement in an exuberant 
framework of narration. Within a few pages or even paragraphs, Kluge’s sequence of micro-
narratives often encapsulates enormous temporal and spatial leaps, dramatic and utterly 
unpredictable shifts between historical periods, spheres of activity and thematic concerns. 
“Oft stehen sie in Nachbarschaft, Konstellation oder Gegensatz,” Kluge says, “in 
Abstoßung oder Anziehung zu etwas anderem. Aber es gibt auch Spannungsverhältnisse 
zwischen Einzelheiten, die gleichgültig gegenüber einem gemeinsamen Sinn bleiben, bloß 
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Parallelen bilden” (PR 25). Contingency, thus, and articulation – in its double meaning as 
both a lending-expression and a linking-together – are constitutively intertwined in Kluge’s 
concept of montage.44 
 In a highly illuminating essay titled “Die Realität ist nicht genug: Alexander Kluges 
praktische Theorie und theoretische Praxis der Montage,” Bernd Stiegler argues that 
“Montage bei Alexander Kluge […] ist ein ästhetisches, theoretisches und epistemologisches 
Prinzip. Sie ist eine Kunst der Analyse und Synthese, eine geschichts- und 
gesellschaftstheoretische Strategie” (Stiegler 52). Kluge, Stiegler explains, “konstruiert ein 
subtil montiertes Universum, das eigentlich eher die Bezeichnung Pluriversum tragen sollte, 
da Montage konsequent auf Fragmentierung und Pluralität setzt.” Echoing what I have said 
above about Kluge’s Antirealismus, Rancière’s notion of dissensus, or Laclau and Mouffe’s 
concept of dis-articulation, Stiegler speaks of Montage as a “Kunst der konstruktiven 
Zerstörung der Realität,” as an “ästhetisch-intellektueller Exorzismus des Realen.” It is an 
“ebenso subtile wie beharrliche Arbeit mit Bildern gegen Bilder, mit Einstellungen gegen 
Einstellungen, mit Wahrnehmungen gegen Wahrnehmungen” (52): a “[montierter] Abbau 
der vermeintlichen Normativität des Faktischen” (53). Underscoring my argument about the 
untranscendable one-ness of globality and its “overwriting” with the differentiated matrix of 
the planetary, Stiegler suggests that “Montage ist daher ein ästhetisches Realitätsprinzip, das 
den Anspruch der Realität zurückweist. Sie setzt auf Fragmentierung, auf ‘offene Räume.’” 
“Eine Bedrohung,” indeed, “stellt […] all das dar, was sich der Fragmentierung widersetzt, 
was monolithisch daherkommt oder erscheint, was Ganzheit beansprucht oder performativ 
inszeniert” (54). “Montage klopft auf die Sollbruchstellen im vermeintlich festgefügten 
Konstrukt der Realität” (57). Amid what Kluge calls the “Widerspruch zwischen dem 
Antirealismus der Gefühle und dem Realismus weltlicher Tatsachen” then, Stiegler 
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concludes, montage “bringt den Antirealismus der Gefühle ins Bild, ins Gehirn und in die 
ästhetische Welt” (54). 
 I have quoted Stiegler’s essay at some length here because it neatly underlines 
everything I have said so far about the problematic nature of globality, about planetarity as 
an epistemological project, about Kluge’s concept of (anti-)realism and the chiasmic 
relationship between an “aesthetics of politics” and a “politics of aesthetics,” about 
contingency, articulation, and a democratic poetics. But Stiegler’s essay – and my preceding 
discussion – also lead to a very important question that Stiegler does not address: If indeed 
Kluge’s democratic poetics is above all an “ästhetisches, theoretisches und epistemologisches 
Prinzip” (52), if it brings, as Stiegler says, “den Antirealismus der Gefühle ins Bild, ins 
Gehirn und in die ästhetische Welt” (54), then does it also bring it into “die Welt” proper? 
What, that is, are the practical limits of an antirealistische construction of the world, of the 
Brother Lumière’s ambivalent slogan Apporter le monde au monde! that Kluge invokes in his 
Geschichten vom Kino?45 How, in a period of radical systemic differentiation, can the aesthetic 
be made to operate not simply against the political and the economic spheres – however un-
real they may be – but in them? If poetics derives from poeiein, then what, in the age of 
globalization, is the precise relationship of poiein to prattein? 
 
IS POIESIS PRAXIS? GENERAL INTELLECT, IMMATERIAL LABOR, COLLECTIVE WILL 
 
I have argued throughout this chapter that planetarity instatiates an epistemological terrain 
or playing field that disrupts, or dis-articulates, what Rancière would call the distribution of 
the sensible of neoliberal globality. Through an aesthetic “Umstrukturierung des sozialen 
Raumes und der gesellschaftlichen Zeit” (MP 84), planetarity allows one to consider time, 
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space and history anew and thus to establish alternative orders of perception and to imagine 
different avenues of historical praxis. Planetarity, then, creates the conditions of possibility 
for seeking Auswege from the exigencies of a contemporary world under the condition of 
neoliberal globality. Auswege thereby, as Stefanie Harris notes, “[operate] at multiple levels of 
the content, the author, and the reader” (Harris 297). It is a level playing field – without 
ultimate foundation or final closure – that Kluge brings into being: a democratic terrain 
accessible to a multiplicity of actors in all their heterogeneity. How, I want to ask here, can 
such an epistemological project be actualized as a political one? How can a political aesthetic 
become true to its name? How, that is, does Kluge conceive of the process by which 
individualized acts of perception – of re-distributing the sensible – attain a critical mass large 
enough to actually shape the constitution of the world in what Kluge would identify as a 
politically progressive way? 
 The answer to this question, I want to argue here, lies precisely in the articulation of 
what Kluge calls “das gesellschaftliche Vorstellungsvermögen” (GS 195), and it is – crucially 
– the very dynamic of globalization that facilitates this process in the 21st century. 
Articulation, then, is important not only in its expressive or discursive dimension but also as 
the combinatory or connective process which the term’s etymology implies. In this sense, 
too, “gibt es immer einen Ausweg [im Zusammenhang]” (FKDB 13). Laclau and Mouffe 
speak of articulation as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Hegemony 105). What is crucial for 
them is the production of what they call, following Gramsci, “complex ‘collective wills’”: 
“the collective will is a result of the politico-ideological articulation of dispersed and 
fragmented historical forces” (67). For a particular project to be successful – or rather: to 
attain hegemony – on a democratic terrain, there is “the need to create a chain of 
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equivalence” (xviii). In her book Exodus und Stellungskrieg: Die Zukunft radikaler Politik, 
published in German in 2005, Mouffe writes: 
  Was auf dem Spiel steht, ist die Erschaffung eines ‘kollektiven Willens’ durch 
  Verbindung einer Vielfalt demokratischer Kämpfe unterschiedlichster  
  Provenienz (ökonomischer, politischer, sozialer und kultureller), die oft im  
  Konflikt miteinander liegen und nicht automatisch konvergieren, zu einer  
  Äquivalenzkette. Ihre Konvergenz kann nur das Ergebnis politischer   
  Artikulation sein. Das Ziel radikaler Politik besteht darin, eine kollektive  
  politische Identität durch das Prinzip demokratischer Äquivalenz zu   
  artikulieren. (Mouffe 38) 
 For Kluge, too, this collective and collaborative – political – dimension is 
paramount. In his “Annotierter Index” to the volume Das Bohren harter Bretter, Kluge argues 
that a “Gemeinwesen bildet sich ZWISCHEN DEN MENSCHEN, nicht in ihnen und 
nicht neben ihnen” (BB 308). “Herstellung von Öffentlichkeit,” he writes, is 
“[gleichbedeutend] mit POLITISIEREN” (312). In his speech on the occasion of the 
Lessing Prize, Kluge quotes Kant’s dictum that “Allein, wie viel und mit welcher Richtigkeit 
würden wir wohl denken, wenn wir nicht gleichsam in Gemeinschaft mit andern […] 
dächten!” The “elementare Fähigkeit […], Öffentlichkeit zu bilden,” he continues, is “eine 
Lebensnotwendigkeit – und dies ist kein Pathos, sondern Lebenspraxis; substanzreiche 
Öffentlichkeit ist die Voraussetzung dafür, dass ich Selbstvertrauen habe und anderen trauen 
kann” (PR 7). In the stories, too, this notion of a human network is ubiquitous, both as a 
formal aspect – the interaction of people as that which animates Kluge’s narratives – and in 
terms of content: The “Sitz der Leidenschaft,” the eponymous story in Die Lücke, die der 
Teufel läßt suggests, is “nicht in den Menschen, sondern zwischen den Menschen” (LT 589). 
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“Intelligenz,” someone proposes elsewhere, “sei anderswo angesiedelt, als man meine, 
nämlich nicht im Kopf eines Einzelnen, sondern als Netzwerk zwischen verschiedenen 
Köpfen” (871). “Die Verbindung [der wesentlichen Fähigkeiten der Menschen] entwickelt 
Stärke, sofern eine Berührungsfläche mit anderen Menschen besteht” (TT 95), Kluge argues 
in the preface to the section “Das moderne Raubtier” in Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt. “[Den] 
‘Freunden der Kritik,’” he writes in the story that also features the post-political technocrats, 
“geht [es] […] ‘um Herstellung eines gedanklichen Geländes, in dem Gedankengänge 
lateralisiert (nebeneinandergestellt) und dadurch in Berührungsfläche gebracht werden mit 
einem subjektiven Input konkreter Menschen, damit sie mit menschlicher Erfahrung 
vernetzt werden’” (LT 520). The political aspect of such networks, thereby, is foregrounded 
throughout: There is a “Netzwerk, das die Politik darstellt” (BB 15). “Das Politische kann, 
wo Menschen leben, nicht verschwinden” (265). Indeed, “das Politische […] findet sich 
überall, wo Menschen leben. In dieser elementaren Form,” importantly, “bewegt es die 
Geschichte” (7). “Wenn große Massen von Menschen […] mit äußerster Bemühung sich 
betätigen, entsteht durch deren Taten eine Bahnung, die alle künftigen Taten erleichtert. Auf 
diesen ‘Straßen’ bewegt sich die Geschichte” (TT 311).  
 Significantly, for Kluge it seems to be precisely the age of globalization and the 21st 
century that present a propitious moment for the effective establishment of such political 
networks. “Zum erstenmal in der Moderne ist eine die ganze Erde umspannende 
menschliche Berührungsfläche entstanden” (MP 145). Asking what could possibly be the 
“Hauptstadt des 21. Jahrhunderts,” in the Frankfurter Poetikvorlesungen he suggests that this is 
“möglicherweise gar keine Stadt”: one must “woanders suchen,” “in den Köpfen der 
Menschen suchen, in der Vorstellung, dass wir tatsächlich auf einem Planeten beisammen 
sind” (TE, June 19). The internet, of course, plays an important role in this endeavor. “Das 
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Internet hat die Partizipation an Öffentlichkeit gewaltig […] gesteigert” (TK 7). Speaking of 
a “Poetik im Zeitalter des Internet,” Kluge remarks that the “Rohstoffe für Poesie sind 
reichhaltig im Netz” – “wie Sand in der Wüste, wie Pflanzen im Dschungel, wie Tropfen im 
Ozean.” The task at hand is “das Internet, mit seiner gewaltigen Partizipation, schiffbar [zu] 
machen für menschliche Gefühle” (TE, June 12). “Im 21. Jahrhundert,” Kluge says, “ist 
noch kein Homer in Sicht. Aber man könnte es zu mehreren machen, zum Beispiel im Netz 
[durch die] Partizipation von mehreren Autoren, [durch] Kooperationen” (TE, June 19). The 
internet thus becomes one facet of – a new addition to – the productive network of media.46 
Kluge, evoking the “Bild eines Netzwerks, das sich zwischen den Menschen ausbreitet,” 
contends that “[die] Texte aber, welche die Verknüpfung herstellen, bilden einen Erzählraum 
[…]. [Alle] Menschen sind in dieser Hinsicht Poeten und die professionellen Autoren sind 
nur besondere Vertrauensleute dieser Netzwerke, die umso nötiger sind, wenn es Menschen 
schlecht geht” (FKDB 74). At the heart of the matter however, I would argue, Kluge 
remains above all a man of the book. “Zwei Intimitäten, die des Autors, die des Lesers, 
korrespondieren miteinander. Ihr Thema heißt: gemeinsame Erfahrung. So bilden sie (mit 
vielen anderen) die Öffentlichkeit der Bücher” (77). “Bücher sind weder Schonkost, noch 
sind sie Trostmittel. Aber ihr Netzwerk tröstet. […] [Ich halte sie] für die Schlüssel zu einer 
Öffentlichkeit, an der wir, möglicherweise ohne es zu wissen, gemeinsam arbeiten” (86). 
 
I am interested in this notion of a collective imaginative labor because it brings me closer to 
the more radical implications of what it could mean to speak of a political aesthetic in the 
age of globalization.47 Kluge’s conception of aesthetic production is emphatically one of 
production tout court. In Gelegenheitsarbeit einer Sklavin, Kluge had written about “die lebendige 
Arbeit, die das ununterdrückbare Produktionsverhältnis ist. Sie besitzt, wenn auch 
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unerforscht, einen autonomen Realismus, der die Potenz hat, Irrtümer und Defizite jeder 
realistischen Konstruktion zu korrigieren” (GS 208). Positing a “radikale Umformung von 
Politik in ein Produktionsinstrument […], das tatsächlich alternative Lebensformen 
produziert” (190), Kluge emphasizes that an “Umproduktion der Öffentlichkeit ist deshalb 
Bedingung und zugleich der wichtigste Gegenstand, an dem sich die realistische Methode 
abarbeitet” (219). “Das alles hat den Charakter einer Baustelle” (220).48 This rhetoric of 
production, of course, must partly be read in the context of the 1970s and the different 
framework this period represented for an avowedly Marxist register. But the category of 
production, in fact, never loses its conceptual centrality for Kluge. In an interview with 
Gertrud Koch, published in 2010 on the occasion of Kluge’s new film Nachrichten aus der 
ideologischen Antike – subtitled, significantly, Marx – Eisenstein – Das Kapital – Kluge argued 
that “people put the best of what they have into their labor. If they could recognize that the 
social production rests in them and that they produce themselves, a rich and emancipatory 
society would result. That this element in human beings isn’t dead is something I am 
convinced of” (Koch 367). Kluge continues to speak of “Produktionsöffentlichkeit” and a 
“Fabrik kollektiver Erfahrung” (FKDB 64), of labor as a “stoffverändernde Tätigkeit” (73), 
of critique as “konsequente aktive Reparaturarbeit,” “Produktion gegen falsche Produktion” 
(PR 70). “Ich bin nicht der Zuschauer meines Lebens,” Kluge argues in the “Totenrede für 
Peter Glotz, “ich bin der Produzent meines Lebens” (BB 269f.). 
 In his fiction too, Kluge time and again returns to this notion of labor, including 
imaginative labor, as transformative production. “Für jede Stoffveränderung in der 
Gesellschaft, heißt es bei Marx, ist die Anwendung menschlicher Arbeit das Element” (LT 
713). On different occasions, he refers to Marx and his assertion that “[die] PRODUKTION 
[…] ist ‘das Übergreifende’” (see TT 389; BB 204). He reiterates his own notions of labor as 
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“stoffverändernde Tätigkeit in der Welt” (TT 394) and of the need “den Begriff des 
Politischen umzuwälzen, d.h. in einen BEGRIFF DER POLITISCHEN PRODUKTION 
umzuwandeln” (TT 390). In a dialogue from Das Bohren harter Bretter, someone explains that 
“Produktion ist für [Marx] […] die Veränderung, die in den Wesenskräften der Menschen 
stattfindet, in den Köpfen […]. – Das hält er nicht für Träume? – Nein, das ist Produktion” 
(BB 64). “Aktionen der REVOLUTIONÄREN VERÄNDERUNG,” indeed, need to 
manifest themselves “als gesellschaftlicher Produktionsprozeß” (see TT 397, 345). 
 The nexus of labor, collaboration, the imaginative and productive capacities of 
human beings, and political transformation finds perhaps its clearest expression in a story 
Kluge includes in identical form in both Tür an Tür mit einem anderen Leben – here as a sub-
narrative in the story “Momentaufnahmen der politischen Revolution” – and in Das Bohren 
harter Bretter. In “Was ist eine ‘fusionierende Gruppe’? / Rosa Luxemburg und die 
Revolution von 1905,” Kluge writes, 
  Die ‘fusionierende Gruppe’ ist das Element aller Revolutionen. Menschen  
  schließen sich zusammen. Ohne es noch zu wissen, bilden sie gegenüber  
  Ihren bisherigen Leben einen neuartigen Zustand, in welchem sich ihre  
  Eigenschaften vereinen, ohne daß sie das beabsichtigen: unterhalb ihrer  
  Willenskräfte, unter dem Eindruck der Unruhe […], auf Grund von   
  Ahnungsvermögen und Tatkraft. […] Der ‘neue revolutionäre Mensch’ (ein  
  zunächst instabiles Element) besteht nicht aus Personen, aus den Altmenschen 
  selbst, sondern entsteht zwischen ihnen, aus den Lücken, welche die Menschen 
  im Alltag voneinander trennten. 
  […] Rosa Luxemburg […] versuchte […], die Erfahrung der ersten Tage der  
  Revolution zu rekonstruieren. […] Die Nachrichten stimmten darin überein,  
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  daß sich im Augenblick der Umwälzung Mitteilungen, Ideen,    
  Handlungsimpulse unter den Menschen rascher verbreiteten, als dies mittels  
  der Telegrafie oder der Verkehrsmittel geschehen konnte. Es schien ihr […],  
  als sei ein EINZIGES LEBEWESEN, EIN REVOLUTIONÄRER   
  GESAMTARBEITER tätig. (BB 138f.; TT 362f.) 
 
In light of all this, I want to ask here, would it be going too far to also read Kluge’s work in 
the context of a certain strand of recent political philosophy that operates with an emphatic 
conception of Marx’s “general intellect,” of the notion of immaterial labor, and even of the 
elusive collective subject of “the multitude”? This post-operaistic approach is one, after all, 
explicitly conceived of for the conditions of globalization and for the era of post-Fordist 
production. Kluge too speaks of “[ihr] zähes Überleben in Zeiten, in denen es so aussieht, 
als ginge Arbeit zugrunde oder könne ersetzt werden” (LT 713), about a 
“Kommunikationsgesellschaft […], die als nachindustriell gilt” (BB 235), and he is invested 
in the quest for “Konzepte eines Politikbegriffs […], der auf die veränderten Bedingungen 
des 21. Jahrhunderts antwortet” (245). Could Kluge’s own project, then, perhaps be used to 
bring together – indeed: to articulate – different forms of contemporary political thought after 
and in the wake of Marx, to mediate, that is, between the strategic horizontality of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s “chain of equivalence” and the more radical verticality of the new 
revolutionary subject of the multitude propagated by thinkers like Hardt, Negri and Paolo 
Virno?49  
 I want to focus here not on the more prominent version of the multitude in Hardt 
and Negri’s bestsellers Empire and Multitude but on Virno’s key text on the issue, translated 
into German in 2005 as Grammatik der Multitude. Virno’s conception, first of all, is less 
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enthralled to a messianic thinking of the multitude than Hardt and Negri’s and thus can 
more easily be brought into sync with the profoundly anti-messianic thinking of the political 
in Laclau, Mouffe, and Kluge’s works, which leave ample space for strategic considerations 
and the nitty-gritty, as it were, of the political process.50 More importantly perhaps, in the 
context of my analysis, in his emphasis on a “grammar of the multitude,” Virno also engages 
more specifically with the multitude in its political-aesthetic aspects, as a carrier, that is, of 
his key categories of general and public intellect, linguistic and imaginative capacities, and 
immaterial labor.51 
 Virno’s analysis unfolds against the background of what he identifies as a 
transformation in the nexus of “Arbeit, Handeln, Intellekt” (Virno 62): “Diese alte 
Dreiteilung,” Virno argues, “ist heute verschwunden. Die Grenzen zwischen reiner 
intellektueller Tätigkeit, politischem Handeln und Arbeit haben sich aufgelöst.” His aim is to 
demonstrate “wie die so genannte postfordistische Arbeit viele der Eigenschaften des 
politischen Handelns aufgesogen hat, und wie dieses Ineinanderfließen von Politik und 
Arbeit einen entscheidenden Grundzug der zeitgenössischen Multitude darstellt. […] Die 
poiesis schließt also mittlerweile zahlreiche Aspekte der praxis mit ein” (63). Virno contends 
“dass der zeitgenössische Kapitalismus seine wesentliche produktive Ressource in den 
sprachlich-relationalen Eigenschaften des Menschen hat, in der Gesamtheit der 
kommunikativen und kognitiven Vermögen” (136f.). In a section titled “Die Sprache auf der 
Bühne,” and in a formulation that could be Kluge’s own, he speaks of “die menschliche 
Kommunikation im Postfordismus” as “die Königin der Produktivkräfte, etwas, das den 
jeweils eigenen Produktionsbereich übersteigt und eher […] die schöpferische 
Hervorbringung in ihrer Gesamtheit betrifft” (79). Much like Kluge, Virno again and again 
emphasizes the “Potenzialität der Sprache” (72), “das allgemeine Sprachvermögen” (73), 
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“sprachliche Fähigkeiten, Wissen, Einbildungskraft usw.” (80) and from there extrapolates to 
an “öffentliche Intellekt, der im Postfordismus schlicht als Produktionsressource erscheint” 
(54). “Dass alle an den sprachlichen und kognitiven Fähigkeiten in gleicher Weise teilhaben, ist 
das konstitutive Element des postfordistischen Produktionsprozesses. Alle ArbeiterInnen 
treten als Sprecher-/DenkerInnen in den Produktionsprozess ein” (52). Virno calls this a 
process by which the “[Produktivkräfte] der Gesellschaft […] in immer größerem Ausmaß 
mit den sprachlich-kommunikativen Fähigkeiten und dem General Intellect zusammenfallen” 
(80). 
 This notion of a public intellect, or – more specifically – Marx’s concept of the general 
intellect are at the heart of Virnos’s conceptualization of the transformative labor of the 
multitude. 
  Der Ausdruck ‘öffentlicher Intellekt’ jedoch steht im Widerspruch zu einer  
  langen Tradition, laut der das Denken eine abseitige und einsame Tätigkeit  
  darstellt […]. Eine Ausnahme hinsichtlich dieser langen Tradition […] stellen 
  meiner Meinung nach bloß einige Seiten von Marx dar, die den Intellekt als  
  etwas Äußerliches und Kollektives, als öffentliches Gut setzen. Im ‘Fragment 
  über Maschinen’, einem Text aus den Grundrissen, schreibt Marx über den  
  General Intellect. Er benutzt den englischen Ausdruck, um diesem Begriff  
  Kraft zu verleihen, so als wolle er ihn hervorheben. Der Begriff General  
  Intellect kann sich aus verschiedenen Zusammenhängen herleiten. […] An  
  dieser Stelle geht es uns aber nicht um philologische Studien. Wichtig ist der  
  äußerliche, soziale, kollektive Charakter, der der intellektuellen Tätigkeit  
  zukommt, sobald diese laut Marx die wahre Antriebskraft der Produktion  
  von Reichtum wird. (46) 
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The general intellect “stellt sich heute vor allem als Kommunikation, Abstraktion und 
Selbstreflexion lebendiger Subjekte dar,” Virno continues (88). One could argue, he 
contends,  
  dass es aufgrund der ökonomischen Entwicklung selbst notwendig ist, dass  
  ein Teil des General Intellect nicht im fixen Kapital aufgeht, sondern sich über  
  die kommunikative Interaktion entfaltet, in Form von Erkenntnismodellen,  
  dialogischen Performances, Sprachspielen. Anders ausgedrückt, der öffentliche  
  Intellekt fällt mit der Kooperation, mit dem koordinierten Handeln der  
  lebendigen Arbeit zusammen, mit der kommunikativen Kompetenz der  
  Individuen. (88) 
“Erst dann,” then, “wenn im Zentrum der Arbeit der sprachliche Intellekt auftaucht, ist 
diese dazu imstande, zahlreiche Charakteristika, die früher das politische Handeln 
auszeichneten, in sich aufzunehmen” (86). “Kommunikation selbst [bringt] neue 
Dingzustände, Erfahrungen und Tatsachen hervor,” it is “performativ: in [ihr] bestimmen 
die Wörter Fakten, Ereignisse, Dingzustände” (128). Once the public intellect becomes the 
“grundlegende Produktivkraft,” accordingly, we reach a “Stadium, in dem […] unsere 
Gedanken als solche unmittelbar den Wert von materiellen Fakten annehmen” (87). 
 “Die Gesamtheit der postfordistischen Arbeitskräfte,” Virno concludes, “sind 
intellektuelle Arbeitskräfte, ‘Massenintellektualität’. […] Die Massenintellektualität ist die 
vorherrschende Form, in der heute der General Intellect auftritt” (153). It is precisely this (im)-
material labor of mass intellectuality that is, for Virno, at the heart of the work of the 
contemporary multitude. It comprises “formale und informelle Kenntnisse, 
Einbildungskraft, ethische Haltungen, Mentalitäten, ‘Sprachspiele’” (151), “also” – and here 
once again Virno comes extremely close to Kluge’s own lexicon – “die allgemeinsten 
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Eigenschaften des Geistes: Sprachvermögen, Lernfähigkeit, Gedächtnis, 
Abstraktionsfähigkeit und das Vermögen, Beziehungen herzustellen, [den] Hang zur 
Selbstreflexion” (153f.). Indeed, “[genau] besehen erlangt dadurch die […] Marx’sche 
Definition der Arbeitskraft ihre volle Bedeutung: ‘der Inbegriff aller physischen und 
geistigen Fähigkeiten, die in der Leiblichkeit, der lebendigen Persönlichkeit eines Menschen 
existieren’” (154). It is in this sense that “[die] Massenintellektualität (und dies ist nur ein 
anderer Name für die Multitude) steht im Mittelpunkt der postfordistischen Ökonomie” 
(155).  
 “Ist es möglich,” in extension, “den Intellekt und das politische Handeln [zu 
vereinen],” Virno asks rhetorically and responds that, yes, “[das] politische Handeln aus der 
momentanen Lähmung zu befreien bedeutet nichts anderes als die Entfaltung des 
Öffentlichseins des Intellekts jenseits der Lohnarbeit” (94). What manifests itself here in this 
mutual imbrication of the economic, the political, and human activity is a model of the 
radical undoing of systemic differentiation. And indeed, in the context of my question about 
a political aesthetic this notion of the general intellect, I would argue, gestures towards a re-
actualization of the old avant-gardist dream of a production aesthetic by which the functional 
differentiation of society is undone and imaginative labor directly translated into the 
transformation of the political and economic spheres.  
 
It is not necessary here to rehearse again Kluge’s embrace of concepts such as Antirealismus, 
Umproduktion der Gesellschaft, Produktionsöffentlichkeit, or the Gesamtarbeiter to realize the 
profound affinities between Kluge’s own and Virno’s thinking. Nor does one need to be 
reminded of Kluge’s dictum that “if [people] could recognize that the social production rests 
in them and that they produce themselves, a rich and emancipatory society would result” 
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(Koch 367). These affinities, as I have demonstrated above, even reach down to minute 
semantic details. There is no doubt, then, that Kluge too is drawn to the idea of a production 
model of aesthetic, to an avant-gardist conception of the relationship between art, politics, 
and life. And indeed, his frequent references to the realism of Brecht – despite all self-
avowed allegiance to the profoundly anti-Brechtian thought of Adorno – underscores this 
point.  
 And yet, I would argue, ultimately Kluge does not go as far in his embrace of such a 
model as Virno and especially Hardt and Negri do, for whom the sheer presence of a 
multitude already constitutes a disruptive and indeed revolutionary event of counter-Empire. 
This is what I meant when I spoke above about the messianism and the verticality often 
associated with the concept of the multitude. Virno too – though much more attuned to 
strategic considerations and the need for articulation – speaks of the multitude as a “Vielheit, 
die als solche im öffentlichen Raum fortbesteht,” of a “soziale und politische Existenzform der 
Vielen als Vieler” (Virno 26). It is in this sense precisely, I would argue here, that Kluge’s 
work could be seen to combine, or mediate between, the more radical implications of the 
concepts of general intellect and the multitude on the one hand and Laclau and Mouffe’s 
notion of the articulation of a hegemonic project on the other: the need, that is, for a 
constant affirmation, negotiation and re-affirmation – on a contingent ground – of strategic 
alliances, nodal points of power, or what with Gramsci they call historical blocs and 
collective wills.52 Additionally, Kluge’s stark reminders, in his globalization narratives, of the 
devaluation of the political, of the precarious fate of human self-determination, and of the 
violent and largely autonomous power of the economic sphere in the contemporary world 
serve as further evidence that he does not believe that the success of the multitude is a given, 
that the self-destruction, as it were, of “Empire” is imminent. The ultimate consequence of 
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all of this – and this brings me to the concluding section of this chapter – must also be a 
kind of conceptual self-moderation, a more modest approach to what Kluge’s writing does, 
and what the act of reading Kluge can do. 
 
PER ASPERA AD ASTRA – AND BACK TO EARTH…? ENLIGHTENMENT LEGACY, 
COSMOPOLITICAL DEMOCRACY, AND TRANSFORMATION FROM BELOW 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have brought Kluge’s work into constellation with a number of 
heterogeneous theoretical and political positions, ranging from conceptions of the nature of 
globalization and discourses of planetarity to a political philosophy of radical democracy and 
the notion of the general intellect in a post-Fordist era. This heterogeneity, I would argue, is not 
a weakness, a conceptual imprecision or fickleness, but a fundamental strength of Kluge’s 
work: it speaks to a kind of political and aesthetic pliability, to the specific form of 
Anschlussfähigkeit – one could also speak of articulability – of Kluge’s later fiction. In Das 
Bohren harter Bretter, Kluge at one point writes approvingly of an “Artikulationsfähigkeit von 
Gegensätzen und Bindungsmöglichkeiten” (BB 85). This underscores, first of all, my 
argument about a democratic poetics at the heart of Kluge’s work. But it also testifies to the 
heterodoxy of a thinker who does not indulge in the fetishism of the small difference that 
plagues so much of leftist theory and politics. Kluge’s is a profoundly eclectic position: No 
matter the unquestionable differences, for instance, between Laclau and Mouffe on the one 
hand and Virno on the other, for Kluge, I would argue, there is a bigger thrust, a broader set 
of goals in which such theories come to coincide. And whatever aspect of such thinking can 
be made serviceable to and brought in line with the direction of this bigger thrust has, for 
Kluge, a specific value of its own. It is in this sense too that he writes in Maßverhältnisse des 
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Politischen that “[die] Parameter (Formen) vereinigen sich zum Politischen in 
emanzipatorischer Richtung dann, wenn sie ein Maß zueinander finden: Dies sind die 
Maßverhältnisse des Politischen” (MP 10). 
 What then, ultimately, could this proper measure for a political aesthetic be, the 
sphere of confluence, as it were, of all I have said in the course of this chapter? I want to 
propose here that Kluge’s suggestion may lie in what one could call a contemporary 
democratic cosmopolitanism. There is, of course, a certain irony to the fact that a trajectory 
that started with the globe and that led me to the planetary will end back on earth, with a 
kind of Enlightenment universalism. But it is precisely the notion of the cosmos as a 
“unified political space” (Urbinati 67), as Nadia Urbinati writes in her discussion of 
cosmopolitical democracy, that, I contend, ultimately animates Kluge’s work. And it is 
precisely for this measure of the political, as I argued above, that a planetary aesthetics 
prepares the epistemological ground.  
 The notion of the cosmopolitical, of course, points to Kant and thus to the heart of 
the Enlightenment legacy, as the “most audacious expression,” as Urbinati explains, “of the 
universalistic ideals of the Enlightenment” (75). And it is, indeed, as a champion of this kind 
of ideal that Kluge presents himself throughout his work. The “Weltzusammenhang” of 
contemporary globalization, he criticizes in Maßverhältnisse des Politischen, “enthält mehr 
Ausgrenzungen als Einbringungen, bei größtmöglicher wechselseitiger Abhängigkeit und Nähe 
aller Beziehungen. Ein Projekt der Menschheit im Sinne Kants ist das nicht” (MP 146). In his 
speech on the occasion of the Schiller Prize in 2001, crucially, Kluge noted that, “Ich 
empfinde den starken Wunsch, unser 21. Jahrhundert, als Waggon betrachtet, an [das] 18. 
Jahrhundert anzukoppeln und nicht an die Giftbecher des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Das ist 
das Pathos und der zugrundeliegende rote Faden in Chronik der Gefühle” (PR 54). “Wir haben 
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zu unserem Unsegen die unmittelbare Verbindung an die gärtnerischen Architekten des 
ausgehenden 18. Jahrhunderts verloren. ES BLEIBT DIE GEDULD DER BÜCHER, DES 
ERZÄHLENS” (59). In his “Rede zum Bremer Literaturpreis 2001,” similarly, Kluge 
remarks that “[alle] Impulse der Aufklärung, je früher sie angesetzt waren, sollten noch 
einmal aufgenommen werden” (66). Speaking of a “Produktionsstätte des Gefühls,” he 
suggests: 
  An diese Form der Aufklärung unser 21. Jahrhundert anzukoppeln […] und  
  alle Gefühle, auch die Irrtümer, wenn sie nützlich sind dafür, dass Menschen  
  zueinanderkommen und sich vertragen, noch einmal abzuklopfen und auf  
  den Prüfstand zu stellen, das ist etwas, was uns zu Beginn des 21.   
  Jahrhunderts auch im Interesse unserer Kinder und der Solidität unseres  
  Gemeinwesens gut ansteht. (66) 
Pointing to his notion of an “Anti-Realismus des Gefühls,” Kluge argues in the Büchner 
Prize speech that “[diese] anti-realistische Partei im Menschen muß auf der Seite der 
Emanzipation, der Aufklärung stehen, andernfalls mißlingt diese” (83). “Das Projekt der 
Aufklärung,” indeed, he postulates in the Lessing Prize speech, “und das Projekt der Poetik 
sind in dieser Perspektive notwendige Alliierte” (21). Oskar Negt, in a text dedicated to 
Kluge’s work, remarks that “[es] ist auffällig, dass in Alexander Kluges jüngsten Büchern 
auch dort, wo der Name nicht fällt, Kants Geist des moralischen Haderns mit der 
Wirklichkeit einen bestimmenden Raum einnnimmt. Wenn ich zurückdenke und die fast 40 
Jahre kooperativer Begriffsarbeit überprüfe,” he continues, “dann mag diese Wahrnehmung 
nichts Erstaunliches haben; wenn wir zusammensaßen und eigene Texte verfassten, haben 
wir stets unsere Gedanken daran überprüft, wie weit sie die überlieferungswürdigen 
politischen Moralia des europäischen Denkens zum Ausdruck bringen” (Negt 76). Kluge 
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himself in turn declares – with an ironic hint of fundamentalism – that “der 
Aufklärungsglaube [stellt] einfache Haltungen zur Verfügung […], die ich ebenso wie eine 
Glaubensgewissheit um keinen Preis der Welt für verkäuflich ansehe” (TK 83). 
 It is then, at long last, to the project of modernity that we return here.53 What is at 
stake in Kluge’s work is human self-determination and Koselleck’s notion of the 
Verfügbarkeit or accessibility of history, an “Erweiterung der autonomen Selbstgesetzgebung” 
(Negt 80), as Negt calls it, on the broadest possible scale. “Menschen haben zweierlei 
Eigentum,” Kluge writes in Chronik der Gefühle: “ihre Lebenszeit, ihren Eigensinn” (CG I 11) 
– the “Eigentum am Lebenslauf” (584). “Menschen [entwickeln] ungeahnte Kräfte, sich den 
Marotten des Schicksals zu widersetzen” (TT 485). One must aspire towards the “Status des 
Produzenten meines Lebens” (MP 25). “Ich bin nicht der Zuschauer meines Lebens,” Kluge 
says in the “Totenrede für Peter Glotz” I have already mentioned above, “ich bin der 
Produzent meines Lebens. Ich bin verantwortlich für meinen Lebenstext, für die Texte, die 
ich schreibe, für meine Bindungen, auch für mein Land (und wenn es kein einzelnes Land 
ist, für Europa oder die Weltrepublik)” (BB 269f.). 
 Responsibility for the world republic: What Kluge’s democratic cosmopolitanism 
hints at is precisely what I have referred to throughout this dissertation as the constitutive 
promise of modernity: the existence of a universal terrain of action, on which an open future 
can be shaped and history be made through transformative human praxis. What must be 
borne in mind, however, is that this universal terrain has a contingent ground. It is 
significant that Koselleck’s notion of the temporalization and the processualization of all 
concepts at the heart of modernity’s emergence can also be read, as Marchart writes, as a 
“kontinuierliche Bewegung der Generalisierung von Kontingenz in der Geschichte des 
(politischen) Denkens” (Marchart 65). Modernity, Marchart contends, “besteht in 
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wesentlichem Ausmaß in der Generalisierung des Moments des Politischen als Moment von 
Grundlosigkeit und von Kontingenz” (84). It is no coincidence that Laclau argues that a 
political philosophy predicated on the notion of contingency “radicalizes the emancipatory 
possibilities offered by the Enlightenment and Marxism” (Laclau 80). “Damit erinnert uns 
Laclau daran, dass eine Konsequenz der Schwächung des ontologischen Status aller 
Fundamente in der Ausweitung der Räume potenzieller Politisierung besteht” (Marchart 
329). And it is equally telling, too, that Virno conceives of the notion of the multitude as 
explicitly a response to the crisis of “die politische Theorie der Moderne” (Virno 25, my 
emphasis).  
 
Two things, then, are left to be said in conclusion, one about the nature of the 
cosmopolitical in the age of globalization, the other about the scope of what I have called 
here a democratic poetics for the 21st century. It is, first of all, a radical and democratic 
model of the cosmopolitical that Kluge proposes, and not the mere transposition onto a 
global scale of the institutions of power of national elites and markets. “Democratic 
cosmopolitanism,” as Urbinati writes, “bills itself as a political response to the acknowledged 
fact of globalization.” 
  Unlike its neo-liberal counterpart, however, it does not see globalization as a  
  natural like [sic] and self-regulating phenomenon. As an ideal, democratic  
  cosmopolitanism represents the reluctance of politics to capitulate in the face 
  of the so-called ‘spontaneity’ of global economic competition. It reaffirms  
  the power of associated individuals and peoples to shape their lives. (Urbinati 
  68) 
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Secondly, if we are dealing here with the terrain of modernity, then we are – fundamentally – 
also dealing with the fact of functional differentiation. And so it is ultimately not an un-doing 
of this kind of differentiation that Kluge’s political aesthetic aims at, but rather what one 
could call perhaps a return from a late modern paradigm to one of classical, and hopeful, 
modernity: not, that is, systemic autonomization at the cost of human agency – the 
hegemony of the economic, the devaluation of the political, and the precariousness of all 
forms of human self-determination – but a sort of re-synchronization of these spheres, so 
that people can do politics, that the political can steer the economic. The function of the 
aesthetic, then, would not be immediately productive; but neither would it be limited to the 
mere als ob of aesthetic autonomy. Kluge’s writing, and the effects of the communicative act 
of reading Kluge, would constitute one part of a larger critical praxis, one element, that is, in 
the long chain of equivalence out of which emerges a transformative politics. Oliver 
Marchart has written about a “Verständnis minimaler Politik,” the sense, “dass selbst die 
bescheidensten politischen Handlungsformen […] potenziell an der instituierenden 
Dimension des Politischen teilhaben” (Marchart 30). Perhaps it would be falsely modest, 
even denigrating, to speak of “minimale Politik” in the light of the planetary. But it is from a 
place like this that an Antirealismus des Motivs must take its flight: a movement from below at 
once modest and expansive, its aim no less than to change the face of contemporary 
globalization – a democratic poetics, in short, for the 21st century.
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NOTES   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In the bibliographical references throughout the main body of this chapter, I will refer to Kluge’s texts as, 
respectively, BB (Das Bohren harter Bretter); CG I and CG II (Chronik der Gefühle, volumes I and II); FKDB 
(Fontane – Kleist – Deutschland – Büchner); GS (Gelegenheitsarbeit einer Sklavin); LT (Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt); MP 
(Kluge and Negt, Maßverhältnisse des Politischen); PR (Personen und Reden); TE (Theorie der Erzählung. Frankfurter 
Poetikvorlesungen); TK (Kluge’s own texts in the issue of Text + Kritik devoted to his work); and TT (Tür an Tür 
mit einem anderen Leben). 
 
2 See especially Harvey 260ff. 
 
3 Mittelman and Robertson are quoted in Steger 10. 
 
4 See Steger: “Hence, I suggest that we use the term globality to signify a social condition characterized by the 
existence of global economic, political, cultural and environmental interconnections and flows […]. Conversely, 
the term globalization should be used to refer to a set of social processes that are thought to transform our present 
social condition into one of globality” (7f.). 
 
5 The national, of course, is still present in these stories but usually appears in its enmeshment in transnational 
and global constellations. Kluge’s emphasis, for instance, on countries like China and India, I would argue, is 
due to their role as emergent economic and political powers in a globalizing world. 
 
6 In the context of Bölsterli’s remarks that “Wachheit sei die Devise” and “[die] Körper müßten sich letztlich 
an die Geräte anpassen,” see Jonathan Crary’s discussion of “sleeplessness research [that] should be understood 
as one part of a quest for soldiers whose physical capabilities will more closely approximate the functionalities 
of non-human apparatuses and networks” in 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (Crary 3). Paul Virilio’s 
work often engages with the same problematic (see Virilio, Speed and Politics and Polar Inertia). 
 
7 See Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft 260ff., and the Introduction to this dissertation. 
 
8 In different accentuations, this de-temporalization can take the form both of a “breite Gegenwart” as, for 
instance, in the work of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, and of a “Gegenwartsschrumpfung” or an outright 
“liquidation of temporality,” as in the work of Hartmut Rosa, Hermann Lübbe, and Fredric Jameson (see 
Gumbrecht; Rosa, Beschleunigung; and Jameson, “End of Temporality”). All three concepts combine temporal 
uniformity with instantaneity in a way that also finds expression in Paul Virilio’s term of an “instantaneity 
without history” (see Polar Inertia 49). See also the Introduction to this dissertation. 
  
9 Hardt and Negri themselves, of course, juxtapose the functioning of Empire with the emergence of a radical 
new subject of political praxis, the multitude: “The passage to Empire and its processes of globalization offer 
new possibilities to the forces of liberation. […] Our political task, we will argue, is not simply to resist these 
processes but to reorganize them and redirect them toward new ends. The creative forces of the multitude that 
sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political 
organization of global flows and exchanges” (Empire xv). Much as Hardt and Negri and Kluge’s overall projects 
differ in nature, in fact, there are significant overlaps in both their diagnoses of the challenges posed by 
contemporary forms of globalization and in their ultimate goal to “reorganize” and “redirect” the latter. I will 
discuss the question of the multitude and the “general intellect,” as it pertains to Kluge’s work, in the last part 
of this chapter. 
 
10 See Fukuyama, End of History 199-208. 
 
11 In his discussion of the “ideological dimension of globalization” (Steger 93), Manfred Steger speaks of 
“globalism” as “an ideology that endows the concept of globalization with neoliberal values and meanings” and 
identifies five major claims of “the dominant neoliberal discourse of globalism” (94). The claims are that 
globalization “is about the liberalization and global integration of markets” (97); that it is “inevitable and 




(103); and that it “furthers the spread of democracy in the world” (110). These claims are central to Fukuyama’s 
argument in both his article “The End of History?” in The National Interest and the book-length essay The End of 
History and the Last Man, and they are frequently targeted – as I have demonstrated above – in Kluge’s critical 
negotiation of the forms and effects of contemporary globalization. 
  
12 Slavoj Zizek’s quip that we are “all Fukuyamans” today hints at this conceptual affinity between neoliberal 
discourses about globalization and the thesis of the “end of history.” 
 
13 For Fukuyama – following Kojève via Hegel – the year 1806 with Napoleon’s victory at the Battle of Jena 
plays a crucial role as the effective “end point of human ideological evolution”: “[…] behind this seemingly odd 
conclusion is the thought that the principles of liberty and equality that emerged from the French Revolution, 
embodied in what Kojève called the modern ‘universal and homogeneous state,’ represented the endpoint of 
human ideological evolution beyond which it was impossible to progress further” (End of History 66). 
Interestingly, Napoleon in general and the battle of Jena in particular are mentioned on several occasions in 
chapters by Kluge in which he is specifically concerned with processes of globalization. Referring to Heinrich 
von Kleist, for instance, Kluge in one story speaks of a “Konstitution des Erdballs, für die als erfahrener 
napoleonischer Fußsoldat zu kämpfen sich lohne” (LT 552). 
 
14 The notions of “post-democracy” and “post-politics” can be found in varying forms in the work of a 
number of contemporary political thinkers, ranging from the socio-empirical approach of Colin Crouch to the 
more philosophical analyses by theorists such as Jacques Rancière, Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Zizek and Alain 
Badiou. What these analyses have in common, on a very general level, is the notion that politics has been 
reduced to a fully consensual administration of the status quo. In post-politics, Zizek paradigmatically argues, 
“the conflict of global ideological visions […] is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats […]; 
via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal 
consensus.” Zizek, indeed, goes as far as labeling globalization itself “the name for [an] emerging post-political 
logic” (Ticklish Subject 236). I will comment on the affinities between Kluge’s work and that of a number of 
broadly post-Marxist thinkers of “radical democracy” in the further course of this chapter. 
  
15 See, for instance, Kluge’s two texts on Habermas in Personen und Reden (PR 76-81). 
 
16 I will expand below, in my discussion of Kluge’s political aesthetic, on both the contents of this line of 
thought and on the reasons for my categorization of Kluge among these thinkers. 
 
17 For the notion of a “post-foundational” political philosophy, see especially Marchart. 
 
18 Curiously, the notion of politics as an “art of the impossible” is advocated most fervently in Kluge’s fictional 
universe by US neoconservatives. Referring to “Bismarcks Satz: POLITIK IST DIE KUNST DES 
MÖGLICHEN,” Kluge writes that, “Dies sehen die etwa 7000 aus den think-tanks in die Administration 
eingewanderten Neokonservativen anders.” “Wir dürfen uns,” one of them argues, “im Realen oder Möglichen 
nicht einsperrren lassen. […] Für eine Großmacht ist es gefährlich, das Mögliche als absoluten Grenzwert zu 
sehen. Vielleicht ist das Reale nicht das Reale? Vielleicht ist das Mögliche nicht das Mögliche?” (LT 619) The 
neoconservative’s position here fully overlaps with Kluge’s own in Maßverhältnisse des Politischen. In another story 
in Tür an Tür mit einem anderen Leben, Kluge writes, “Radikale Neokonservative neigten zur Annahme, daß das 
Einzige, was für die Französische Revolution überhaupt spreche, die hier vorgetragene Erwartung an den 
Zirkus sei, praktisch Unmögliches zu bewirken. Eine Großmacht wie die USA dürfe sich nicht in das 
GEFÄNGNIS DES MÖGLICHEN einsperren lassen” (TT 475f.). I will comment below on the question of 
narrative authority and the vastly different positions from which Kluge’s characters often speak. 
 
19 It is tempting – but perhaps going too far – to read the less prominent role of the concept of the 
“Lebenslauf” in Kluge’s later fiction in the context of Hartmut Rosa’s assertion that under the temporal regime 
of late modernity, predicated as it is on radical processes of acceleration, the unified Lebenslauf, or the 
“institutionalisiertes Lebenslaufregime,” has been largely invalidated (see Rosa, Beschleunigung). 
 
20 See Bergermann: “Und so lautet [Spivaks] Forderung: ‘I propose the planet to overwrite the globe.’ Der 




Planetarischen – zudem mit Anspielungen auf entfremdende Landvermessung und Computerdarstellung – 
folgt der Vorschlag, das eine mit dem anderen zu ‘überschreiben’, nicht zu ersetzen, womit zumindest 
impliziert wäre, dass das Verhältnis von Globus und Planet keiner dualistischen Logik folgen will” 
(Bergermann 24). The fact that Bergermann contradicts herself by speaking simultaneously of a 
“problematische Gegenüberstellung” and of a relationship “das […] keiner dualistischen Logik folgen will” illustrates 
the complexity and difficulty of the concept of planetarity. I will discuss the more problematic aspects of 
Kluge’s own concept of planetarity in the further course of this chapter. 
   
21 This essentially predates the beginning of the universe and the big bang, which is now estimated to have 
happened some 13.7 billion years ago. The earth itself is only around 4.5 billion years old (see Kaku 11). 
  
22 See Stenger: “[Planck time] is the smallest time that can be operationally defined, that is, measured even in 
principle” (“Planck Time”).  
 
23 On the function of extraterrestrials, see Adelson, “Future of Futurity.”  
 
24 The increasing standardization of time in the course of the 19th century, of course, and the eventual 
determination of the globally uniform Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), are widely considered to have been key 
factors in the deepening and widening of processes of globalization. In light of my discussion here and of 
Spivak’s notion of a fully circumscribed globe, it is interesting in this context to refer to a conversation between 
Kluge and Joseph Vogl, in which the latter remarks that, “Die Greenwich-Zeit markiert den Ort, von dem aus 
jede weitere Stunde der Welt gemessen werden kann.” Vogl thereby crucially identifies the “Augenblick ihrer 
Installation” with the very moment when “der Globus eingewickelt ist in eine eigene Zeit” (Kluge and Vogl 268, 
my emphasis). 
 
25 See Koselleck, Begriffsgeschichten 205, and the Introduction to this dissertation.  
 
26 In this context, see especially the narratives in the section “Die Wende von Dezember 1941” in Tür an Tür 
mit einem anderen Leben, in which questions of time, possibility, lack of time and crisis are used as a kind of 
leitmotif. 
 
27 See Fore in his discussion of Kluge and Negt’s Geschichte und Eigensinn: “Instead of trying to keep pace with 
the breakneck speed of reality, we need to slow it down, to arrest and capture it so as to make it 
comprehensible. For Negt and Kluge, this inhibiting function is one of the defining virtues of poetic 
constructions, especially in the contemporary age of turbocapitalism” (Fore 33). 
 
28 This also explains the difference between planetarity in Kluge’s later fiction and earlier invocations of a world 
beyond the globe, for instance in Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang from 1973. Kluge there is not primarily 
concerned, I would argue, with a transcendental exercise in “thinking differently” or with what I have called 
above humanity’s epistemological estrangement from the globe. In Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang, in fact, 
there is no globe. The earth has been pulverized in the dystopian scenario of a Third World War: the planetary 
sphere provides the only refuge for the remainders of humanity. What is often at stake there, accordingly, is the 
displacement of a global logic into a realm beyond the globe or indeed the colonization of outer space. Andreas 
Huyssen, for instance, has argued that Kluge’s stories in Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang are “tales […], in 
which capitalism races through space in a state of permanent civil war, leaping from one galactic system to the 
next, always in search of raw materials, labor power, and the maximization of profit” (Twilight Memories 150). 
Though this motif of a colonization of outer space reappears in a few of Kluge’s later stories – see, for 
instance, “Dienstliche Erklärung eines Kundschafters” (CG I 208ff.) or “Politische Ökonomie der Sterne” (LT 
331f.) and “Projekt einer Sternensonde mit einer Geschwindigkeit von 0,9 c” (LT 355ff.) – in the 
overwhelming majority of them, and especially in Die Lücke, die der Teufel läßt and in Tür an Tür mit einem anderen 
Leben, the planetary manifests itself as that which is incommensurate with the globe, as a kind of estranging 
“other.” One could argue, then, that Kluge’s imagining the planet at two very different historical junctures is 
itself determined historically by two very different conceptions of a certain “end of politics.” In 1973, in an 
environment of global ideological conflict and nuclear threat, the prospect of “politics” – in a Schmittian sense 
– going full circle and completing itself in the political annihilation of the enemy as well as the concomitant 




after 1989, on the contrary, institutes a post-political order of an entirely different kind: one that still makes 
Kluge seek a reconfiguration of the globe, but not one that makes an escape from the globe an immediate 
necessity. One interesting question is to what extent Kluge’s thinking of planetarity might again be transformed 
in light of the catastrophic effects of climate change and the environmental problems on earth today. 
 
29 Friedman’s essay “Planetarity: Musing Modernist Studies,” published in the journal Modernism/modernity in 
2010, is one of the most comprehensive statements advocating a planetary approach in the humanities. Though 
Friedman is primarily concerned with planetarity in its relation to the question of modernity and in the field of 
English Studies, her article resonates strongly with Kluge’s work too. Calling for a “transformational planetary 
epistemology” (474), Friedman argues that such a “planetary epistemology […] needs to be relational” (477). 
“A relational epistemology,” she writes, “allows us to see the globe afresh, to see that modernity which is not 
one, to see modernity in its multiple and diverse forms in the geohistory of the world” (480). “A planetary 
aesthetics […] needs to be transformative rather than merely additive” (487). Referring to practices such as 
“collage” – an “archive of radical juxtaposition [that] […] establishes a montage of differences where the 
putting side by side illuminates those differences at the same time that it spotlights commonalities” – Friedman 
argues that planetarity “in its very name invokes the Earth in deep time. […] The critical practices of re-vision, 
recovery, circulation, and collage can examine the meanings of the non-human world for the human and the 
interactions of human modernities with the Earth as a planet in the cosmos.” With “human modernities a mere 
parenthesis within nature’s geohistory,” Friedman proposes “to examine the intersection of human modernities 
with the earth’s non-human species, diversities, and cosmic rhythms” (493). I will comment below both on the 
relationship of this kind of anti-anthropocentrism to the notion of human praxis and on the question of 
modernity and globalization.  
 
30 The notion of Unterscheidungsvermögen, or a “capacity to differentiate,” is ubiquitous throughout Kluge’s 
fictional and theoretical work, including Maßverhältnisse des Politischen and the Frankfurter Poetikvorlesungen. 
 
31 In a wide-ranging article titled “Kluge’s Auswege,” Stefanie Harris argues that the “idea of Auswege – at the 
level of the experience as well as the representation and conceptualization of historical events – is at the core of 
Kluge’s multimedia project” (Harris 295). “Kluge’s concept of Auswege,” she writes, “is a persistent thematic 
element and formal term that the author employs to offer exits or flights of possibility from a consensus that 
would normalize feeling, thought, and judgment” (295). Underscoring my argument that Kluge is concerned 
less with proposing concrete alternatives than with an imperative to think differently, Harris suggests that 
“[not] simply a counteraction or counterstatement, Auswege describes a process of representation/depiction that 
would serve as the reader’s point of departure to reimagine the present” (296). They “are oppositional formal 
strategies that seek to open an Erzählraum in which understanding has not been prescribed or decided yet” 
(307). 
  
32 It is worth mentioning here that Rancière’s model of a mutual imbrication of politics and aesthetics, by which 
an aesthetics of politics can be countered by a politics of aesthetics, is fundamentally different from Walter 
Benjamin’s taxonomic, and rather vague, juxtaposition of a fascist aestheticization of politics and a progressive 
politicization of aesthetics. Rancière himself writes that “[there] is thus an ‘aesthetics’ at the core of politics that 
has nothing to do with Benjamin’s discussion of the ‘aestheticization of politics’ specific to the ‘age of the 
masses’” (Politics of Aesthetics 13). 
 
33 Kluge’s emphatic conception of subjectivity here is also a radical disavowal of different forms of anti-
humanism in recent discourses in the humanities. 
 
34 Cf. Adorno’s assertion “Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen” (Minima Moralia 43). 
 
35 Cf. Brecht’s polemic in the famous poem “Die Lösung”: “Wäre es da / Nicht doch einfacher, die Regierung 
/ Löste das Volk auf und / Wählte ein anderes?” (Brecht 404). 
 
36 At a conference on the work of Kluge that was held in the Belgian city of Liège in December 2013, Thomas 
Elsaesser warned against a kind of “ventriloquism” in critical analyses of Kluge’s work, which would confine 
itself to the mere regurgitation of Kluge’s own – and often well-rehearsed – terms and positions. My attempt to 




Laclau) – rather than, for instance, within the orbit of the Frankfurt School – is also an attempt at honoring this 
imperative. 
  
37 Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of hegemony is crucially informed by the work of Antonio Gramsci. See 
especially the latter’s Prison Notebooks. 
 
38 “In the context of this discussion, we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements 
such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from 
the articulatory practice, we will call discourse” (Laclau and Mouffe 105). 
 
39 See Laclau and Mouffe 186; Marchart 118-151. 
 
40 See Huyssen: “[The] reader never knows whether or with what to identify, which is, of course, exactly what 
Kluge intends” (Twilight Memories 146). 
 
41 Of course, not all of Kluge’s stories are about questions of society, politics, and power. But, I would argue, a 
vast number of them are. It is with attempts at instituting or dis-articulating forms of social and political order 
that many of Kluge’s narratives, and the characters in them, are concerned. 
 
42 As far as the tone of all this is concerned, one could in a critical spirit remark that rather than Kluge letting 
speak his characters, everybody – Enlightenment philosopher and everyman, neocon and extraterrestrial – 
speaks like Kluge. 
 
43 I will further expand on this issue in the following section of this chapter. 
 
44 Sven Hanuschek has argued that “Kluges Blick ist der eines Polyhistors, auf allen Gebieten” (Hanuschek 42). 
“Als ‘geübter wissenschaftlich-anarchistischer Mensch’, als den Kluge sich sieht, zeigt sich seine Polyhistorie 
nicht interessiert an einer Einteilung in Einzeldisziplinen, offensichtlich folgt sie anderen Motiven” (43). 
Pointing to a “beiordnende Montage, die nur zurückhaltend Rezeptionslenkung betreibt” (45) and to a 
“dezentrierte Montage der einzelnen Teile” without an “übergeordnete ‘auktoriale’ Instanz” (44), Hanuschek 
significantly argues that “Polyhistoren haben keine hierarchisierende Sicht auf die Welt, sie pflegen einen 
erzdemokratischen Umgang mit dem Wissen um Teil und Ganzes” (43, my emphasis). 
 
45 See Stiegler 57. 
 
46 Kluge’s television and, increasingly, online work through his production company DCTP – which I have not 
addressed here – can be seen in this context. Though without question an important aspect of Kluge’s work in 
the context of globalization, a discussion of his project in its multi-media dimension would both shift the focus 
of my analysis in a different direction and decisively exceed the scope of this chapter. 
 
47 In this context, see also Appadurai’s notion of “a shift in recent decades, […] in which the imagination has 
become a collective, social fact” in his Modernity at Large (Appadurai 5). 
!
48 The notion of a “Baustelle,” incidentally, is another clear marker of a post-foundational concept of 
production, construction, or articulation. The attempt – metaphorically speaking – to build something is made 
in recognition of both the contingency of the ground on which it is built and the possibility of its later 
disassembling. 
   
49 By verticality I refer to the appearance of a radical, and unmediated, moment of rupture in the present 
condition, something that has also been labeled in recent political philosophy the revolutionary “event” that 
completely does away with an existing framework for political praxis. 
 
50 For a critique of Hardt and Negri’s conception of the multitude – especially in its messianic dimension – 
from a post-foundationalist point of view, see for instance Mouffe’s Exodus und Stellungskrieg, Marchart’s 





51 This is not to suggest that these aspects are absent from Hardt and Negri’s work. There are, indeed, 
significant overlaps between their own and Kluge’s rhetoric. In Multitude, for example, Hardt and Negri – in a 
precise echo of Kluge’s notions of “Netzwerk” and “Berührungsfläche” – speak of “new circuits of 
cooperation and collaboration that stretch across nations and continents and allow an unlimited number of 
encounters […]. The multitude […] might thus be conceived as a network” (Multitude xiii). They too argue that 
labor “must refer to human creative capacities in all their generality” (105) and contend that “‘immaterial labor,’ 
that is, labor that creates immaterial products, such as knowledge, information, communication, a relationship, 
or an emotional response” (108) has become increasingly important as the role of industrial labor has waned. In 
Empire, they point to the “creative forces of the multitude” that are “capable of […] constructing a counter-
Empire” (Empire xv), to “the multitude [as] the real productive force of our social world” (62), to “the 
productive cooperation of mass intellectuality and affective networks” (413), and to “immaterial labor and 
cooperation” as the “dominant productive force” (385). Hardt and Negri mention “the critical powers of labor 
and the everyday passional wisdom of the affects” (358): “The scientific, affective, and linguistic forces of the 
multitude aggressively transform the conditions of social production” (366). “The central role previously 
occupied by the labor power of mass factory workers […] is today increasingly filled by intellectual, immaterial 
and communicative labor power,” they write (29). In Hardt and Negri’s view, thereby, the “intense relationship 
of mutual implication of all social forces” (24f.) in Empire creates a new paradigm of production in which 
formerly differentiated spheres now all contribute together to the “production of social reality” (22). “This 
radical transformation of labor power and the incorporation of science, communication, and language into 
productive force have redefined the entire phenomenology of labor and the entire world horizon of 
production” (364). With the role of immaterial labor sharply increased, accordingly, what Hardt and Negri call 
“virtuality” comes to play an ever more important role: “By the virtual we understand the set of powers to act 
(being, loving, transforming, creating) that reside in the multitude. […] Now we have to investigate how the 
virtual can put pressure on the borders of the possible, and thus touch on the real. The passage from the virtual 
through the possible to the real is the fundamental act of creation. Living labor is what constructs the 
passageway from the virtual to the real; it is the vehicle of possibility. […] Labor is productive excess with 
respect to the existing order and the rules of its reproduction. This productive excess is at once the result of a 
collective force of emancipation and the substance of the new social virtuality of labor’s productive and 
liberatory capacities” (357). All these passages, I would argue, are profoundly Klugian in rhetoric and 
sentiment. 
 
52 See Laclau and Mouffe 67. 
 
53 Andreas Huyssen has significantly argued that “the discursive return of modernity captures something in the 
dialectics of globalization, whose aporetic mix of destruction and creation, so reminiscent of modernity in the 






FUTURITY, TRANSFORMATION, AND THE POLITICS OF POIEIN 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Kunst ist tatsächlich die Welt noch einmal, dieser so gleich wie ungleich. 
- Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 
Like many dissertations, mine too was born out of the confluence of a theoretical position 
with a – more elusive perhaps – aesthetic sensibility. Much of this will have become 
transparent over the preceding roughly 240 pages, but it may still be worthwhile to retrace 
briefly some of the key steps of my argument here, and to elucidate a little further the inner 
architectonics and – without being too deterministic – something like the narrative arc of 
this study. This will also allow me to bring to the fore once again the question of the fate of 
futurity in late modernity, of art and transformation, and of what the meaning could be of a 
politics of aesthetic production in the 21st century. 
 
The underlying question, in each chapter of this dissertation, was the same: What, I asked, 
happens to the constitute promise of modernity – that history can be made and an open 
future be shaped through transformative human praxis – at a historical juncture when our 
capacity to imagine the future seems exhausted, when the forces of techno-economic hyper-
acceleration and systemic autonomization put under enormous pressure the principles of 
human agency and self-determination? And how is this problematic of what I have called 
here late modernity negotiated in works of art? One answer, I suggested, was to be found in 
a conspicuous formal development in the work of the modernist authors Theo Angelopoulos, 
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Heiner Müller and Alexander Kluge. It is through a transformation of chronotopes – a shift 
in the formal articulation of time and space – that the precarious status of modernity’s 
promise becomes legible in their fiction, films and poetry. 
 On a first level, then, form emerged as the sedimentation of a particular social-
historical content, as the aesthetic expression of a contemporary historical formation and its 
attendant regimes of time and space. These manifested themselves in the work of all three 
authors in form of a decisive shrinking of the historical terrain, a radical narrowing of the 
conditions of possibility for transformative and self-determined human praxis. 
Angelopoulos’s sequence shots in the 1980s and after bespoke a voiding of historical time, 
the transition from a contested political history to a timeless state of existential alienation, 
the future vanishing, the present but an echo chamber of historical defeat, the past a 
memory of a history gone wrong or else the projection plane for a nostalgic longing that 
must remain perpetually unfulfilled. Müller’s poetry in the period around and after 1989 
articulated this epochal moment as the epitome of a catastrophic space of experience, with 
no horizon of expectation in sight. Marked by Müller’s terminal illness and his impending 
death, the post-Wende years were represented as a moment of calamity: the movements of 
chronological time, progress, growth and accumulation – historical as much as existential – 
became synonymous with death, decay, and catastrophe. In Kluge’s fiction of the 21st 
century, the expansive trajectories of globalization, paradoxically, often went hand in hand 
with a foreclosure of historical time, as processes of acceleration, technologization and 
systemic autonomization undermined humanity’s aspiration to shape its own destiny in the 
world. No matter how much one would want to object to the profound negativity of such 
scenarios, the chronotopes in the work of all three authors nevertheless encapsulate, I would 
argue, essential aspects of late modernity’s temporal regime, marked as it is by a waning 
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sense of the future, by the paradoxical enmeshment of acceleration and stasis, and by a 
widespread exhaustion of the capacity and the desire to imagine a different, and better, world 
than ours today. 
 Importantly, however, this is only one part of the story. For Angelopoulos, Müller 
and Kluge also produce new chronotopes that instantiate different models of time: 
antagonistic times, counter-times, ästhetische Eigenzeiten directed against the dominant models 
of time in late modernity. And so if late modernity is marked by an absence of routes to 
what Axel Honneth has called “innerweltliche Transzendenz”1, then it is precisely such a 
form of transcendence that Angelopoulos, Müller and Kluge aim for: the insertion of a 
temporal brèche, that is, into a present that is perceived as deeply out of sync with the 
historical promise of modernity. What manifests itself here is an aesthetic “politics of time” 
in the very sense Peter Osborne uses the term, as a “politics which takes the temporal 
structures of social practices as the specific objects of its transformative (or preservative) 
intent” (Osborne xii). The concept of a transformation of chronotopes, then, does not 
simply designate the shift to a late-modern regime of time – form as the sedimentation of 
content – but also – form as Eigenzeit and antagonism – a disavowal of the very models of 
temporality and historicity brought about by late modernity. “Innerweltliche Transzendenz,” 
in this sense, is nothing other than a different name for “futurity,” as the aesthetic trans-
formation, in this specific instance, of the present. 
 
The question of futurity – as both a political problematic and a specifically literary property – 
has come to prominence in recent years in the work of the German Studies scholars Leslie 
A. Adelson and Amir Eshel. Adelson, in her introduction to the matter in a special issue of 
The Germanic Review titled “Futurity Now,” notes that “the future has emerged, in Germany 
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and elsewhere, as a growing problem in thought” (“Futurity Now” 216). “If futurity has 
been a defining structural feature of European modernity in its traditional sense,” Adelson 
contends, “and if concepts of modernity are changing and proliferating in our time, then it 
stands to reason that new functions and structures of futurity will emerge as well” (217). 
“Futurity,” in this sense, is above all “an analytical tool rather than a temporal domain” 
(216), “a critical concept – however one chooses to define it” (214). Though Adelson also 
offers case studies of her own, her tentative definition of what constitutes futurity is 
deliberately indeterminate and presents the latter as a field of research that has yet to be 
staked out in future inquiry. For Adelson, “‘futurity’ denotes a broad range of aesthetic 
practices in contemporary literature that revolve around the future in some still undefined 
ways – practices for which we do not yet have the kind of sophisticated critical vocabulary 
applied to memorial cultures and the historical past in literary guise” (“Future of Futurity” 
155). It is as part of this endeavor, too, that I conceive of my own dissertation. 
 Eshel, in his book-length study Futurity: Contemporary Literature and the Quest for the 
Past, argues that futurity is neither “the artistic celebration of modernity’s technological 
forward thrust […] [nor] […] the promotion of a utopian future in which modern, economic 
and political contingencies are resolved in a conclusive manner. Rather,” Eshel contends, 
drawing on the Neopragmatism of Richard Rorty and others, “futurity marks the potential 
of literature to widen the language and to expand the pool of idioms we employ in making 
sense of what has occurred while imagining whom [sic] we may become” (Eshel 5). The 
“poetic movement towards the future,” for Eshel, “is composed of different elements”: 
vocabularies that “[keep] the world ‘full of possibilities;’” the presentation of “ethically and 
politically ambivalent situations” that “help to open possibilities for the future by inviting us 
to debate;” “uncertainty and skepticism about our ability to shape our future,” which helps 
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in turn to “examine the human action necessary to overcome this doubt.” Contemporary 
literature, Eshel states, “creates the ‘open, future, possible’ by expanding our vocabularies, by 
probing the human ability to act, and by prompting reflection and debate. I call these 
capacities of contemporary literature ‘futurity’” (4).  
 Though Eshel’s and my own understanding of futurity often converge in important 
ways, certain elements of his conception of the term are at once too expansive and not 
expansive enough when applied to the question of what would constitute a political aesthetic: 
Too expansive because the criteria Eshel mentions are so general in scope and can be 
applied to such a vast number of literary – and non-literary – texts that the category of 
futurity becomes almost completely diluted; not expansive enough, however, because Eshel’s 
emphasis on content, meaning, debate, and the lessons to be learned – literature’s potential, 
in his approving paraphrase of Rorty, for “inspiring ‘new patterns of action’” (8) – ultimately 
locates the political and the transformative aspects of literature in a realm extraneous to the 
properly literary itself. Importantly, in addition, in its focus on past events as a point of 
orientation for future praxis, Eshel’s model of literature as a medium of historical learning is 
predicated on a concept of historia magistra vitae that the very temporal regime of modernity – 
with its rupture between Erfahrungsraum and Erwartungshorizont – has largely invalidated.2 The 
notion of a political aesthetic, accordingly, suggests something in the medium of form that 
would be both more intrinsically and more immediately transformative in its effects. 
 What I am gesturing towards here is something akin to Stathis Gourgouris’s 
capacious understanding of the politics of poiein. In his Lessons in Secular Criticism, Gourgouris 
speaks of “the language of poiēsis in its most distilled meaning, that is, the capacity of human 
beings to alter radically the forms and structures they inherit” (xvii). “The range of poiein,” 
Gourgouris argues, “includes not merely the art of making but the art of forming (thereby, 
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within the domain of history, transforming)” (7). For him, the “political substance of poiein is 
thus not signified just by its constitutively transformative power, which would be a mere 
abstraction, but by the fact that in its ancient meaning, it pertains to humanity’s immanent 
(even if perpetually self-altering) encounter with the world” (11). “Poiētic thinking,” 
importantly thereby, “does not seek to absolve the world of its uncertainties, does not seek 
the incontestable, but submits its knowledge to the precariousness of living beings making 
history” (24). We return here to what I have called in the introduction to this dissertation the 
constitutive promise of modernity and a sense of our – and art’s – being-in-history. Poiesis, 
Gourgouris suggests in a different place, is “a performative indication of how encountering 
the world is a creative/destructive intervention, an alteration of the framework of every such 
encounter” (Does Literature Think? xiv). This form of what he labels “secular criticism” is 
“not a theory but a practice – an experimental, often interrogative practice […]” (Lessons 13). 
“It’s not that it doesn’t involve the rational and the analytic […], but it certainly exceeds 
them because it deals with imagining things, with things that may be presently impossible” 
(25). In his reading of Aristotle’s famous assertion that “[with] respect to the requirements of 
art, a probable impossibility is always preferable to an improbable possibility” (25f.), 
accordingly, Gourgouris stresses this aspect of the impossible: “The great poets,” he contends, 
“are distinguished precisely in that they can bring the impossible within their dynamic range, 
their poiētic power” (27). This is particularly relevant in moments of large-scale historical 
crisis, in times – as I have suggested in my own reading of our present – when shared 
horizons for transformative praxis seem to have shrunk. “Not all impossibles or 
impossibilities are the same,” Gourgouris states. “It is those impossibilities that somehow 
enable us to shape reality more profoundly – those impossibilities that matter to reality, that 
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are critical to reality, that bring reality to judgment, to krisis – that give art (poiēsis) its 
existentially altering, its political meaning” (27). 
 Such probable impossibilities, then, are the ultimate horizon for the notion of a 
political aesthetic. Indeed, if we are to take the term seriously – in its transformative and 
transgressive ambition – we cannot fully disengage the concept of a political aesthetic from a 
more radical understanding of the conjunction of aesthetics and politics, of what constitutes 
the politics in poiein. My insistence on this, however, is also tempered – and profoundly so – 
by a skepticism about the feasibility of such an emphatic proposition amid the radical 
functional differentiation of late modern societies, amid the de-synchronization of human 
praxis on the one hand and systemic activity on the other, and amid pervasive trajectories of 
systemic autonomization today. I do not mean to advocate here, of course, for a kind of 
Romantic anti-modernism, a left melancholia, or even a retreat to the Grand Hotel Abyss, 
but one cannot ignore the enormous pressures the current social-historical formation puts 
on notions of transformation and transgression, let alone on the conjunction of aesthetics 
and politics. It is no contradiction, consequently, that political aesthetics can encompass 
oeuvres as fundamentally different as those, for instance, of Angelopoulos and Kluge. 
Political aesthetics is a plural term. 
 
This plurality and polysemy of contemporary – and specifically modernist – forms of 
political aesthetics was a key concern of this dissertation. The notion of a transformation of 
chronotopes, then, forms part of a wider nexus in which what comes together are different 
legacies for thinking aesthetics and politics, particular models of futurity, and specific 
conceptions of a politics of aesthetic production. There is an intrinsic connection, in the 
work of Angelopoulos, between an Adornian accent, a disavowal of the future, and an 
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aesthetics of autonomy. The same nexus crystallizes itself in the work of Müller in form of a 
recourse to Benjamin, a messianic model of futurity, and a notion of art as the carrier for an 
as yet indeterminate future-to-come. In Kluge, finally, an optimistic view of an open future 
coincides with an updated form of a production aesthetic and a poetic model of radical 
democracy that could be argued to have its roots in a position akin to that of Gramsci. That 
the work of all three authors is also anschlussfähig to the thinking of a wide range of 
contemporary interlocutors – the champions of posthistoire, the standard bearers of late 
Marxism, Agamben and Derrida, Spivak, Rancière, Mouffe, Laclau and Virno – further 
underlines the internal multiplicity of modernist political aesthetics in late modernity. 
 My own assessment of the three projects I have discussed here is also tinged by my 
ambivalence about the feasibility of a radically transformative political aesthetic in late 
modernity. And so, once again, it is no contradiction that I would embrace both 
Angelopoulos’s work and Kluge’s – the two ends of the spectrum represented in this study – 
as viable responses to the problematic of keeping time in place. This is a matter of theoretical 
positioning as much as of aesthetic sensibility. I am drawn to Kluge’s historical optimism, to 
his forward-looking vision of a planetary, and democratic, modernity. But I equally admire 
the consistency, sincerity and seriousness of Angelopoulos’s position, his commitment, in 
the face of a perceived historical defeat, to the potency of art as society’s dialectical other. I 
am less sure, I believe, about Müller’s work. His late poetry is often deeply compelling, and 
has an almost visceral quality. But in many ways it also wavers inconclusively between 
unmitigated catastrophism and a stubborn avowal of futurity – an extreme and potentially 
even productive tension that Müller, however, tries to resolve with a kind of political-
aesthetic messianism that I personally find rather unconvincing. Ultimately, the underlying 
structure of this study or what one could call the narrative arc of this dissertation – despite 
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all my reservations – nevertheless give an optimistic account of the scope and possibilities of 
a modernist political aesthetic in late modernity. I do not want to be too deterministic; nor 
should Angelopoulos, Müller and Kluge be seen as fully paradigmatic figures for different 
historical moments within late modernity itself. But the dissertation does move from the 
early 1980s through the crucial historical juncture around 1989 to the present day, and the 
trajectory I suggest here is also one that leads from aporia to ambivalence and then to the 
avowal of futurity, from a historically pessimistic aesthetics of autonomy to a much more 
emphatic notion of what a political aesthetic can be, and what art can do, in the 21st century.  
 
In light of this diversity of responses to the same overarching social-historical and aesthetic 
problematic, it is intriguing that both Angelopoulos and Kluge, in books devoted to their 
work, have been labeled “the last modernist.”3 This phenomenon can be interpreted in two, 
mutually contradictory, ways. Either the proliferation of last modernists is an unmistakable 
sign for modernism’s truly precarious status in the world today; or, however, there is 
something premature about its many obituaries: if, that is, there is more than one last 
modernist, then perhaps modernism can last a little longer. It is also in this latter spirit that I 
submit this study – in the hope, not least, that modernism still constitutes a valid framework 
for an engagement with the present, that to consider our own historical moment through the 





1 See Rosa, Beschleunigung und Entfremdung 74. 
 
2 See especially Koselleck’s essay “Historia Magistra Vitae. Über die Auflösung des Topos im Horizont 
neuzeitlich bewegter Geschichte” (Vergangene Zukunft 38-66). 
 
3 See Horton and Lutze, respectively. Other candidates on a long list of figures include Beckett and Burroughs, 
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